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General synopsis 
With 11,2 % of the labour force unemployed in the Com-
munity in 1985, the economic crisis has taken a heavy toll. 
Unemployment in the Community is much higher than in 
the United States (7,3 %) and especially Japan (2,5 %), and 
there is no sign of it falling in the near future. Within the 
Community, conditions in the different sectors of activity are 
a source of even greater despondency. Since the beginning of 
the 1970s, most of the larger sectors of activity (agriculture, 
industry, construction) have significantly reduced their 
workforces. At the same time, services, especially those 
linked to general government, have, it is true, created milli-
ons of extra jobs, but still not enough to provide work for 
all those seeking work. Along with Japan, the United States, 
where the business cycle has fluctuated widely and a greater 
number of people have moved in and out of the labour 
force, has throughout demonstrated its ability to generate 
employment for the bulk of the population. Between 1972 
and 1982, for example, an extra 19 million people found 
jobs in the United States and an extra 6 million in Japan, 
whereas total employment in the Community rose by only 
60 OOO. 
This curtailing of the job-creation process, and its adverse 
impact on the development of unemployment, provides the 
most tangible evidence of the seriousness of the adjustmen·t 
crisis which is now facing the Community and which, when 
account is taken of developments in the main industrial 
areas of the world, is more European than global in nature. 
On the basis of a comparison of the economic performances 
in the Community, the United States and Japan, analysed 
by sector, the following chapters describe the main structural 
developments over the last 15 years and attempt to assess 
what the main explanatory factors have been. They also 
look at the situation in industry, the new economic role 
played by market services, and the impact of technological 
progress on structural change. The main conclusions present 
a consistent picture thus: 
(i) The Community has not performed as well as its trading 
partners in the growth sectors. i.e. those most closely 
linked to new technologies, and its competitiveness in 
those sectors has deteriorated both on world markets 
and on the internal market. 
(ii) In contrast, in the Community, the weak-demand sec-
tors. or those less subject to the pressures of international 
competition have maintained, if not improved their pos-
itions. This shift towards products less sensitive to a 
recovery in economic activity has contributed, to an 
important extent, to the worsening of the employment 
situation. 
General synopsis 
In the Community, the unsatisfactory allocation of the fac-
tors of production has become more marked. The diffusion 
of productivity and other gains through the production 
system has been hampered and the rate of job creation 
sharply curtailed. In the United States and especially in 
Japan, the 'exposed sectors' and the 'sheltered sectors' have 
played quite different roles, thereby ensuring a more satisfac-
tory overall economic performance; the former have concen-
trated on safeguarding their cost effectiveness and have 
launched a major investment drive, while the latter have 
recorded moderate productivity gains with an accompanying 
rise in employment. 
Chapter I : Competitiveness of European m-
dustry: situation to date 
Since 1973, the rate of growth of world demand for industrial 
products has slowed down, intensifying international compe-
tition as each manufacturer has endeavoured to hold on to 
or increase market shares. 
Demand for some manufactured products with a high new-
technology content has, however, been extremely firm, ex-
panding by 6-7 % a year in volume terms, or two to three 
times faster than demand for other products. Those 
countries well placed to meet this demand, particularly be-
cause of their competitive edge, were certain to enjoy a more 
satisfactory growth performance. 
An analysis of the performances of recent years shows clearly 
that Community industry has been unable to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered. In the case of the strong-
demand products, it has managed neither to satisfy fully the 
needs of European consumers, nor to expand its outlets 
worldwide. As a result, in terms of total internal demand in 
the Community, the rate of penetration by high-technology 
products from outside the Community rose from 7 % to 
17 % between 1972 and 1982, whilst over the same period 
the corresponding figures for the United States and Japan 
were 10 % and 5 % respectively. At the same time, in spite 
of an increased export drive, the Community's share of the 
world market contracted from 28 % in 1972 to 25,7 % in 
1982, while the shares accounted for by US and Japanese 
producers expanded. This resulted in a slow but steady fall 
in the cover ratio of Community imports by Community 
exports. Moreover although the import cover rate for Com-
munity industry remains high, the high-technology sectors 
are contributing less and less to trade surpluses. 
This analysis of trade flows paints a fairly accurate picture 
of conditions in European industry. In the high-technology 
sectors (electrical equipment and electronics, information 
s 
General synopsis 
technology and automated office machinery, precision and 
measuring equipment, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals), 
European products are not sufficiently competitive, and 
this has led to a growing import dependence on products 
manufactured in the United States, Japan and certain 
countries of South-East Asia and to less emphasis being 
placed on high-technology exports. On the other hand, Com-
munity producers perform best in markets for the more 
traditional, industrial, but weak-demand products, and they 
are concentrating more and more on exporting their prod-
ucts to areas where competition is less keen (other OECD 
countries, State-trading countries, OPEC countries). This 
increase in emphasis on products that are less sensitive to 
economic activity and that have a lower value-added content 
has, almost certainly, contributed to the lower growth rates 
observed in Europe and to a deterioration in the employment 
situation in industry. This is particularly worrying since the 
Community is more dependent on international trade than 
its partners. 
Chapter 2: The determinants of supply m m-
dustry in the Community 
This chapter attempts to find an explanation for the develop-
ments noted in Chapter I based in particular on a study of 
the allocation of the factors of production (labour and 
capital) in the three economic areas surveyed. 
It should first be noted that, not only is European industry 
poorly represented in the high-technology sectors but the 
latter are also growing more slowly in the Community than 
in its main trading partners. These sectors accounted for 
only 20 % of industrial value-added in the Community in 
1982, compared with just under 30 % in the United States 
and Japan. Over a JO-year period, they grew at an annual 
rate in volume terms of 3,3 %, compared with 3,7 % in 
the United States and 12,2 % in Japan. The situation is 
deteriorating further, especially as demand for these prod-
ucts remains sluggish. 
An initial analysis, even at the sectoral level, of the trends 
of labour costs and capital accumulation in the three areas 
reveals marked differences. Although it is still not possible 
to establish any direct causal relationships, the divergences 
observed throw some light on the reasons why the crisis in 
the Community is so deep-seated. 
Taking comparative labour costs, for example, the sectoral 
data available highlight a series of major structural differ-
ences between the Community, the United States and Japan: 
(i) For any particular occupational category, differences in 
hourly labour costs within manufacturing in the Com-
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(ii) 
munity are slight, whichever Member State we look at; 
the dispersion is, in fact, half that observed in the United 
States or Japan. 
Over time, this wage dispersion has tended to narrow, 
particularly in countries providing a guaranteed mini-
mum wage or applying inflation indexing to wages. 
(iii) The rigidity of employment between sectors is also more 
marked in the Community countries, while individuals 
in the United States and Japan have found it easier 
to move between sectors, given the prospect of higher 
earnings for the same level of occupational skill. 
Movements in labour costs since 1973 are also highly instruc-
tive in this respect: 
(i) During the period 1973-82, growth in real wages per 
capita in European industry (2,9 % a year on average) 
was mid-way between that in the United States (1,1 %) 
and Japan (4,2 %). Between 1982 and 1985, however, 
there has been an unmistakable slowdown in real wage 
increases per capita in Community industry ( 1,2 % a 
year on average), unlike in the United States and Japan, 
where the trend discernible in the preceding period has 
continued (1,7 % and 4,7 % respectively). 
(ii) The trend in real unit labour costs (defined as the ratio 
of real wages to productivity) differs a great deal between 
sectors. The weaker the demand that a particular sector 
has experienced, the more unfavourable the situation 
has become. Even so, the disparities in unit labour costs 
between sectors are much more pronounced in Japanese 
industry than in Community industry. Taking the period 
1973-82, the disparity in the growth of unit labour costs 
between strong-demand and weak-demand sectors was 
7,1 % a year on average in Japan and 1,6 % in the 
Community. Cost performances in the weak-demand 
sectors are much the same in the Community as in the 
United States and Japan. As a result, Japanese industry 
enjoys a significant cost advantage in the high-tech-
nology, strong-demand sectors. 
(iii) Expressed in terms of a common currency, changes in 
relative unit labour costs can be amply explained by 
exchange rate movements. The reversal in trend that 
took place in 1980 was due to the fact that. between 
1974 and 1980, the ECU appreciated markedly against 
its trading partners' currencies before depreciating again. 
In 1985, relative labour costs in the Community, ex-
pressed in terms of a common currency, are estimated 
to be 28,7 % lower in the Community than they were in 
1980, whereas they have risen sharply in the United 
States (by 50,5 % over the same period). In Japan, 
they have fallen by only 1,3 %. The Community's cost 
competitiveness has thus improved appreciably. How-
ever, this position could be jeopardized if the present 
decline in the value of the dollar continues. 
The recent improvement in real labour costs in industry in 
the Community (discernible since 1982) has resulted in a 
perceptible revival of industrial investment although this has 
by no means closed the investment gap that exists between 
the Community, on the one hand, and the United States 
and Japan, on the other. Not only had industrial investment 
in Europe fallen to a low level but the sectoral allocation 
of investment by sector of activity has created problems. 
Between 1972 and 1982, the growth of gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) for industry as a whole was 3,9 percent-
age points lower in the Community than in the United States, 
and 3,5 percentage points lower than in Japan. However, on 
examining the performance of strong-demand sector.s during 
the same period, it will be seen that the disparity in annual 
growth rates for GFCF was 6,8 percentage points as between 
the Community and the United States and 4,9 points as 
between the Community and Japan. This can be put down 
to a combination of factors: 
(i) The gross rate of return on capital in industry fell more 
markedly in the Community than in the United States 
or Japan, and, moreover,it was in the pace-setting sec-
tors (high technology and strong demand) that the de-
cline was largest. Furthermore, in terms of levels, the 
gross rate of return on capital is probably lower in 
Europe, in the high-technology sectors, than in the other 
types of sector although in the United States or Japan 
profitability in these sectors is consistently higher than 
the average for industry. 
(ii) The appreciable fall in profitability itself results in part 
from a decline in capital productivity due to a reduction 
in working hours, which has not always been offset by 
a more intensive utilization of equipment and by the fall 
in rate of capacity utilization between 1973 and 1982. 
Faced with falling profits, firms have endeavoured to reduce 
their wage bill and to cut back on investment. This lacklustre 
investment performance in Europe explains the weakness of 
the growth of the capital stock which has thus become old 
more quickly in Europe than in the United States or, above 
all, in Japan. 
The pace of modernization of the structure of production 
has thus slowed down and the substitution of capital for 
labour. which has taken place in European industry. al-
though more rapid than in the United States was less than 
in Japan. and was accompanied by even greater reductions 
in industrial employment. 
General synopsis 
An analysis of the trend of total factor productivity clearly 
illustrates the importance of the substitution process. In the 
weak-demand sectors, the increase in per capita productivity 
is due essentially to capital/labour substitution while, in the 
high-technology sectors, the rate of technological progress 
is the determining factor. 
As a result, comparisons of the growth in total factor pro-
ductivity as between the main economic areas (which can 
be likened to a measure of technological progress) is particu-
larly instructive. The characteristics of Japanese industry are 
noticeably different from those in the other two economic 
areas and show clearly the priority accorded to high-tech-
nology sectors in Japan. The disparity in the growth of total 
factor productivity between the Community and Japan is 
pronounced in the high0 technology sectors (with a growth 
rate of 8,1 % in Japan as against 2,6 % in the Community) 
and quite small in the moderate-demand sectors (growth of 
1,8 % as against 1,3 %) whilst in the weak-demand sectors, 
Community industry is actually better placed than Japanese 
industry (0, 7 % as against 0, I % ). 
Community industry thus appears to be having some diffi-
culty in assimilating technological innovations in the most 
dynamic sectors. This is all the more worrying as the invest-
ment trend in the Community is particularly unfavourable 
in these sectors when contrasted with the situation in the 
United States or Japan. 
Chapter 3: The development of market services 
in the European Community, the 
United States and Japan 
This chapter looks at the growing contribution being made 
by the market services sector to economic activity as a whole, 
in particular as indicated by an analysis of changes in the 
structure of value-added, employment and investment. This 
change is clearly confirmed for the Community and the 
United States but is less certain in Japan, (leaving aside 
the marked increase in service sector employment) where 
industry is becoming increasingly more important and con-
tinues to maintain a vigorous performance. 
Nevertheless. the information available does not appear to 
bear out the idea that a de-industrialization process is under 
way in the major Western economies. Two main findings 
emerge: 
(i) Alongside the appearance of new services linked to tech-
nological progress. an extensive reallocation of certain 
activities previously carried on by industry to the service 
sector is taking place. This is confirmed by the increased 
7 
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importance in all countries of the activity branch 'Busi-
ness services provided to enterprises'. This change in 
structure is also typified by the extent to which the 
leasing of plant and machinery and other investments 
to industry by service firms has expanded. Such invest-
ments are recorded in services but affect industrial 
output. 
(ii) The key determinant of the growth of market services 
is demand by industry. It has been established that this 
finding, which it has been possible to test only for the 
Member States, holds good regardless of the particular 
Member State considered. In the Community of Six, for 
example, the first of the factors determining the growth 
of services appears to have been the increase in the 
consumption of services by industry, the second being 
the consumption of services by the service sector itself, 
and the third the final consumption of households (the 
growth in exports of services has been even more buoy-
ant than industrial demand, but exports account for less 
than 8 % of total activity in the service sector). 
The expansion of the service sector, which plays a key role 
in the creation of new jobs (5, I million extra jobs created in 
the Community between 1970 and 1982), is thus closely tied 
up with the expansion of industry. The stronger and more 
competitive industry in the Community, the greater the 
contribution made by the service sector to assuring a satis-
factory and balanced economic performance. As the service 
sector is made up largely of dynamic and innovative small 
and medium-sized businesses, it can provide the industrial 
fabric in Europe with the degree of flexibility which, accord-
ing to the analysis made in Chapter 2, it appears to have 
lacked. 
Chapter 4: Technological progress, structural 
change and employment 
This chapter is somewhat different in nature from the other 
three. Abandoning the analytical approach, it attempts a 
more theoretical formulation of the relationships between 
research, product and process innovation, and structural 
adjustment and unemployment. 
The faster pace at which new information technologies are 
being introduced has led to falling employment in pro-
duction activities although, on examining job creation as-
sociated with new product innovation, there is no indication, 
for the OECD area as a whole, that technological change has 
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caused a net loss of jobs. The extent to which technological 
progress has created as well as suppressed jobs varies from 
one country to another, depending primarily on the recent 
trend in competitiveness and on the policy pursued with 
regard to research and new technologies. The Community 
is at present becoming less specialized exporting a whole 
range of products with a high intellectual and a high value-
added content, particularly to markets that are the most 
demanding technologically. 
Any hope of reducing long-term unemployment in the Com-
munity hinges on the latter's ability to encourage the devel-
opment of new products and such products. The direct 
employment potential of high-technology industries is very 
low, probably accounting for barely 5 % of total employ-
ment, but their multiplier effects on other sectors are signifi-
cant, especially where high-technology products are pro-
tected by intellectual property rights and international 
patents. The multiplier effects can, therefore, breathe fresh 
life into a large number of traditional production sectors, 
and the flexibility thereby brought about can have a major 
impact on regional development. 
Even so, the Community's relative decline will not be ar-
rested until such time as certain trends have been reversed: 
(i) Japan and the United States have mapped out long-term 
growth strategies based on an intensive programme of 
technological innovation. Such is not the case in the 
Community, where innovation, as a long-term determi-
nant of growth, is not taken into account sufficiently in 
economic policy-making. 
(ii) The level of civil R&D spending in real terms, in Japan, 
is considerably underestimated. If account is taken of 
the real cost of R&D in Japan and of the duplication of 
efforts in Europe, it is currently approaching the level 
for the Community as a whole. It is less a matter of 
the Community stepping up its R&D spending as a 
proportion of GDP, than of the Community exploiting 
its size to the full by maximizing the degree of interaction 
between national and Community programmes. 
(iii) The Community must endeavour therefore to harness 
its human, scientific and technical potential fully by 
concentrating more of its research effort on programmes 
with a high employment potential. 
(iv) The Community's capacity to assimilate innovation 
must be fostered by creating a social and economic 
environment conductive to the proliferation of intellec-
tual and risk capital. 
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Competitiveness of European industry: situation to date · " 
Introduction 
A country's industrial competitiveness rests on its ability to 
retain and expand its shares of world markets and to main-
tain a balance on its domestic market between imports and 
national output that is compatible with its export perform-
ance. This chapter looks at the trading performances of the 
Community, the United States and Japan since the first oil 
shock, sets out the findings arrived at and traces the broad 
trends shaping their growth prospects. 
The approach adopted in this chapter focuses on the fact 
that, against a background of sluggish economic growth 
since 1973 that has been punctuated by successive economic 
upheavals, there has been an overall contraction in the 
growth of demand from firms and consumers; however 
demand for a limited number of industrial products has 
remained very buoyant, with growth rates reminiscent of the 
1960s. In the face of such limited, yet dynamic opportunities, 
which were to expose them to stiffer international compe-
tition, the industrialized countries have had to speed up the 
process of adapting their productive systems. The more 
flexible, responsive to changes in the environment and inno-
vative they have become, the better they have been able 
to adjust to structural changes in the pattern of demand 
redirecting, in step with these changes, their means of pro.-
duction to the growth sectors of the economy. 
Thus for the Community, consolidation of future growth, 
and hence restoration of a higher level of employment in 
industry, depends on whether European firms are able to 
adapt to this changing pattern of demand. It is as if, relin-
quishing the strong positions it carved out coming to rely 
on less sophisticated products that are not so exposed to 
competition from the United States, Japan and the new 
producers in South-East Asia, but the demand for which is 
growing only sluggishly. The recent successes achieved by 
Europeans with some new technologies must not, however, 
be allowed to mask this general trend. The analysis made in 
this chapter brings clearly to light the dangerous slope down 
which European industry as a whole is now progressing. 
1. Trend of demand in industrialized countries 
The trend of domestic demand in the industrialized countries 
between 1972 and 1982 varied widely. Calculations in US 
dollars are made below for demand in nine industrialized 
countries, the nine being the United,States. Japan. Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom. Italy. Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Denmark, which together account for over 80 % 
of the OECD's industrial output. Domestic demand was 
ascertained in terms of supply, i.e. on the basis of output 
and imports and not of demand components (private con-
sumption, investment, etc.). This is because manufacturers 
compete with one another on their different home markets 
and in each country domestic demand is met by eithe; 
domestic or foreign manufacturers. 
The definition used is the conventional one: domestic de-
mand = share of domestic output intended for the home 
market + imports; in other words, domestic demand = 
output - exports + imports. Defined in this way, domestic 
demand (or apparent consumption) is a much broader con-
cept than final domestic demand since it also includes the 
intermediate consumption of enterprises and general govern-
ment. 
The annual growth in volume terms of domestic demand 
was obtained by deflating growth in value terms by the index 
of the prices of value-added in each sector. This is because 
no domestic demand deflator is generally available for each 
sector, but the comparisons made for the countries possess-
ing data on the trend of demand in volume terms have shown 
that the approximation achieved yields highly comparable 
results, especially over a long period. 
The analyses focus on industrial products generally, with 
agricultural and energy products thus being excluded. On 
the basis of an industrial breakdown by 13 sectors, it was 
possible to compare and classify them by reference to the 
growth rate of domestic demand in the I 0-year period 1972-
82.1 In order to analyse and compare the individual 
countries. the growth rate of demand in the entire area 
comprising the countries of the Community,2 the United 
States and Japan was calculated for each sector by weighting 
the growth in each country by domestic demand in respect 
of the sector in question expressed as a proportion of 
total domestic demand in the nine countries surveyed (see 
Table I). . . . 
1.1 The three categories of demand 
Taking the area made up by those nine countries, sectoral 
growth in domestic demand over the period 1978-82 falls 
into three clearly defined categories: strong demand, moder-
1 The average annual growth rate is calculated on the basis of data 
smoothed over two years: average for 1981-82 compared with avc:rage 
for 1972-73. 
' Throughout the text, unless otherwise stated, 'Community' should be 
un~erstood to refer to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the 
Umted Kingdom. Italy. the Netherlands. Belgium and Denmark, i.e. 
EUR 7. since full sectoral data have not been compiled for Ireland, 
Greece and Lullembourg. 
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ate demand, weak demand. These three categories will be 
systematically applied both in this chapter and in the ensuing 
chapter. Each industrial sector has thus been classified ac-
cording to the demand category to which it belongs. 
Strong-demand sectors: International demand in these sec-
tors (electrical equipment and electronics, information tech-
nology and automated office equipment, precision instru-
ments and chemicals and pharmaceuticals) expanded 
sharply, by an average of some 7 % in volume terms each 
year despite the general slowdown in economic activity. It 
did not experience any genuine downward trend even after 
the contraction in the growth of GDP associated with the 
oil shocks. 
Moderate-demand sectors: Demand in five sectors (rubber 
and plastics. transport equipment, paper pulp, packaging 
Table 1 
Growth of domestic demand in volume tenns (1982-72)1 
(in US dollars and at 1975 prices and exchange rates) 
(classification based on growth rate for the area as a whole) 
B DK 
Strong-demand sectors 6,0 3,9 
Electrical equipment and electronics 1,8 0,1 
Information technology. automated office 
equipment & precision instruments 6,8 7,1 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 8,3 5,0 
Moderate-demand sectors 2,5 1,6 
Rubber and plastics 8,0 0,0 
Transport equipment 2.8 -1,2 
Paper. pulp, packaging & printing l,l 1,1 
Food, drink and tobacco 2,2 3,1 
Industrial machinery 2,2 0,2 
D 
4,9 
3,5 
8,2 
5,1 
1,4 
4,1 
3,2 
1.1 
1,1 
0,2 
Weak-demand sectors 1.4 -0,l -0,1 
Misc. products 2,5 -1,0 -I.I 
Textiles, leather and clothing .0,8 1,1 -0,5 
Steel and metal ores 1.6 8,3 0,6 
Metal goods 1,8 0,6 0,3 
Construction materials, non-metallic min-
erals 1,5 .-3,0 0,4 
Total manufactured products 2,9 1,4 1,6 
and printing, food, drink and tobacco, and industrial ma-
chinery) showed little buoyancy, expanding by an average 
of 2 %-3 % a year. This category displays the most marked 
differences between the growth rates of domestic demand 
for each of the nine countries and those recorded by the 
area as a whole; the differences are particularly numerous 
in the case of the sectors producing capital goods. 
Weak-demand sectors: In these sectors, demand grew by 
between I % and 1,5 % a year during the period under 
review, with relatively minor differences between countries. 
This trend was discernible primarily in the intermediate 
industries (steel, metal ores and metal goods, building ma-
terials, miscellaneous industrial products, and the textile, 
leather and clothing industries). This category incudes all 
the traditional sectors with a high employment content, and 
it is here that the greatest number of jobs have been lost. 
(%) 
F NL UK EUR 7 USA Japan EUR 7 + 
USA+ 
Japan 
5,7 7,1 6,1 2,9 5,2 4,8 13,5 6,7 
5,9 4,3 5,4 0,6 3,7 5,5 15,1 7,7 
7,4 16,0 7,9 7,0 8,9 5,7 6,8 7,0 
4,9 7,7 6,9 3,9 5,5 3,7 11,8 6,4 
2,3 2,8 4,4 0,3 1,9 2,3 4,8 2,5 
3,5 1,6 6,9 0,8 3,2 5,0 1,2 3,5 
4,7 5,8 0,6 -0,3 3,2 1,4 7,l 2,9 
2,6 2,6 3,9 0,7 l,8 2,9 3,7 2,6 
1.5 4.0 5,8 1,2 2,0 1,7 3,8 2,2 
0,2 -1,0 4,0 -1,0 0.2 3.2 3,6 2,0 
-0,1 2,6 1,4 -2,l 0,2 0.5 3,0 l,l 
3,3 4,7 3,7 -1,6 1,3 1,8 l,4 1,5 
-0,9 2,7 -0,4 -0,3 0,2 1,5 2,7 1,2 
-0,7 3,5 -0,2 -0,7 0,7 -0,7 3,7 l,3 
-0,9 -0,2 2,2 -3,9 -0,5 -0,0 4,2 l,2 
2,2 3,7 2.3 -3,2 0,9 0,3 1,8 1,0 
2,3 3,5 3,8 -0,2 1.9 2,3 6,4 3.1 
I The average annual growth rate is calculated on the basis or data smoothed over two ycan: average for 1981-82 compared with average for 1972-73. 
S0uru1· Eurostat and Commission departments. 
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As mentioned above, the sectoral classification of the indi-
vidual countries diverges quite significantly from that of the 
entire area under review. Thus transport equipment should, 
if anything, be classified with the strong-demand sectors in 
Japan and in most European countries, while industrial 
machinery should, if anything, feature among the weak-
demand sectors in the Community (with the exception of 
the Netherlands). Nevertheless, the growth rate of demand 
in each sector should also be compared with that of industry 
as a whole, and in many cases the classification made is 
justified on this basis. Thus, the growth of domestic demand 
for food or industrial machinery has been considerable in 
Japan (averaging 3,8 % and 3,6 % a year respectively) but, 
compared with the growth rate of demand for industrialized 
products in Japan (averaging 6,4 % a year), these figures 
are still quite modest. 
Overall however, the classification of sectors based on data 
for the zone as a whole, is close to that obtained for each 
country separately, including those of medium size. 
1.2 The shifting pattern of demand m indus-
trialized countries 
Table I gives average changes in domestic sectoral demand· 
in volume terms in the period 1972-82, after adjusting for 
the impact of cyclical fluctuations. In some cases, demand 
is insensitive to general economic conditions while, in others, 
the latter are the determining influence on demand. 
Strong-demand sectors 
The sectors falling into this category are still by far those 
least affected by the fluctuations discernible in the industrial-
ized economies (see Graph I). Most remarkable is the 'infor-
mation technology, automated office equipment and pre-
cision instruments' sector, where the trend has remained 
practically unchanged since the early 1970s. It is interesting 
to note that information-technology requirements have 
grown more rapidly in Europe than in the United States or 
Japan. In terms of annual averages, domestic demand in the 
Community is reckoned to have risen by 8,9 % as against 
5,7 % in the United States and 6,8 % in Japan, with closely 
comparable figures being recorded in the different Member 
States (without exception, their performances have sur-
passed that of Japan). European firms in this sector have 
therefore invested heavily in new plant and machinery, the 
problem being to know whether supply has managed to keep 
pace with the sharp increase in demand. This sector has thus 
been unaffected by the crisis and represents a growing share 
of total domestic demand. Electrical engineering (electrical 
Trend of demand in industrialized countries 
equipment, heavy electrical plant) and electronics (consumer 
electronics, telecommunications equipment) present a some-
what different picture. Although the trend in this sectqr too 
has been virtually unaffected by general economic con-
ditions, considerable differences do exist between the leading 
industrialized countries. Growth in Europe (3,7 % a year) 
thus lags a long way behind that in Japan (averaging 15,1 % 
a year). 1 Furthermore, a closer analysis of the trends in 
world demand shows clearly that demand for electronic 
components and consumer electronics is continuing to ex-
pand while heavy electrical plant and electrical supplies and 
cables are experiencing some contraction in demand, which 
is being reflected in the characteristic demand curve for the 
entire 'electrical equipment and electronics' sector. 
In the chemical sector, a similar differentiation phenomenon 
is evident. While pharmaceuticals have been spared by the 
crisis, the petrochemical industry as a whole has suffered 
the backlash of higher oil prices. Growth in these sectors 
has not therefore followed a particularly steady path and, 
even if the long-term trend is sharply upwards, the demand 
for certain product categories can be more erratic. Buoyant 
growth on the chemicals market in the Community (5,5 % 
a year on average) and in Japan (11,8 %) contrasts with the 
modest growth in the United States (3,7 %). 
The feature common to this group of products, for which 
there is very strong demand, is their pronounced new-tech-
nology content, as can be clearly seen from a comparison 
of the list of strong-demand sectors with the OECD classifi-
cation of industries with a high-technology content. 2 
0 ECD classification of high-technology industries 
on the basis of the level of R&D spending 
(SITC nomenclature) 
I. Aerospace 
2. Information technology and automated office equipment 
3. Electronics 
4. Pharmaceuticals 
5. Precision and measuring instruments 
6. Electrical equipment 
1 The growth rate in Japan has probably been somewhat overestimated. 
Some of the most dynamic activities in this sector should appear in the 
'information technology/automated office equipment' sector, where the 
growth rate has been underestimated in Table I. 
OECD, Specia/isatio11 et competitil'ite des i11dustries manufacturieres en 
haute, moyenne et faible illle,rsite en R&D. Paris, October 1984. 
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Classification of strong-demand sectors• 
on the basis of domestic demand growth between 1972 and 
1982 (NACE nomenclature) 
I. Electrical equipment and electronics 
2. Information technology. automated office machinery, 
and precision and measuring equipment 
3. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
As pointed out in the OECD report, this group of industries 
on its own accounts for over 50 % of R&D spending by 
industry whereas it represents about one quarter of value-
added in industry in the Community, compared with around 
one third in the United States and Japan. There is very 
vigorous growth in the demand for the products manufac-
tured by these industries, which have other features in com-
mon too: large amount of R&D expenditure, very high 
investment risks, immense strategic importance at national 
level, a more rapid introduction of new products, and fierce 
compe\ition in the areas of production and marketing world-
wide. 
Moderate-demand sectors 
This grouping comprises sectors that differ a great deal both 
in terms of their role in the productive system and as regards 
type of customer. 
A more detailed disaggregation would be needed for the 
'transport equipment' sector. Shipbuilding, for example, has 
been severely hit by the crisis while aerospace emerged in 
much better shape. Lastly, there is the motor vehicle indus-
try, which, directly and indirectly, plays a major role in 
European industry and which, in the industrialized 
countries, has seen its growth rate fall below that recorded 
in the period 1960-73. The demand for motor vehicles is 
slackening and is now often confined to replacement pur-
chases, particularly in the United States. The Japanese dom-
estic market is the only one which continues to be sustained 
by some degree of buoyancy, and as a result it enjoys a not-
inconsiderable competitivite edge on export markets. 
Growth in the agri-food, drink and tobacco industries, which 
are directly dependent on private consumption and exports, 
has been modest (2,0 % a year) but has followed a very 
steady trend over time, having been hardly affected at all by 
the crisis. Domestic demand in two European countries, 
' Aerospace equipment should be included in this classification but could 
not be distinguished statistically from ·transport equipment' which is 
included in the moderate-demand sectors. 
14 
Italy and the Netherlands, has been firmer (4 % and 5,8 % 
respectively), reflecting the importance of these industries in 
their productive systems. 
The industrial machinery sector covers act1v1t1es ranging 
from machine tools to textile machinery, agricultural ma-
chinery, civil engineering equipment, handling equipment 
and miscellaneous items of mechanical equipment. It thus 
produces plant and machinery for the productive system, 
and the demand for such equipment is heavily dependent 
on the trend of gross fixed capital formation in industry. The 
scale of the investment problem facing European countries is 
clearly illustrated by the differences in the growth rate of 
demand in volume terms between Europe (0,2 %), the Un-
ited States (3,2 %) and Japan (3,6 %). 
Weak-demand sectors 
Demand in the textile, leather and clothing industries con-
tracted in volume terms between 1972 and 1982 in four of 
the nine countries for which sectoral statistics are available. 
This sector is characterized by a very sluggish trend rate 
of growth and by a quite marked sensitivity to economic 
recessions. Even in Japan and Italy, where the demand 
for textiles has remained more pronounced than elsewhere 
(rising by 2, 7 % a year compared with 2, I % in the area 
surveyed), a downturn in economic activity occurred after 
1979, bringing a significant fall in the growth rate. 
In many respects, the situation in the steel and metal goods 
sectors is quite similar to that in the textile industry, although 
both sectors experienced more pronounced fluctuations in 
activity and displayed greater sensitivity to economic crises. 
The markets downstream (motor vehicles, building and con-
struction) are now, for the most part, ·replacement' markets, 
indicating that. here too, the growth prospects for demand 
in the medium term should show little, if any, change from 
the trends observed over the last JO years. In the steel 
industry proper, Japan and Italy still stand out from the 
rest, domestic demand in both countries growing three times 
as fast as in their main trading partners. 
The building materials and non-metallic minerals sector is 
largely dependent on developments in construction and pub-
lic works. This explains why demand has remained flat over 
the period under review. Here too, Italy stands out in part 
from the rest because of its Jess favourable position at the 
outset. .,,. 
. !· 
The miscellaneous products sector covers a range of indus-
trial activities that are apparently unrelated (sporting arms, 
jewellery, musical instruments) and its importance in indus-
try is altogether marginal. The comparisons therefore are 
not very significant. 
Trend of demand in industrialized countries 
GRAPH l : Tread of demand in volume terms in the industrialized countries (1972-82) (1972= 100) 
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1.3 National domestic markets: size and devel-
opment 
Domestic demand, as calculated for each country surveyed, 
is a measure of the size of the domestic market. If we 
look at the area comprising the seven Community countries 
concerned, the United States and Japan, then it is possible 
to calculate the market shares for this group of industrialized 
countries (equivalent to 80 % of the OECD market), ac-
counted for by each of them. The size of each country's 
market was estimated using purchasing power standards, 
while its growth was measured on the basis of 1975 prices 
and exchange rates. 
Using current purchasing power standards makes it possible 
to eliminate the exchange-rate effect, the yardstick being the 
difference in price levels between countries (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
The main lesson to be learnt from the figures in the table is 
the small (and diminishing) size of the European internal 
market. In 1982, taking industry as a whole, it was smaller 
than that of the United States (37 % as against 40,7 %), 
but nearly 15 percentage points larger than the Japanese 
domestic market. 
In the case of strong-demand products, the Community 
market is 10 percentage points smaller than that of the 
United States and only 7 percentage points larger than that 
of Japan (as against 12 percentage points in 1972). The fall 
in the Community's share is due mainly to the contracting 
domestic markets in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom. The relative smallness of the Com-
munity market, despite growth which has been as buoyant 
as that of its trading partners, becomes even more significant 
if this breakdown is compared with the breakdown of popu-
lation in each of the three areas: 44 % for Europe, 37 % 
for the United States and 19 % for Japan. 
Geographical breakdown of domestic demand by demand category (1972-82) 
(at current prices and purchasing power parities) 
Strong-demand 
sectors 
1972 1982 
B 1,3 1,3 
DK 0,5 0,5 
D 11,0 10,1 
F 6,5 6,5 
I 5,8 5,7 
NL 1,6 1,3 
UK 8,2 7,1 
EUR 7 34,9 32,5 
USA 42,1 42,1 
Japan 23,0 25,5 
EUR 7 + USA + Japan 100 100 
SourC"tJ: Euro5tat and Commission departments. 
Trend data are available up to 1985 for industry as a whole 
(see Table 3). They provide an indication of the size of the 
gap that has opened up between Europe and.its main part-
ners since 1982. Between 1972 and 1982, domestic markets 
for industrial products in the Community and the United 
States were expanding at the same rate. Since then, i.e. 
16 
(%) 
Moderate.demand Weak-demand Total industry 
sectors sectors 
1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982 
1,6 1,5 1,4 1,2 1,5 1,4 
0,7 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,6 
10,9 10,1 12,8 11,2 11,6 10,5 
7,7 8,3 7,1 7,0 7,2 7,5 
6,8 7,5 7,1 9,7 6,8 7,9 
1,9 1,8 1,6 1,3 1,7 1,5 
10,1 8,9 8,2 6,6 9,1 7,7 
39,7 38,9 38,8 37,5 38,6 37,0 
45,6 44,5 37,3 35,1 41,9 40,7 
14,6 16.8 24,0 27,5 19,6 22,3 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
between 1982 and 1985, the Community has seen its market 
expand at the same rate as previously (2,4 % a year), while 
the United States has caught up with the Japanese growth 
rate, the domestic markets in both these countries having 
expanded on average by 6,5 % a year in the last three years. 
Table 3 
Movements in domestic demand in volume terms for all industrial 
products ( 1972-85) 
(annual growth rate, as%) 
(in US dollars and at 1975 prices and exchange rates) 
1982.72 1983 1984 19851 1985/82 
B 2,9 -0,6 2,9 1,3 1,2 
DK 1,4 5.6 8,8 6,5 7,0 
D 1.6 3.1 3,4 2,7 3,1 
F 2,2 -1,2 1,0 1,2 0,3 
I 3,5 -7,7 4,8 2,1 -0,4 
NL 3,8 0,3 5,8 3,2 3,1 
UK 0,3 5,5 4,7 4,1 4,8 
EUR 7 2,0 0,9 3,4 2,9 2.4 
USA 2,3 6,7 9,9 3,5 6,7 
Japan 6,4 3.6 10,2 5,8 6.5 
1 Eslimate. 
S011rn·.c Eurostat and Commission departments. 
In the final analysis, despite the difficulties associated with 
international comparisons of levels, the conclusion to be 
drawn is obvious: the relative advantage enjoyed by US and 
Japanese industry, benefiting as they do from vast domestic 
markets with a high degree of integration in the high-tech-
nology sectors. in which economies of scale play a crucial 
role, is enormous. Conversely, with a market which has not 
only contracted in size but is still too often compartmental-
ized as between Member States, Community industry is not 
best placed to regain its position in the world economy to 
which its potential strength entitles it. 
2. How domestic demand is met 
A country's domestic demand is met either by domestic 
production (share of output not exported) or by imports. In 
an economy based on free trade, consumers choose between 
domestic and foreign products according to a number of 
criteria, principal among which are the price, quality and 
novelty of the goods on offer. In other words, domestic 
producers must be at least as competitive as foreign pro-
ducers on their own markets. This is an essential precon-
dition of being able to compete on third markets. 
Taking industrial products as a whole, there 'would at the 
moment appear to be no appreciable difference between the 
United States and the Community (when considering only 
extra Community trade) in the way in which consumers 
How domestic demand is met 
choose between products according to their country of ori-
gin. Domestic production has in recent years gone towards 
meeting just less than 90 % of Community demand and a 
little more than 90 % of demand in the us.1 with imports 
accounting for the remainder. Given the rise of the dollar, 
foreign products (expressed as a percentage of domestic 
demand) have naturally tended to account for a slightly 
larger share of the US market since 1982; however, develop-
ments have been similar in the Community (see Table 2, 
statistical annex). In Japan, 95 % of demand is met by 
domestic production, and there have been no significant 
changes in the situation for a number of years. These overall 
results, estimated for industry as a whole, thus appear to be 
relatively balanced, though they do, in point of fact, conceal 
a sectoral situation which is more worrying for the Com-
munity. 
2.1 Sectoral domestic demand met out of 
domestic production or imports 
Graphs 2 to 4 show, for the three main demand categories 
(strong, moderate and weak), the changes from 1972 to 1982 
in the shares of domestic demand met in the Community, 
the United States and Japan by domestic production or by 
imports from the Community or the rest of the world. 
In the strong-demand sectors, the contrast between the Com-
munity, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan 
on the other, is particularly striking. For such sectors, manu-
facturing for the most part high-technology products, the 
Community constitutes a highly open market. Taking the 
average for 1982, less than 60 % of Member States' domestic 
consumption was accounted for by domestic output, as 
against 90 % in the United States and 95 % in Japan. 
Furthermore, within the space of 10 years, this figure has 
fallen by 14 percentage points, compared with 4,2 in the 
United States and I, I in Japan. The second lesson to be 
drawn from these figures is the growing share of products 
coming from outside the Community, a reflection of its 
inability to boost supply in order to satisfy growing demand. 
In 1972, the value of imports from outside the Community 
was equivalent to 53 % of the total of imports between 
Community countries. By 1982, this figure had risen to 
72%. 
This steady, year-by-year increase stems in the main from 
the growth in imports from outside the Community of the 
1 If intra-Community trade had been included. the percentage for the 
Community would have fallen in 1982 (the last year for which figures 
are available) to 72 %, this figure representing the weighted average of 
the share of domestic demand met by domestic production in each 
Member State. 
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GRAPH 3: Cover rates for domestic demand in moderate-demand sectors (total domestic demand at current prices= 100) 
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whole range of products with electronic components (rang-
ing from information technology and automated office 
equipment to measuring and precision instruments) . In the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sector, the expansion of trade 
is due more to intra-Community trade. 
Penetra tion by products from outside the Community is 
much less significantly marked in the moderate-demand 
sectors. Community integra tion has made further, a lbeit 
less rapid, advances here too, especially in the transport 
equipment and industrial machinery sectors. Since the end 
of the 1970s, however, the penetration rates for industrial 
machinery coming from outside the Community have risen 
very sharply. In the period 1979-82, such machinery boosted 
its share of demand in the Community from 12 % to almost 
17 %. This rapid growth in imports from outside the Com-
munity of products going through a period of technological 
upheaval is particularly ma rked in France, the United King-
dom, and to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. It is a disturbing ref1ecti on on the technologically 
outda ted na ture of Community products and of the growing 
tendency for them to be replaced by products frequently 
of Japa nese origin. The example of France is particularly 
revea ling in this respect : traditionally an importer of ma-
chine tools, it saw the proportion of its domestic dema nd 
accounted for by Community imports of industria l machin-
ery fall from 32 % to 30 % between 1979 a nd 1983. During 
that same period , the rate of penetration by non-Community 
products increased from 14 % to 19 %. 
Leaving aside the special case o f plant a nd machinery, the 
Community countries have genera lly been more successful 
in terms of both trend and level, in retaining their share of 
the Community market in this product category (shares 
exceeding 80 % in the case of the larger countries) . As will 
be seen in the fo llowing chapter, it is in this sector that 
Commun ity firms have managed their best performances as 
rega rds investment , profitability and labour costs . 
Fina lly, the weak-demand sectors in the Community remain 
relatively dependent on fo reign products although there 
are no major dilTerences between imports from within the 
ommunity and tho e from outside. The penetration rates 
for ommunity and non-Community products have both 
ri en by just under four percentage points. In these sectors 
however, there are very wide dilTerences between Com-
munity countries (with an increase in the share of domestic 
demand in the United Kingdom met by Community firms , 
and a very low level of penetration of the l talian market) 
s i common knowledge, the Japanese market is quite 
dilTerent from the others: fir tly, becau e of its low level of 
import (on average 5 % of domestic demand is covered by 
How domestic demand is met 
imports) , and , secondly. beca use of the remarkable stability 
that has characterized the level of imports (no real change 
in 10 yea rs). Moreover, the estimates available for the period 
up to 1985 show no noticeable change in the sit ua tion. The 
5 % figure is not significa ntly exceeded in a ny sector except 
the 'metal ores' secto r (importation of raw materials), a nd 
the share of Japanese domestic demand met by Community 
products is very low indeed (0,8 % for industry as a whole). 
In 1982, the highest sha re acco unted for by Community 
products was 1,8 % on the Japanese domestic market in 
industrial machinery, although even thi s figure was lower 
than tha t recorded in 1974/75 (2,3 %). While percentages of 
a similar order of magnitude can be observed in the textile 
and clothing industries a nd in the chemica l industry, no 
increase is discernible in any of them. 
In the early 1970s, the United States was in a simi lar situation 
to Japan, with the level of import penetration runn ing a t 
around 5 %, but the trend in the United States has been 
very different. The US market has gradua lly opened itself 
up to imports. In the strong-demand sectors, imports now 
cover a little over 10 % of domestic demand for industrial 
products. The opening up of the US domestic market has 
accelera ted with the ri se of the dollar and. between 1982 
and 1985 . the level of import penetration continued to rise 
appreci ably (by I, 7 % in three yea rs) . However, this has 
brought little or no benefit for imports from Europe, and the 
sha re of European imports on the US ma rket has remained 
virtua lly uncha nged fo r the las t I O yea rs (between 1,6 and 
2 % of total domestic demand) . Community exports to the 
US market have expanded at much the same ra te as US 
domestic demand. The very strong surge in European ex-
ports to the US market in 1984 has not brought about any 
funda menta l change in the situat ion. It is thus mainly non-
European, and in particular Japanese, exports which have 
been satisfying a growing share of US domestic demand. 
2.2 Origin of Community imports differs ac-
cording to the products concerned 
The countries from wi th the European Community imports 
goods are, of course, mainly the OECD countries. but the 
patterns of import dependence differ a great deal from one 
sector to another (see Table 4). In the strong-demand sectors, 
the United States and Japa n play a dominant role. but their 
importance decreases significantly in the moderate-demand 
ectors and becomes marginal in the weak-demand sectors . 
The pattern of technological dependence characteristic of 
strong-demand products i very evident here. Taken as a 
whole. the newly-industrialized countries still play a mar-
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ginal role in such sectors, although their share of the weak-
demand sectors now exceeds that of the United States. 
Japan's share in the moderate-demand sectors is accounted 
for solely by imports of motor vehicles and machine tools. 
The Eastern Europe countries have a genuine presence only 
in the weak-demand sectors. 
The United States imports its strong-demand products 
mainly from Japan, the Community (chemicals in particu-
lar), South-East Asia and Canada (rest of the OECD), but 
it is interesting to note that the largest share of the US 
market accounted for by Community products is in the 
moderate-demand sectors. Here too, Japanese cars are nat-
urally the key factor in the high percentage of imports of 
transport equipment which make up nearly 40 % of total 
US imports, a much higher percentage than in the Com-
munity or Japan. 
The level of Japanese industrial imports is as we have seen, 
low compared with the scale of domestic demand. They 
Table 4 
Structure and geographical breakdown of industrial imports in 1983 
EUR 101 
lmpon~ 
SD MD WD To1al 
industry 
OECD 24.3 24,8 19.6 68.6 OECD 
USA 10,7 7,3 3.3 21.2 Japan 
Japan 5,6 4,0 I. I 10.7 EUR 10 
Rest ofOECD 8,0 13,5 15,3 36.7 Rest ofOECD 
D,•1•t•lopi11g Del'eloping 
cmmtries 4,0 6,6 13.4 24,0 coumries 
South-East Asia 1,6 0.9 3.3 5.8 South-East Asia 
Africa 0,1 0,8 2,3 3.2 Africa 
Total East Eur. 0.9 I.I 2,7 4,7 Total East Eur. 
Total OPEC 0.2 0,6 0,7 1.5 Total OPEC 
Latin America 0,5 2,6 2.3 5.3 Latin America 
Other LDCs 0,7 0,6 2,1 3.5 Other LDCs 
Rest of' 1rorld 1,5 2.7 3,1 7.4 Rest of' ll'orlcl 
Total 29,8 34,1 36,1 100 fotal 
I Extra-Community trade for the Communll) or Ten. 
NB: SO = stronl!l demand; MO "" moderate demand: WD = weak demand. 
S,mrn·: Volimcx. DG II. 
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also differ in terms of their geographical origin from the 
industrial imports of their trading partners. In 1983, for 
example, imports of high-technology (strong-demand) prod-
ucts accounted for only 27 % of total imports. In all, 51 % 
of such high-technology imports were made up of US prod-
ucts as against only 21 % for Community products. How-
ever, Japanese industrial imports consist primarily of weak-
demand products (46 % of total imports) from countries in 
South-East Asia but also from the United States and the 
countries of Latin America. 
2.3 The increase in the Community's import 
dependence is to be found mainly in strong-
demand products 
A look at the relative trend of the levels of sectoral import 
penetration in relation to the trend for industrial products 
as a whole indicates the lessons to be drawn from this initial 
analysis (see Table 5). 
(%) 
USA Japan 
Imports Imports 
SD MD WD Tolal SD MD WD Toial 
industry industry 
17.4 35.8 15,8 69.1 OECD 21.3 22.4 20,3 64,0 
8,6 10,8 3.2 22,6 USA 13,5 11,5 6,0 31,0 
4,8 9,0 5,8 19,6 EUR 10 5,5 5,5 4,2 15,2 
4,0 16.0 6,8 26.9 Rest ofOECD 2.3 5.4 10.1 17.8 
Del'eloping 
7,7 4.0 11.6 23.3 cou/1/ries 3,9 3.4 20,5 27,8 
4,6 I.I 5,2 10.9 South-East Asia 2.3 1.2 6,6 10,0 
0,1 0,1 1.2 1.4 Africa 0,1 0,3 2,8 3,1 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 Total East Eur. 0,2 0,2 1.1 1,5 
0,2 0,1 0.4 0,6 Total OPEC 0.1 0.1 2,6 2,8 
2,5 2.4 3.4 8,2 Latin America 0,6 1.0 5,3 7,0 
0,2 0.1 1.2 1.6 Other LDCs 0,6 0,6 2.1 3.4 
1.9 1.2 4,6 7.6 Rest of ll'Orld 1.0 2.1 5,1 8,2 
27.0 41.0 32.0 100 Total 26.2 27,9 45.9 100 
How domestic demand is met 
Table 5 
Import specialization in 1983 and change compared with 1972 
(in current US dollars) 
EU R 101 Level Changc2 USA Level Changc2 Japan Level Changc2 
1983 1983-72 1983 1983-72 1983 1983-7~ 
I. Paper, packaging I. Transport equip- I. Steel and meta l 
MD 1,49 - 0,13 ment MD 1,41 -0, 13 ores WO 2,51 +0.33 
2. Miscellaneous in- 2. Electrical equip- 2. Food products 
dustrial products ment and elec-
WO 1,38 -0,30 tronics so 1,32 +0, 19 MD 1,48 + 0,10 
3. Information 3. Miscellaneous in- 3. Chemicals 
tech. , precision & dustrial products 
office equipment so 1,34 + 0,23 WO 1,22 - 0,08 so 1.19 + 0.21 
4. Steel and metal 4. Textiles, lea ther 4. Miscellaneous in-
ores WO 1,12 - 0,13 and clothing WO 1,04 + 0,0 1 dustrial products WO 1,12 -0,30 
5. Electrical equip- 5. Information 5. Non-metallic 
ment and elec- tech ., precision & minerals 
Ironies so 1,10 + 0,24 office eq uipment so 0,97 + 0,12 WO 1,12 + 0.15 
6. Textiles, leather 6. Industrial 6. Textiles, leather 
a nd clothing WO 1, 10 + 0, 16 machinery MD 0.9 1 + 0,2 1 and clothing WO 0,88 + 0,12 
7. Food products MD 1,03 - 0,42 7. Rubber, plastics MD 0,91 - 0, 18 7. Pa per, packaging MD 0,88 + 0,22 
8. Non-metallic 8. Steel and metal 8. Electrical equip-
minerals ores ment and elec-
WO 0,93 + 0.05 WO 0.90 - 0,10 tronics so 0,71 +0,14 
9. Industrial 9. Metal goods 9. Information 
machinery tech., precision & 
MD 0,92 + 0.16 WO 0,88 + 0,04 office equipment so 0,68 - 0,44 
10. Chemicals 10. Paper, packaging 10. Industrial 
so 0.83 - 0.02 MD 0,88 - 0,20 machinery MD 0.59 - 0,09 
11 . Metal goods 11 . Non-metallic 11. Metal goods 
WO 0.82 + 0.17 minerals WO 0,78 - 0, 16 WO 0,46 + 0,19 
12. Rubber, plastics MD 0,68 + 0.08 12. Food products MD 0.66 - 0.22 12. Rubber. plastics MD 0,42 + 0.19 
13. Transport equip- 13. Chemicals 13. Transport equip-
ment MD 0.61 + 0.20 so 0.57 + 0.11 ment MD 0,35 - 0.01 
Strong demand Strong demand Strong demand 
(SO) 1,01 + 0.13 (SO) 0.93 + 0. t:1 (SO) 0.88 + 0.08 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
demand (MD) 0,88 - 0.04 demand (MD) 1.05 - 0.06 demand (MD) 0.73 + 0.01 
Weak demand Weak demand Weak demand 
(WO) 1.1 3 - 0.04 (WO) 1.00 - 0.04 (WO) 1.44 + 0.03 
I E.,1rn-Commun11y trudc: for the Communit) of Ten . 
Clrnngc: d1ITcrcncc in import spcci:alizution between IQ83 and 1972. 
.VB Import sp«:mll zut1on : lmpons in a ~cc tor m one coun tr) to1al imports of that S4..'Ctor fN the OECD :m.::1 
to tal import s o f thut counlr) to tal OECU imports 
Souru• \'ollmn. DG II . 
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The Community countries are showing an increasing pro-
pensity to import strong-demand and high-technology prod-
ucts (information technology equipment, automated office 
equipment, precision equipment, electrical equipment and 
electronics). In these sectors the import specialization coef-
ficient I rose significantly over the period ( + 0,23 and + 
0,24). By contrast, though it has traditionally been an im-
porter of paper, metal ores and agri-foodstuffs, the Com-
munity has reduced its specialization coefficient for products 
in these sectors ( - 0.13 and - 0.42). There has therefore 
been an appreciable change over the I 0-year period in the 
Community's import profile. with a very appreciable im-
provement in certain traditional sectors in which demand is 
moderate or weak and greater import dependence on high-
technology products and. more generally, capital goods (to 
these can be added, over and above the products already 
mentioned. industrial machinery and transport equipment). 
As part two of this chapter also shows. the more pronounced 
import specialization in such goods, which have high value-
added. R&D and skilled-labour contents, is accompanied 
by a deterioration in the level of export specialization in 
such goods. resulting in a steady decline in the Community's 
trade surplus. 
The level of import specialization in the United States differs 
relatively little from that of the Community. the specializa-
tion indices for capital goods, textiles and clothing being 
relatively high. However. it is concentrated on a smaller 
number of sectors (4 out of 13 sectors have a dependence 
index. measuring import specialization, of more than I). and 
the variations in the indices between 1972 and 1983 are 
generally smaller than in the case of the Community. Here 
again. it is in the levels of export specialization. with special-
ization being concentrated on strong-demand products in 
the case of the United States. that the most marked differ-
ences in pattern between the United States and the Com-
munity appear. 
In Japan. the results are consistent with the developments 
outlined above. with import specialization concentrated in 
the main on weak-demand or moderate-demand products 
(metal ores and non-metallic minerals, textiles and clothing, 
and foodstuffs). Chemicals are the only strong-demand 
products to reach a significant level ( 1.19), up 0,21 since 
1972, reflecting Japanese industry's shift away from a sector 
in which profitability has been affected by the higher costs 
of energy raw materials. The sharpest fall in import special-
ization is in information technology and automated office 
equipment, the index dipping by 0.44 between 1972 and 1983 
despite a relatively high level of import penetr~tion relative 
to domestic demand. 
1 Sec definition in Table 5. 
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3. The reaction of exporters 
In parallel with the increasing proportion of Community 
domestic demand met by foreign products, particularly in 
the case of high-technology, there was a sharp rise through-
out the period 1972-82 in the share of Community industrial 
output being exported. Admittedly this growing concen-
tration on exports has been accompanied by a steady re-
duction in Member State's shares of markets worldwide. 
This has meant that Community exports have been growing 
less rapidly than those of their trading partners. The increase 
in the proportion of Community output being exported is 
due primarily to a redirection of trade flows to third-country 
markets. It is as if, faced with exacting demand in terms of 
quality and price within the Community, European industri-
alists have decided to look for new outlets elsewhere. This 
seems to be borne out by the geographical pattern of their 
exports and their increased export specialization in weak-
demand products. At all events, the trends observed merely 
confirm the difficulty encountered by Community producers 
in maintaining their shares of expanding markets in indus-
trialized countries. 
3.1 An increasing proportion of Community 
output is being exported 
In 1982. manufacturing firms in the Community exported 
16 % of their output to the rest of the world, compared with 
9 % in the United States and 14 % in Japan. In the strong-
demand sectors in particular, the proportion of their output 
exported was substantial (23 % in 1982) and expanding 
rapidly (up 6,2 percentage points compared with 1972). It 
easily exceeds the corresponding percentages in the United 
States and Japan (see Graph 5). In the other product catego-
ries. the proportion of output exported was not as large but, 
generally speaking, it was higher than in the United States 
and Japan. 
At first sight, therefore. the Community's performance was 
satisfactory and improved steadily between 1972 and 1982 
in all the sectors surveyed. As shown in Graph 5 the rate of 
growth matches that recorded in Japan for strong-demand 
products and was actually higher in the case of weak-demand 
products. 
This encouraging export performance is all the more signifi-
cant as the figures for output exported relate only to trade 
with countries outside the Community. If exports to other 
Member States were included. the proportion of Community 
output exported would be roughly doubled. 
The expansion in US exports has been Jess vigorous. The 
share of US industrial output exported - a figure that has 
consistently Jagged behind the corresponding figure for the 
Community or Japan - peaked at over I O % in 1980 (15 % 
for strong-demand products); since then , however, the rapid 
growth of domestic demand and the steady appreciation 
of the dollar against the currencies of the United States' 
The reaction of exporters 
competitors have led to a slow but steady contraction of US 
export growth. According to the estimates available for 
1985, the proportion of total manufacturing output exported 
will be 7,7 %, compared with 17,4 % for the Community. 
This proportion which, for the Community, remained stable 
between 1981 and 1983 at aro und 16 %, has therefore in-
creased markedly between 1983 and 1985. 
o ........................................ _._ ................. o ............................ _._ ........ ...._..__ ...... _. o ....................... _...._...__._.._..__ ...... --
12 7S 84 72 7S O 84 72 7S 80 84 
B. EUR 7: Eatn-community cxporu. 
A more detailed sectoral breakdown shows that in the case 
of plant and machinery and chemical and pharmaceutical 
product , the hares of Community outpu t exported a re 
much the same as. and even higher than . the corresponding 
figures for Japan. whi le they easi ly exceed those recorded in 
the United States. In terms of the changes in export shares, 
the bias towards exports discernible in Japan is renected in 
increases of a Imo t 15 percentage points over I O years for 
indu trial machinery and for information technology and 
automated office equipment, and of 12.5 percentage points 
for transport equipment . 
Thi generally favourable picture for the ommunity must. 
however. be qualified . For. it is only in the case of weak-
demand products that the share of output exported has 
expanded in step with gains in market shares. In the case of 
high-technology products, for which there is strong demand, 
and, to some extent, moderate-demand products, the in-
crease in the proportion of output exported has been ac-
companied by a con traction in market shares . Community 
exports of strong-demand products have therefore grown 
less rapid ly than those of the Community's partners (con-
traction in market shares) but more quickly than output in 
the Member States (increase in the proportion of output 
exported) . And so here there is a situat ion in which the 
structure of export outlets is changing rather than one in 
which activi ty is actually expanding. 
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3.2 Unfavourable pattern of export specializa-
tion in the Community 
The choices of external trade specialization made by indus-
tries in the Community are a source of concern (see Table 
6). The degree of export specialization 1 in the Community 
is low in the case of strong-demand and moderate-demand 
products; what is more, between 1972 and 1983 it showed 
the most pronounced decline in the former category. By 
contrast in the weak-demand sectors, there is a high degree 
of export specialization that has become even more marked 
in recent years. 
The patterns of specialization in the United States and Japan 
contrast sharply with that in the Community, since their 
economies are highly specialized in the strong-demand and 
moderate-demand sectors (with Japanese specialization in 
the moderate-demand sectors in particular increasing rap-
idly, admittedly from a relatively low level). The degree of 
specialization in the weak-demand sectors, on the other 
hand, is very low in the United States and is actually falling 
back significantly in Japan. 
From this point of view, it is interesting to classify industrial 
sectors according to their degree of specialization: in the 
Community, the list is headed by the sectors producing 
goods for which the volume of international demand ex-
panded sluggishly by some 1-1,5 % a year, between 1972 
and 1982 (see Table 1 ), while at the bottom of the list we 
find the sectors whose products are in greatest demand and 
in which the degree of Community specialization is declining. 
The sectoral classification in the United States is the one 
most in keeping with movements in demand. It is also 
the most stable, the changes between 1972 and 1983 being 
generally marginal (except for the decline in transport equip-
ment and the expansion in information technology). The 
degree of US export specialization is thus high for strong-
demand products and low for products in least demand. 
This reinforces the role of the United States in international 
trade. 
In addition to its presence on the market in high-technology 
products, Japan was still quite highly specialized in steel and 
metal goods in 1983; unlike the Community, however, its 
indices of specialization in these sectors are falling. Further-
more. unlike its partners. it has a chemicals industry that 
accounts for only a small (and declining) share of exports. 
The increase in energy input prices goes a long way towards 
explaining Japan's withdrawal from a sector it now considers 
insufficiently profitable. 
1 That is to say. the ratio or the export market share of a given industrial 
sector in the Community to the export market share of total Community 
industry. 
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The situation portrayed above is consistent with the con-
clusions reached in the preceding section. Rising rates of 
penetration in markets for strong-demand products are ac-
companied by a growing weakness in the Community's 
productive system, with exports being concentrated in these 
sectors where demand is flat. The geographical breakdown 
of Community exports to third countries is one of the factors 
influencing specialization choices. 
3.3 The industrialized countries absorb only a 
small share of Community exports of high-
technology and medium-technology pro-
ducts 
In 1983, the value of strong-demand and moderate-demand 
products exported to the OECD area represented only 34 % 
of total Community exports to third countries, while the 
corresponding figures for Jananese and US exports were 
45 % and 51 % repectively. In 1972, the figures were 42 % 
for the Community, 39 % for Japan and 56 % for the United 
States (see Table 7). 
These figures illustrate the difficulties faced by European 
producers in maintaining their position on the most demand-
ing markets. By channelling an increasing proportion of 
their exports to non-industrialized countries, they are man-
aging to continue to export a large share of what they 
produce; however, the goods exported to those countries do 
not have the same technology content. It is more than 
likely that demand in OECD countries for strong-demand 
products in particular which, as we saw above, are mainly 
high-technology products, is not of the same kind as demand 
in newly industrializing countries. 
Once again, the general impression left by Table 7 is that 
Community industry is lagging behind its main partners. It 
is beset by a series of weaknesses. In the Community, weak-
demand products account for a greater proportion of ex-
ports than in Japan or the United States. The Community 
exports Jess to Japan than the United States and Jess to the 
United States than Japan. Moreover, its exports to OPEC 
countries account for a high proportion of its sales abroad, 
making it very dependent on income movements in the 
oil-producing countries, where income has remained high 
because of the strength of the dollar. Its presence in the 
newly-industrialized countries. especially in South-East Asia 
and Latin America. the expanding Third World markets, is 
still overshadowed by that of the United States or Japan. 
Only in the OECD area excluding the Community, the 
United States and Japan. in the State-trading countries and 
in Africa does its performance surpass those of the United 
States and Japan. 
The reaction of exporters 
Table 6 
Export specialization in 1983 and change compared with 1972 
(in current US dollars) 
EU R 101 Level Variation2 USA Level Va riation2 Japan Level Variation2 
1983 1983-72 1983 1983-72 1983 1983-72 
I. Metal goods I . Info rmation I . Electrical equip-
tech., precision & ment a nd elec-
WD 1,32 + 0,19 office equipment SD 1,62 + 0,13 Ironies SD 1,82 + 0,12 
2. Industria l 2. Industria l 2. Transport equip-
machinery MD 1,25 - 0,05 machinery MD 1,29 - 0, 10 ment MD 1,51 + 0,09 
3. Miscellaneous in- 3. Electrical equip- 3. Informa tion 
dustrial products ment and elec- tech., precision & 
WD 1,23 + 0,18 Ironies SD 1,20 + 0,06 o ffice equipment SD 1,44 + 0,14 
4. Non-metallic 4. Chemicals 4. Steel a nd meta l 
minerals SD 1,21 + 0,24 SD 1,03 + 0,02 ores WD 1,26 - 0,12 
5. Chemicals 5. Transport equip- 5. Rubber and plas-
SD 1,16 - 0,02 ment MD 1,04 - 0,22 ties MD 0,91 - 0,09 
6. Textiles, lea ther 6. Food products 6. Metal goods 
and clothing WD 1,06 + 0,13 MD 1,04 - 0,05 WD 0,88 - 0.19 
7. Food products 7. Paper, packaging 7. Industrial 
MD 1,00 + 0.10 MD 0,96 - 0,07 machinery MD 0,87 + 0,27 
8. Rubber and plas- 8. Meta l goods 8. Non-metallic 
ties MD 0,97 - 0,11 WD 0,78 - 0,04 minerals WD 0,73 + 0,03 
9. Steel and meta l 9. Non-metallic 9. Textile, lea ther 
ores WD 0,95 + 0,10 minerals WD 0,75 + 0,02 and clothing WD 0.69 - 0,45 
10. Electrical equip- 10. Rubber a nd plas- 10. Chemicals 
ment and elec- ties 
tronics SD 0,89 - 0,08 MD 0,71 - 0,03 SD 0,49 - 0,25 
11 . Transport eq uip- 11. Miscellaneous in- 11. Miscellaneous in-
ment MD 0.84 - 0.08 dustrial products WD 0,67 - 0,02 dustria l products WD 0.36 - 0,23 
12. Info rmation 12. Steel and metal 12. Paper, packaging 
tech., precision & ores 
office equipment SD 0,64 - 0,19 WD 0,44 - 0,02 MD 0,20 - 0,03 
13. Paper, packaging 13. Textiles, lea ther 13. Food products 
MD 0.50 + 0.04 and clothing WD 0,38 + 0,02 MD 0,12 - 0. 12 
Strong demand Strong demand Strong dema nd 
(SD) 0,96 - 0,11 (SD) 1,18 + 0,06 (SD) 1.1 6 - 0,01 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
demand (M D) 0,97 - 0,03 demand (MD) 1,12 - 0,10 demand (M D) 0,96 + 0.23 
Weak demand Weak demand Weak demand 
(WD) I.I I + 0,17 (WD) 0,55 - 0.04 (WD) 0.84 - 0,38 
I E.,tm-Community trade fo r the Community or Ten. 
hungc: dirrcrcncc in c,port spcciulization bc1wcrn 1972 and 1983. 
N B: E,port spn:iuli z.a tion: exports in a sector m o ne country to tal exports o f that sector for the OECD area 
total exports of that country total O ECD c., ports 
ourrt · Volimc:<. DG II . 
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Table 7 
Geographical breakdown of industrial exports in 1983 
(in US dollars) 
EUR 101 
l::xporh 
SD MO WO Total 
industry 
OECD 14,5 19,8 14.3 48,5 OECD 
USA 3.6 6,9 4,4 14,9 Japan 
Japan 0,9 0.9 0,7 2.4 EUR 10 
Rest ofOECD 10,0 12,0 9,2 31.2 Rest ofOECD 
De1•elopi11g Developing 
cou111ries 12,5 20,1 10,8 43.4 countries 
South-East Asia 1,2 1.4 0,9 3,5 South-Est Asia 
Africa 1.5 2.7 0,9 5.1 Africa 
Total East Eur. 1.7 2.6 2,0 6.3 Total East Eur. 
Total OPEC 4,7 8,5 4,5 17,8 Total OPEC 
Latin America 1,6 2,2 0,8 4,6 Latin America 
Other 1.8 2.7 1.7 6,1 Other 
Rest of ll'orld 3.1 3,2 I. 7 8,1 Rest of ll'orld 
Total 30,1 43,1 26,8 100 Total 
I f,tra•Commumty trade: for the Community of Ten . 
.\"8 SD • strong demand; MO g moderate demand; WD = 1<eak demand. 
Sourer. Vohmcx. DG II. 
By specializing in products that are in least demand and by 
channelling a large share of its exports to the least profitable 
markets. the Community is losing market shares to the 
United States and Japan in sectors with a high value-added 
content; it is increasing its market penetration only in sectors 
where it is least exposed to competition from its main trading 
partners. Even if the gains and losses cancel each other out 
overall. this development is bound to jeopardize the chances 
of a European economic recovery (see Graph 6). 
3.4 The Community's cover rate for industrial 
trade is still high, but high-technology sec-
tors are contributing less and less to trade 
surpluses 
As a result of the pattern of the Community's export special-
ization and of the increase in penetration rates, the cover 
rate for strong-demand products has been declining steadily 
28 
(%) 
USA Japan 
Expons Expons 
SD MD WD Total SD MD WD Total 
industry industry 
22,9 28,1 8,2 59,2 OECD 21,6 23,1 6,8 51,4 
3,5 3,2 1,6 8,3 USA 11,5 13,8 4,2 29,5 
10,9 8,9 2,7 22,5 EUR 10 6,6 4,8 1,2 12,6 
8,5 16,0 3,9 28.4 Rest ofOECD 3,5 4,5 1,4 9,3 
Developing 
13,2 15,8 4,3 33,2 countries 12,5 16,6 11,5 40,6 
4,2 2,7 0,9 7,8 South-East Asia 5,7 4,1 3,8 13,7 
0,6 I.I 0,2 1,8 Africa 0,5 1.4 0,3 2,1 
0,3 0.4 0.1 0,7 Total East Eur. 0,5 0.8 1,0 2,4 
2.4 5,1 1,2 8,7 Total OPEC 3,4 6,5 4,0 13,8 
5,1 5,6 1,9 12,6 Latin America 1,0 2,5 0,5 4,0 
0,6 0,9 0,0 1,6 Other 1.4 1,3 1.9 4,6 
1.8 5,0 0,7 7,6 Rest of world 2,8 3,0 2,1 8,0 
37,9 48,9 13,2 100 Total 36,9 42,7 20,4 100 
since 1974, (see Graph 7) largely on account of the poor 
performances recorded by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United Kingdom (although their cover rates are far 
from comparable), while the trade surpluses of the other 
Member States have remained fairly stable. 
Better results are recorded in the moderate-demand sectors, 
but here too, the general outlook is one of slow but steady 
deterioration in the situation. The Community has the most 
stable cover rate in the weak-demand sectors, in which 
several Member States tend to specialize. For example, the 
pronounced improvement in the Italian cover rate for trade 
in these products has more than offset the decline in the 
Belgian rate. 
As the above analyses imply. Japanese cover rates are very 
high in strong-demand sectors. they are, moreover, on a 
rising trend (leaving aside marked cyclical fluctuations) and 
still exceed those of Japan's partners, even for weak-demand 
products. 
The cover rates for the United States are lower than those for 
the Community, and especially low in the less sophisticated 
sectors; more important, they have been declining steadily 
since 1980, when the US cover rate for industry as a whole 
stood at I, 10; by 1983 it was down to 0,81, and is expected 
to be only 0,66 in 1985. Not since 1963, the first year for 
which detailed foreign trade data are available, has such a 
low rate been recorded. Prior to 1980, trade disequilibrium 
The reaction of exporters 
was most pronounced in 1972 (cover rate: 0,87) and 1978 
(cover rate: 0,89). 
On the whole, despite the sound performances of the Com-
munity currencies against the dollar and the yen, the Com-
munity appears to be concentrating increasingly on the prod-
ucts that are least sensitive to economic recovery, namely, 
those with a low value-added content; this has been a major 
factor in the deteriorating employment situation in industry. 
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GRAPH 7: Coftl' rates of total Imports by total exports 
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The main determinants of employment: a tentative quantification 
Taking a simplified approach, the main factors influencing the 
number of persons employed in a country over a given period 
of time can be reduced down to four key economic variables. 
Two of them, domestic demand and exports, normally have a 
positive impact on employment, while the other two, imports 
and the apparent productivity of labour, tend to have a negative 
impact. 
On the basis of changes in the four variables between 1975 and 
1982, an input-output approach (see methodological section 
below) makes it possible to estimate the contribution made by 
each of them to value- added and industrial employment in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. Of course, being based on the presumed stability 
of the technico-economic coefficients during the period under 
review, this exercise is, to some extent, a theoretical one. Yet, 
the results obtained justify the approach adopted. The changes 
in employment estimated in this way for industry as a whole in 
the period 1975-82 dilTer by no more than 5 % from those 
recorded and available in the national accounts. 
The table below gives the results in percentage terms (and in 
absolute values) for employment created or destroyed through 
the operation of each of the variables in question, taken first 
separately and then together. 
Overall, the external trade effects virtually cancel each other out 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and France (with exports 
creating just as much employment as that destroyed by imports). 
There was a positive outcome in Italy, where, during the period 
under review, exports soared in volume terms, while the experi-
ence was distinctly negative in the United Kingdom, where the 
increase in the import penetration rate (up 4 percentage points 
between 1975 and 1982- a similar increase to that recorded in 
the other Member States) - was not accompanied by any 
corresponding increase in exports, far from it. 
The calculation made also brings to light the relatively minor 
impact on employment of the expansion in domestic demand or 
- to be more precise - the insufficient growth in domestic 
demand. In all the countries surveyed, the sharp improvement 
in productivity was reflected, all things being equal, in a substan-
tial net loss of jobs in three of the four Community countries 
surveyed. This is a simple accounting identity, resulting from 
the very definition of productivity. Overall, however, this re-
duction in numbers employed could have been olTset only by a 
Impact on employment in manufacturing in 1982 of changes in the key economic variables between 1975 and 1982 
(Changes expressed as percentages and in 'OOO; comparison with 1975) 
D F 
Impact 
I. of the increase in the level of import penetration rates -12 -11 
(- I 050) (-620) 
2. of the development of exports (rates of growth) 14 12 
(+I 220) ( +680) 
A. External trade elTect 0 I 
(0) (- 55) 
3. of the development of domestic demand (rates of growth) 8 II 
(700) ( +620) 
4. of the development of labour productivity (rates of -17 -22 
growth) (-1 485) (- I 250) 
B. Estimated elTect of all four variables -12 -15 
(-1 050) (-850) 
c. Change observed ( 1982 employment - 1975 employment) -9 -II 
(-800) (-640) 
E. Unexplained residual (C-B as% of employment in 1982) 3 5 
NB· As an imtrnl arrro:umntion. the simultaneous effect of a number of variables is equal to the product of each of them 1akcn separately. 
Sourn-. DG II rakulations. 
UK 
-9 -13 
(-505) (-975) 
20 4 
(+I 125) ( +300) 
8 -10 
( +450) ( - 750) 
15 -3 
( + 845) (-225) 
-24 -9 
(-1 350) (-675) 
-7 -21 
(-450) ( - I 575) 
-3 -21 
(-170) (-1 565) 
5 0 
much greater change in the volume of domestic demand over 
the period under consideration. Given the scale of domestic 
demand in relation to exports, an extra percentage point of 
growth in demand clearly has a greater impact on employment 
than the same rate of growth in exports. 
Methodological approach 
Input-output tables provide a complete and coherent picture of 
all flows of goods and services produced and traded in an 
economy during a given period (usually one year). 
If the conventional hypotheses underlying the input-output mo-
dels are accepted, namely: 
(i) fixed production structures (fixed technico-economic coef-
ficients); 
(ii) fixed breakdown between domestic output and imports in 
each flow , (fixed import shares); and 
(iii) fixed relationships between employment and production 
(fixed employment coefficients); 
it is then possible to show, for a given final demand, the levels 
of production and employment needed directly and indirectly 
to satisfy that demand. 
In summary, the method used consists of estimating final des 
mand in 1982 and, by adjusting import shares and employment 
coefficients to their 1982 level, calculating production and em-
ployment in 1982, it being assumed that the technico-economic 
coefficients for 1975 remain unchanged. 
The reaction of exporters 
As regards final demand, the estimates for 1982 were made as 
follows : 
for exports, by applying for each product the growth rate of 
exports. in volume terms in the period 1975-82; for domestic 
demand, by applying for each product the growth rate of total 
domestic demand in volume terms in the period 1975-82. 
The import shares were assigned their 1982 values (estimated 
on the basis of the changes in import penetration rates in the 
period 1975-82), while the employment coefficients were also 
assigned their 1982 values ( estimated on the basis of changes in 
the apparent productivity of labour). 
Three changes are made; ther.efore, to the basic input-output 
model (1975); they relate to : 
(i) import shares, 
(ii) employment coefficients, and 
(iii) final demand. 
As a result, the model provides a reasonable picture of the 
situation in 1982 (any discrepancies between that and the actual 
situation are an indication of the unsuitability of the hypotheses 
applied and of the lack of harmonized statistics). 
The analysis of the changes that occurred in the period 1975-82 
is then taken further by separating the effects on employment 
of the different parameters in the model. In other words, it is 
possible, by adjusting in tum the import shares, the employment 
coefficients and final demand, to gauge separately the impact 
of each of these adjustments on value-added and employment. 
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Introduction 
Taking stock of the Community's trade performance over 
the past 10 yea rs or so. we find that penetration ratios ha ve 
ri sen while export market shares have contracted, particu-
larly fo r the products tha t the industri a li zed countries con-
sume in the la rgest quantities. These findin gs are partly 
explained by an unsuitable import and export spec ia li zation 
and by an unfa vo urable pa tt ern of trade nows. but those 
fa cto rs arc not the deep-seated reasons for the deteriora ti on 
in industrial compet iti ve ness in the Communit y. The pur-
pose of thi s chap ter is to att empt an explanation based on 
a study of the fac tors of producti on labour a nd capital. 
There arc many other fac tors influencing an economy's 
competiti ve ness some o f which , such as the di ssemination 
of innovation and technological progress. arc analysed else-
where in th is number of E11ropca11 Eco110111r (Chapter 4). But 
an exa mination of these economic va riables produces some 
un eq ui vocal findin gs : the industrial base for prod ucing high-
technology goods in the Communit y is too narrow: the share 
of value-added in indust ry acco unted for by high-technology 
industri es is small compared with the situation in the United 
States and Japa n. and prod ucti on costs are rising too 
quickl y. Although the substituti on of capit al for labour has 
taken place on a large sca le . productivity gains arc still 
modest and not sufficient to offse t the increase in labo ur 
cos ts. wh ich is harming the cos t-competiti veness o f Euro-
pean prod ucts. Despite the expansion of potential ma rket s. 
in1·estmenl in the hi gh-techn ology secto rs has stalled and 
there has been little gro ll'th in the capi tal stock. The expla-
nation for the unsati sfactory a ll oca tion of available capit al 
betll'een the \'ari ous types o f in\'cstmenl may well lie in the 
rd:1ti1·e ll'eakness of the gross rate of return on capital 
i1m:sted in the sec tors producing high-technology goods. 
Tabk I 
Bn•ukdcmn of rallll'-add~d in industry in 1982 (total industry = IOO) 
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I. Main economic features of supply in industry 
1. I Differing growth rates 
In all industrialized countries. the buoyancy of demand for 
the various categories of manufac tured goods has played a 
determining role in economic growth in the different sectors 
of industry. In the Community, as in the United Sta tes and 
Japan, firms in the sec tors whose products were in greatest 
demand have. on average. enjoyed vigorous growth . expand-
ing in genera l a t a rate two to three 1imes as fast as indust ry 
as a whole. While trends were comparable overall from one 
country to another. ra tes of growth differed widely in the 
period 1972-82 (see Graph I) . While the Community and 
the United States obtained much the same result s in all 
sectors. Japan recorded spec tacular growth with the indus-
tri a l growth-rate differential separa ting it fro m the Com-
munity standing at 5 percentage points a yea r (9 po ints in 
the case o r the strong-demand sectors). 
Hence the need for an industria l base mainl y or increasi ngly 
gea red to the manufacture of strong-dema nd products. The 
grea ter the number of firm s concentrating on these expand-
ing markets. the more sustained ind ust ri al growth will be 
and the more effecti vely empl oyment will be safeguarded . 
But the contribution firm s in this sec tor make to total 
industrial output in the Community is still limited . 
In 1982. va lue-added in the stro ng-demand sec tors rep-
resented onl y 20 % of total va lue-added in industry in the 
Communit y. compared with 28 % in the United States and 
27 % in Japa n. Community suppl y thus already appears to 
be structurall y inadequate bearing in mind that as we saw in 
Chapter I. the three areas concerned ha ve internal,domestic 
markets or comparable size (sec Table I). 
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GRAPH I: Valae-addedatmarbtpriees(l975priaa) 1972•100 
(EUR 7 in BCU, the United Slala and Japan In ilitloaal curreac!iet) 
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Even at constant prices, the strong-demand sectors account 
for a smaller percentage of value-added in industry in 
Europe than the other two categories. In the United States 
and the Community alike, the moderate-demand sectors 
make up the bulk of value-added. In Japan, however, the 
share of value-added at 1975 prices accounted for by firms 
producing goods in greatest demand has suddenly ballooned, 
exceeding by 5 points that recorded for the weak-demand 
sectors and by 6 points that of moderate-demand sectors. 
The strong-demand sectors now make up 37 % value-added 
in industry in Japan (at 1975 prices). 
The strong-demand sectors 
Growth rate differentials in the high-technology sectors 
(automated office equipment, information technology, elec-
trical equipment and electronics, chemicals, pharmaceu-
ticals) tended to widen, at the Community's expense, 
towards the end of the period. 
In 1982, the disparity between the Community and the 
United States as regards the volume of output in this cate-
gory expressed as a percentage of total industrial output 
stood at 5 points (compared with 4 points in 1972) while the 
disparity between the Community and Japan was 14 points 
in 1982 (compared with 3 points in 1972). · 
These results bear witness to Europe's vulnerability and to 
the difficulties experienced by Community industrialists in 
taking advantage of the opportunities available on these 
expanding markets. Up to 1974, the Community's growth 
performance for value-added was identical to that of its 
international competitors. However, the Community has not 
yet genuinely absorbed the consequences of the oil shocks. 
Nor did the United States avoid altogether the industrial 
slowdown after 1979, but its growth rate did remain positive 
(1,7 % a year between 1979 and 1982). In Japan, on the 
other hand, growth expanded even more rapidly (with value-
added by firms in these sectors rising by 15 % a year in real 
terms over the past few years). 
Moderate-demand sectors 
These sectors represent between 45 % and 50 % of value-
added in industry in the Community and in the United 
States, but only 37 % in Japan. These figures illustrate their 
importance in the industrial fabric of the first two areas 
as well as the impact that somewhat sluggish demand for 
moderate-demand products has on the general level of ac-
tivity. Admittedly, the growth differential between Japan, 
on the one hand, and the Community and the United States, 
on the other. is less marked in these sectors. than in the 
Main economic features of supply in industry 
strong-demand sectors, but it still averages 5 points a year. 
The gap is manifestly wider between the United States and 
Japan as far as the motor vehicle industry is concerned and 
between the Community and Japan for industrial machinery. 
Weak-demand sectors 
These sectors which manufacture for the most part inter-
mediate products and mass-consumption products such as 
textiles and clothing, (and which showed little signs of buoy-
ancy as far back as the early 1970s) have seen the growth 
rate of their value-added plunge after 1979, except in Japan, 
which actually performed better than in the period 1972-79 
in most of the sectors under consideration. Japan's ability 
to stear clear of the affects of the slowdown in the growth 
of economic activity and world trade after the second oil 
shock is just as striking in the weak-demand as in the 
moderate-demand and strong-demand sectors. The situation 
in the Community closely resembles that in the United 
States. However, the decline in the weak-demand sectors 
has probably contributed all the more greatly to holding 
down the growth of industrial output in Europe, as they 
account for a larger share of value-added at current prices 
than the strong-demand sectors. 
1.2 The deterioration in industrial employment 
in the Community 
The slack growth of industrial output after the first oil 
shock had a major impact on industrial employment in 
the Community. With an index of 100 in 1972, industrial 
employment in the Community was probably down to 80,3 
in 1985, a loss of 5,9 million jobs in less than 13 years. The 
corresponding indices for the United States and Japan are 
103,5 and 105,8 respectively (see Graph 2). 
The numbers employed in industry in Europe have been 
declining steadily since the early 1970s, and no net creation 
of industrial jobs has occurred in the Community as a whole 
since 1973. The rate of job losses actually gathered further 
momentum after the second oil shock (from 1,2 % a year 
in 1973-79 to 2,6 % a year thereafter). In 1972, 30, 1 million 
people were working in industry-a figure that had only 
once been exceeded since 1950, and then only slightly (30,8 
million in 1970). By 1985, the figure had fallen to only 24,2 
million. At no time in the intervening 10 years or so did it 
approach its 1972 level. The other sectors of the economy, 
and in particular market services, managed to offset only 
80 % of the job losses in industry. The number of jobs 
available thus fell a long way short of being able to accom-
modate the growth in the labour force. 
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The second feature of industrial employment in the Com-
munity has been that the contraction was on a broad front, 
affecting all sectors. In the strong-demand sectors and to a 
lesser extent, in the moderate-demand sectors, job creation 
continued until 1974, but ever since job losses have prolifer-
ated in all sectors. 
Even in the strong-demand sectors that performed best, such 
as automated office equipment and information technology, 
or electrical equipment and electronics, manpower was re-
duced by 16 % between 1974 and 1982. The smallest (per-
centage) contraction was in transport equipment, where the 
numbers employed fell by only 10 % over that period. 
Job losses were, of course, highest (over 60 % of all jobs 
lost) in the weak-demand sectors, which account for 40 % 
of industrial employment; half of the losses were concen-
trated in textiles and clothing. Italian industry (between 
1972 and 1982) was the exception here; only 80 OOO jobs 
disappeared in textiles and clothing (compared with 420 OOO 
in the United Kingdom and in the FR of Germany), while 
tlew jobs were actually created in the steel and metal goods 
sectors. 
Apart from differences in rates of contraction or in the 
timing of major job-shedding operations, the situations in 
the countries of the Community are very similar: industry 
no longer seems able to play the same active role on the 
employment front as during the 1960s. Despite some pick-
up in industrial activity, almost all the latest data available 
on sectoral employment, point to a downward trend. .; . 
By the end of 1984, industrial employment was more than 
10 % down on its 1980 level in all the Community countries 
except Denmark, with the largest losses being recorded in 
the United Kingdom. In early 1985, therefore, employment 
in the Community stood at its lowest level ever. 
Available estimares do, however, suggest some turnaround 
in the trend in 1985. There will probably be renewed job 
creation in industry in Germany, the Netherlands and Den-
mark (indeed, such a development was discernible in Den-
mark back in 1984), while Jabour-shedding should slow 
down markedly in Belgium and the United Kingdom. The 
balance of net changes in employment in the Community 
will probably remain negative, however, since the trough 
does not yet appear to have been reached in Italy and, 
especially, in France. 
The extreme flexibility of employment in the "United States 
is in marked contrast with the steady decline in the number 
of persons employed in manufacturing in Europe. Over 12 
years, US industrial employment fluctuated in line with 
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business cycles: almost 700 OOO jobs created between 1970 
and 1973; 1,7 million Jost between 1973 and 1975; 2,8 million 
created between 1975 and 1979; and 2,6 million Jost between 
1979 and 1983. The economic recovery in 1984 Jed to a 
further expansion of industrial employment as 1 million new 
jobs were created in 1984 and 1985. 
US industry also differs from industry in the Community in 
that it displays strong discrepancies between sectors. Be-
tween 1975 and 1982, a period of major fluctuations, the 
various sectors recorded significantly different rates of job 
creation or elimination. The growth employment in the 
strong-demand sectors was spectacular compared to the 
situation in Europe: 1,6 % a year over JO years, with a 
record 2 % a year between 1975 and 1980. Even in the 
moderate-demand sectors, job creation was far from negli-
gible at 0,5 % a year. 
Although quite a large number of jobs were axed in the 
weak-demand sectors, a revival in economic growth such as 
that observed from 1975 to 1980 Jed to a renewal of recruit-
ment, even in those low-growth sectors, a development yet 
to get under way in the Community. 
In the Jong-run, this has resulted in a reallocation of man-
power between industrial sectors in the United States, to the 
benefit of the growth sectors. The shift in employment from 
sectors where value-added is rising only slowly to sectors 
undergoing a period of expansion has helped to sustain 
productivity growth in US industry witheut employment 
bearing the brunt of this development as it has done in the 
Community. 
Manpower management in Japanese industry remained a 
model of stability. at least until 1982. Fluctuations from one 
year to the next in the numbers employed were very small, 
averaging 0, 1-0,2 % a year. Since 1982, job creation has 
gained momentum, and employment expanded by almost 
2 % a year between 1982 and 1985. The number of persons 
employed in Japanese industry in 1985, is expected to reach 
a record 12,2 million. a figure that was approached only 
once (12 million in 1973) during the entire period 1960-84. 
The stability of employment in industry as a whole in Japan 
is very much reflected in the situation at sectoral level. In 
1975, industrial employment in Japan contracted sharply in 
all sectors. It was not until 1979 that very robust growth in 
the strong-demand sectors led to new job creation, but at 
a rate normally associated with Japan, namely, 4.2 % a year 
between 1979 and 1982. This figure contrasts markedly with 
the 0, I % recorded in the United States and especially with 
the 2,5 % decline recorded in the Community. 
Main economic features of supply in industry 
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Altogether, in the Community, the United States and Japan 
alike, it is as though a major, but manifestly different, role 
has been assigned to employment in the adjustment policies 
adopted by all three countries to deal with declining econ-
omic growth. Industrial firms in the Community seem to 
have gradually imposed an increasing share of the adjust-
ment burden on labour, while US industrialists, facing simi-
lar conditions of low growth, appear to have managed in 
the long run to concentrate on maintaining and even expand-
ing the numbers employed in the productive sector. Al-
though the scope for adjusting recruitment rapidly to the 
level of economic activity made for wide variations from 
one year to the next in the· numbers employed, flexible 
manpower management has, in the long run, had a positive 
effect overall on the stability of employment. 
Japanese firms have followed an extremely cautious employ-
ment policy, despite enjoying exceptionally high growth 
rates. They have taken on workers only in sectors where 
productive capacity limits had been reached, and even then 
only if the markets concerned were guaranteed to expand 
vigorously. This approach is particularly striking in the 
strong-demand sectors, where, in view of the growth rates 
achieved, a more sustained recruitment policy along US or 
European lines could have been pursued. 
1.3 Trade-off between employment and pro-
ductivity 
At the macroeconomic level, productivity can be maintained 
at a certain level during a period of low growth, only at 
the expense of employment. The example of Japan does, 
however, show that priority can be given to productivity 
gains, regardless of growth. 
The varying behaviour of Japanese firms from one sector to 
another is very characteristic. Those in the strong-demand 
sectors in particular have aimed first and foremost at im-
proving productivity. At an annual rate of 11,3 % their 
value-added per capita rose two and a half times as fast as 
the average for the economy as a whole (see Graph 3), the 
intention being to keep their products as competitive as 
possible. This motive seems to have played a key role in the 
choices made by Japanese industrialists, who exported 14 % 
of their output in 1982, compared with 9 % in 1972. This 
outward-looking trade policy has obliged them to improve 
the efficiency of their productive apparatus by maintaining 
a high level of capital/labour substitution. 1 
• For a detailed description of this bank see 'Studies of national accounts 
- No 4 Structural Data Base. Tables by branch 1960-1981", Eurostat, 
1984. 
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The spectacular growth of sectoral productivity in Japan, 
which actually accelerated after 1979, is associated primarily 
with the sectors that are linked to the development of micro-
processors (automated office equipment and information 
technology, precision instruments, electrical and elec-
tronics), but the rates of growth are much higher than those 
recorded by international competitors. 
In Chapter 4 of this issue of European Economy an attempt 
is made to demonstrate that a link exists between the speed 
of dissemination of technological progress, the trade-off 
between product innovation and process innovation, and 
changes in productivity. Causal relationships are difficult to 
establish, but it remains a fact that profitability in those 
sectors is higher in Japan than in its trading partners, and 
this enables Japanese industry to finance faster growth. 
Compared with its main trading partners, the United States 
has a particularly flat productivity curve. In the moderate-
demand sectors, which represent over 45 % of total value-
added in US industry, value-added per person employed, 
expressed at constant prices, was virtually unchanged be-
tween 1972 and 1982. Productivity gains were slightly higher 
in the other industrial branches, but still below those rec-
orded by other industrialized countries. 
These differences in behaviour are due partly to the fact that 
the domestic market absorbs over 90 % of US industrial 
output, but such disparities in the rate of productivity gains 
undermine the US economy and accentuate the competitive 
pressure exerted by non-US products despite the fact that, 
in terms of level, US industrial productivity remains ahead 
of that of its trading partners. 
Some lost ground was made up in the United States between 
1983 and 1985. The gap between industrial productivity 
gains in the United States and in its trading partner was 
reduced somewhat, with American productivity rising by 
over 3 % a year, significantly up on the preceding 10 years. 
The vigorous improvement in US industrial productivity, in 
particular in 1983 (3,2 % ) shows that, despite the very high 
levels of value-added per person employed, US industry still 
has vast reserves of potential productivity that could be 
tapped, among other things, with the introduction of new 
technologies. 
While its performance has not equalled Japan's, the Com-
munity attempted.throughout the 1970s, to maintain the 
productivity trends recorded during the preceding period of 
economic expansion but, as we have seen, this entailed a 
stringent policy of job retrenchment. As external markets 
hold the key to sustained economic activity, each Member 
Main economic features of supply in industry 
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State has been obliged to seek a steady improvement in 
productivity. The strong-demand sectors have pursued this 
objective in systematic fashion. The index of productivity in 
these sectors is generally somewhere between 150 and 170 
(base year 1972 = I 00), with the figure for Denmark reach-
ing 200. The result for the United Kingdom, with an index 
of 138, was somewhat below that of its partners. 
This development has a_ctually gathered momentum in recent 
years. Despite an annual average growth rate slightly over 
2 % between 1982 and 1985 in value-added by industry in 
the Community, industrial productivity has probably picked 
up by 4,5 % a year in recent years. For industry as a whole, 
this is all the more significant in that the productivity gains 
achieved matched those recorded in the strong-demand sec-
tors between 1972 and 1982. 
The trend of industrial productivity reflects clearly the re-
sponse of businessmen to the growing difficulty they have 
in holding on to their shares of both domestic and export 
markets. The clearest improvement was in the United King-
dom, where, between 1983 and 1985, the growth of pro-
ductivity in industry (as measured since 1972) increased 
fourfold. Similar performances were also recorded in Den-
mark, the Netherlands, and Germany. 
For all that, it is too early to conclude that the Community 
countries have managed to overcome their difficulties in 
maintaining productivity gains. The satisfactory figures re-
corded in recent years are due largely to a catching-up 
process following the poor results obtained in 1981 and 1982 
in a number of countries (and especially Germany and Italy 
in 1983). A less satisfactory trend is discernible in 1985. 
1.4 Control of producer prices 
Producer prices, the third variable with which we are con-
cerned after growth and productivity, are measured here 
using the price deflator for value-added. The data available 
highlight contrasting developments in Japan, the United 
States and the Community (see Graph 4). 
Japan was the country most successful by far in controlling 
producer prices. Over the period 1973-82, industrial prices 
rose on average by only 2,6 % a year, compared with 6, I % 
for prices in the economy as a whole. However, prices in the 
strong-demand sectors have actually declined steadily since 
1975 (by an average of 4, 7 % a year between 1975 and 1982). 
Prices in the moderate-demand and weak-demand sectors 
rose by over 4 % a year on average, but most of the rise 
occurred in the earlier part of that period. In the weak-
demand sectors, prices were virtually stable between 1974 
and 1982 (an increase of I, I % a year). 
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Sectoral price differences are very pronounced, however, 
and depend on the degree of exposure to foreign compe-
tition: with its prices rising by 7,3 % a year, the most 
inflationary sector, the agri-food industry, has a rate of 
inflation 12 points higher than the electrical equipment and 
electronics sector, where prices have fallen by 4,8 % a year. 
Admittedly, the former exports only 1 % of its output, 
compared with 3 I % for the latter. The classification of 
branches by rates of price increases and that by share of 
output exported are virtually identical. 
Price trends are much more uniform from one sector to 
another in the United States. The difference between the 
rate of increase of industrial prices and that of prices in the 
economy as a whole is less than one percentage point, while 
that between the industrial sector exerting least control over 
production costs (steel, with an increase of 9,8 % a year 
between 1973 and 1982) and the least inflationary sector 
(textiles and clothing: 5 % a year) is some 5 points. Together 
with the electrical equipment and electronics sector, the 
textiles and clothing sector recorded the highest productivity 
gains between 1972 and 1982 (3 % a year). It is reasonable 
to suppose that, in the United States too, the marked slow-
down in the rate of price rises in the economy, from an 
annual average of 7,7 % between 1972 and 1982 to one of 
3,9 % between 1982 and I 985, spread to all sectors, probably 
in a uniform manner. US producers seem either unwilling 
or unable to attempt systematically to adapt price increases 
to the share of their output accounted for by exports. 
For its part the Community has managed to some extent 
to hold down cost increases in the strong-demand sectors 
(automated office equipment and information technology: 
4,8 % a year; chemicals and pharmaceuticals: 6,9 % a year; 
electrical equipment and electronics: 7,2 % a year). In the 
other sectors, however, price rises have been much more 
pronounced and have consistently outstripped those re-
corded in the United States. 
Even sectors heavily engaged in exporting, such as the indus-
trial machinery or transport equipment sector, have wit-
nessed price rises of the order of 9-10 % a year. At all events, 
irrespective of the category of sector in question, prices in 
the Community have consistently risen faster than those in 
its main trading partners. 
1.5 Summary 
The contrasting picture that emerges from an analysis of the 
main features of supply in industry in the three main trading 
partners, namely, the Community, the United States and 
Japan, is not very flattering for Europe as a whole. 
GRAPH 4: Price deflator for ,aloe-added at market prices (1972= 100) 
(EUR 7 in ECU, for the Uniled States and Japan, national currencies) 
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After the years of broadly based expansion up to the early 
1970s, what buoyant demand there was gradually focused on 
a narrower range of industrial products. Potential markets 
contracted and competition grew keener. The industrialized 
countries seem to have adopted an increasingly uniform 
pattern of consumption, with the emphasis on the same 
high-technology products. The productive apparatus in each 
country has responded differently to this narrowing of the 
market. 
Japan provides the most clear-cut example. The economic 
performances of Japanese firms are closely linked to the 
intensity of demand for their products. In the case of high-
technology products, for which there is very strong demand, 
all the economic parameters are developing satisfactorily, 
with value-added and productivity rising sharply, pro-
duction costs falling, and a net creation of jobs taking place. 
Here too, export performances have been remarkable. More 
generally, as domestic and international demands have be-
come less buoyant, industrial performances have deterio-
rated. 
Being less dependent on export markets, US industry has 
adjusted to the moderate expansion of domestic demand. 
Regardless of the type of demand, productivity gains have 
been small while producer prices have risen rapidly. By 
contrast employment has continued to expand in the strong-
demand and moderate-demand sectors despite marked cycli-
cal fluctuations. Only firms in the weak-demand sectors have 
announced large-scale redundancies. Since 1983, this long-
term pattern seems to have been broken. US industrialists 
have been faced with foreign penetration of their home 
market that has been particularly pronounced because of 
the persistent overvaluation of the dollar. In order to regain 
competitiveness on their home market, they have had to 
draw on the reserves of productivity available to them 
through the dissemination of advanced technologies. This 
has revived the growth of US productivity. and employment 
started to rise again in 1984 and 1985. 
Like Japan, the Community has relied to a large extent on 
exports to prop up economic activity. In order to remain 
competitive, it has attempted to boost productivity. Owing 
to its poor position in the strong-demand sectors, however. 
it has not managed to adapt supply to new demand trends. 
As in the United States, industrial growth has been sluggish. 
This has resulted in a sharp fall in the number of jobs 
available to wage- and salary-earners in Europe while, at 
the same time, production costs in industry have riien mark-
edly, all but keeping pace with the general rate of inflation 
in the economy. 
Industry in the Community was at a disadvantage at the 
outset when it came to meeting this new type of demand for 
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products with a high-technology content, its output of such 
products being limited. However, the expansion of supply 
in the Community, far from adding to the output of such 
products, has been so modest that Japan caught up with the 
Community before easily out-distancing it in this respect, as 
the United States had likewise done. The inadequacy of 
supply goes a long way towards explaining the loss of market 
shares and the greater degree of penetration of the Com-
munity market. 
2. Earnings and labour costs 
The main causes of rising unemployment and more rapid 
substitution of capital for labour are probably the following: 
the labour market is insufficiently flexible, per capita wages 
are expanding too fast, and unit labour costs are rising. This 
section examines these problems as they arise in the different 
sectors, with the aim of shedding a clearer light on the type 
of problems facing industry in Europe. 
2.1 Cost structures and labour market flexibility 
An analysis of labour-market flexibility is extremely complex 
and is dependent on the availability of a whole range of 
social and economic data. It may be interesting here to look 
at the sectoral dispersion of labour costs and at how they 
have evolved over time. However, for this we need harmon-
ized data on all the sectors and countries with which we are 
concerned, and the level of disaggregation should be such 
as to ensure that the variations observed between sectors 
reflect economic reality as closely as possible. Moreover, in 
view of the differences in skills between sectors, we need to 
take the hourly labour costs for a specific group of workers, 
namely production workers. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes figures on harmon-
ized hourly labour costs for workers in I 8 industrial sectors 
in six European countries, the United States and Japan. 1 
The figures for I 982 show clearly that the sectoral dispersion 
of earnings in industry is much wider in the United States 
and Japan than in the Community (the US figure is almost 
twice the French and German figures-see Table 2). 
Other studies based on more highly aggregated data for 
fewer countries have yielded comparable results.2 
• For a more detailed description of the concepts and definitions used see 
annex. 
The other four activity branches included in the totals in the tables, but 
for which data are not given separately are 'Agriculture. forestry and 
fishing', 'Fuel and power', 'Building and construction' and 'Non-market 
services·. 
Earnings and Jabour costs 
Table 2 
Sectoral dispersion of hourly labour costs of production workers in 1982 (18 sectors) 
( in US dollars/hour) 
B D F NL UK USA Japan 
I. Average hourly labour costs 9,07 9,76 7,69 7,21 9,37 6,64 11 ,13 5,57 
2. Standard deviation 1,57 1,46 1, 11 0,81 1,57 1,12 3,15 1,45 
2/ 1 Dispersion coefficient 0,17 0, 15 0,14 0, 11 0,17 0,17 0,28 0,26 
Source: Bureau or Labor Statistics. Office of Productivity and Technology; data fo r 18 industrial sectors . 
The dispersion coefficients obtained for Jabour costs in the 
European countries are closely bunched (in the range 0, 11-
0, 17); while those for the United States and Japan are very 
similar (0,28 and 0,26 respectively) . The dispersion is not 
due to productivity differentials. The sectoral dispersion of 
per capita productivity is no wider in the United States than 
in Europe. These findings confirm that at this level wage 
determination is more rigid in all the Community countries, 
than in the United States or Japan. This has several conse-
quences for the sectors in the upper and lower reaches of 
the league table of labour costs (see Table 3) : 
(i) In the sectors with low labour costs (clothing, footwear, 
furniture) , costs in some European countries, notably 
Table 3 
Range of hourly labour costs of production in 1982 
Low-cost sectors 
B 
Clothing 6.3 
Footwea r 7.2 
Furniture 
High-cost sectors 
Steel 12. 1 
Moto r vehicles 10.9 
Chemicals 10,4 
Sourf't' ' Bun:au of Lubor ta tist1cs. 
Germany and the Netherlands, were higher than those 
in the United States. This contrasts with the findings for 
industry as a whole. The relatively high level of labour 
costs in these sectors in Europe has worked to the benefit 
of producers outside Europe and is one of the reasons 
behind the rise in penetration ratios. 
(ii) In sectors with high labour costs (steel, motor vehicles, 
chemicals), there is a considerable difference in costs 
between the countries in Europe, on the one hand, and 
the United States on the other. In Japan Jabour costs in 
these sectors in 1982 were comparable to those in Eu-
rope, while labour costs in the clothing sector were much 
lower. 
( in US Dollars/hour) 
D F NL UK USA Japan 
7,1 5,6 5,8 6,7 4,5 6,5 2,9 
7,4 6,3 5,8 7,7 5,4 6,6 
10,1 6,4 6,3 8,2 6,5 8,1 4,5 
11.6 9,8 8,7 12,5 8,2 22,7 9,9 
13.3 9,1 7,7 9,9 7,7 18,7 7,2 
I 1.5 9,2 7,8 11,0 7,9 13,9 8,5 
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As one way of remaining competitive in the face of rapidly 
escalating labour costs, a number of European firms in the 
low-cost and high-productivity sectors have taken advantage 
of this situation. In Italy, for example, the increase in labour 
costs in the strong-demand sectors (electrical equipment 
and electronics, information technology) has remained very 
moderate. 
In the long run, however, there may be a movement towards 
alignment in hourly labour costs between sectors or their 
dispersion may become increasingly pronounced, depending 
on both productivity differentials and the labour-market 
situation in each sector. In the case of the countries in 
Europe for which long time series on the trend of labour 
costs are available, 1 the figures for 18 different industrial 
sectors (General Industrial Classification of Economic Ac-
. tivities within the European Communities - NACE) show 
clearly that, all in all, the dispersion of hourly labour costs 
in production has changed little over time (see Table 4). 
Table 4 )' :--
Dispersion coefficients of gross hourly labour costs of industrial 
production (18 sectors) 
8 D F NL 
October 1972 0,16 0,10 0,15 0,16 0,11 
April 1983 0.14 0,12 0,13 0.08 0.10 
I October 1982 instead or April 1983. 
N B.Thc dispersion coefficient is the ratio of the standard deviation to the average. 
Sourer: Euroitat Average gross hourly caminp actually paid to workers (industry). 
UK' 
0,16 
0,15 
In most European countries, agreements uniformly linking 
wages to prices and the existence of a guaranteed minimum 
wage in all industrial sectors have had the effect of tightly 
compressing differentials. This is particularly true in Italy 
and, to a lesser extent, in France and Belgium. An alternative 
approach to analysing the rigidity of cost structures and 
labour-market mechanisms is to measure how quickly the 
pattern of sectoral employment changes. Table 5 compares 
indices of the change in industrial employment for two 
periods: 1973-76 and 1979-82. The higher the index, the 
more the relative shares of the various sectors in total em-
ployment have changed over the period. A country in which 
industrial employment shows a marked fall but in which 
unemployment affects all sectors equally (in proportional 
terms) will have a low index of change. 
t To improve the estimation of changes in longer-term trends the figures 
are based on three-year moving averages. 
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Table 5 
Index of change in industrial employment 
B D F NL UK USA Japan 
1973-76 
1979-82 
10,5 6,9 4,8 3,4 5,9 6,1 7,0 8,2 
5,1 5.3 3,4 4,2 5,6 7,2 7,2 6,3 
NB: Th~ index. of chang~ 1s c~lculat~ using th~ expression I: (S,, . S11_1} where S,, is the share 
of mdu,;tnal sector , ( 13 mdustnal sectors m the NACE class1Jication) in total industrial 
employment in year t. Absolute values have been aggregated. 
Source_;i: Eurostat and Commission depanmcnts. 
As a measure of labour-market rigidity, this index is far 
from perfect. However, it does provide confirmation that, 
on the whole, the sectoral structure of industrial employment 
is more rigid in Europe than in the United States and Japan. 
The structure is especially rigid in Italy and France. The 
index for the UK is also very high, but this is a result of the 
marked loss of employment in certain traditional sectors. 
It is interesting to see how per capita earnings have re-
sponded to changes in the structure of industrial employ-
ment. According to the classical approach. the lower (higher) 
the level of unemployment in a particular sector in relation 
to total industrial unemployment, the higher (lower) the 
growth of wages in that sector in relation to the figure for 
industry as a whole.2 
In fact there does not seem to be any simple relationship 
between a particular variable (here, the labour market situ-
ation) and the increase in per capita earnings (see Table 6). 
In the sectors where real wages have risen rapidly, a number 
of factors have undoubtedly made themselves felt at different 
levels: trade-union power (e.g. in the printing and paper 
sector in the United Kingdom and Belgium), comparatively 
sound competitive position (e.g. in the textile sector in Italy 
and in the agri-food sector in France), vigorous expansion 
of demand (e.g. in the transport equipment sector in Ger-
many and France). 
Similarly.just as many reasons can be put forward to explain 
the wages in some sectors: competition from countries where 
labour is cheap (e.g. textiles in Belgium, Germany and the 
United Kingdom); a marked contraction in demand (e.g. 
2 The average annual growth rates of the price indexes of gross value-
added for market services and manufacturing, between 1970-72 and 1980-
82. were 9.5 % and 8,5 % for the Community, and 6,8 % and 6,0 % for 
the United States. 
building materials in Germany and the Netherlands); low 
profitability (e.g. steel in France and Belgium). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that real wage increases do not show 
Table 6 
Changes in real wages in industry 1973-82 
(in brackets: average annual growth rates) 
High gnm.th rate of 
earnings 
B Paper, packaging (5,6) 
Information tech .. precision & office equip. (5,5) 
Industrial machinery (5,2) 
DK Information. tech., precision & office equip. (4,5) 
Rubber, plastics (3,9) 
Electrical equipment and electronics (3,6) 
D Paper, packaging . (4,0) 
Rubber, plastics (3,9) 
Transport equipment (3,9) 
F Transport equipment (6,0) 
Food products (5,3) 
Chemicals "(4,2) 
Textiles. leather and clothing (3,6) 
Non-metallic minerals (3.5) 
Food products (3.0) 
NL Information tech., precision & office equip. (3.5) 
Textiles, leather and clothing (2,9) 
Electric equipment and electronics (2.6) 
UK Metal goods (4,2) 
Food products (4,2) 
Paper, packaging (4,0) 
EUR 7 Food products (3.7) 
Transport equipment (3.6) 
Paper. packaging (3.6) 
USA Chemicals ( 1.8) 
Steel and metal ores ( 1.8) 
Metal goods ( 1.4) 
Japan Food products (4,9) 
Industrial machinery (4.8) 
Information. tcch .. precision & ollice equip. (4.7) 
S,,ur,·l"\. Eurostat and C,,mmis!\ton departments . 
Earnings and labour costs 
any particular pattern in the three categories of sector 
defined according to the demand for their products (see 
Table 7). 
(%) 
Low g:row_th rate of 
carmngs 
Metal products (2,6) 
Steel and metal ores (3,7) 
Textiles, leather and clothing (3,7) 
Non-metallic minerals (2,6) 
Steel and metal ores (1,9; 
Transport equipment (2,0) 
Food products (2,1) 
Non-metallic minerals (2,4) 
Textiles, leather and clothing (2,4) 
Steel and metal ores (I, 7) 
Information tech., precision & office equip. ( 1.9) 
Electrical equipment and electronics (2,0) 
Transport equipment ( -0.5) 
Steel and metal ores (0,5) 
Chemicals (0,7) 
Transport equipment ( 1.4) 
Non-metallic minerals (1,5) 
Paper, packaging (1,7) 
Information tech., precision & office equip. (0,0) 
Textiles, leather and clothing (0,9) 
Transport equipment (1.3) 
Steel and metal ores (2,0) 
Information tech .. precision & office equip. (2.3) 
Textiles, leather and clothing (2,4) 
Textiles. leather and clothing (0.0) 
Paper, packaging (0.4) 
Rubber, plastics (0.5) 
Non-metallic minerals (2,9) 
Electrical equipment and electronics (3,8) 
Metal goods (4,0) 
. VB Reul wa~ ure defined here .1s the compcn~1tion of cmployres dcnontd by the GOP pm."C dcnator. 
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Table 7 
Labour costs and productivity in industry (average annual growth rate for the period between 1972-73/1981-82) 
Strong-demand 
sectors 
Real Apparent Real unit 
~ages productivity labour costs 
of labour 
B 4,5 4,9 -0,4 
DK 3,4 6,9 -3,3 
D 3,6 4,2 -0.6 
F 2,9 4,5 -1,6 
I 1,1 5,0 -3,7 
NL 2,4 3,6 -1,2 
UK 1,7 2,6 -0,9 
EUR 7 2,7 4,3 -1,5 
USA 1,3 2,0 -0.8 
Japan 3.8 11.3 -6,7 
Sourrrs: Eurostat and Commission depanments 
2.2 Real unit labour costs 
As long as real wages move in line with changes in value-
added per person employed. the share of earnings in value-
added in industry remains constant. In Japan. the spectacu-
lar improvement in the apparent productivity of labour 
(value-added per person employed) thus paved the way for 
large increases in real wages. It is generally considered that 
a decline in real unit labour costs (defined as the ratio of 
real wages to labour productivity) is conducive to a rise in 
employment. 1 Accordingly, the growth in unemployment in 
Europe in recent years is thought to be due in part to rising 
unit labour costs. 
The trend of real unit labour costs has dilTered significantly 
from one sector to another, the weak-demand sectors having 
been more adversely alTected than the other sectors (see 
Graph 5 and Table 7). The dilTerence is particularly pro-
nounced in Japan, where real unit labour costs fell by 6,7 % 
in the strong-demand sectors (compared with a decline of 
1,5 % in the Community) and rose by 0,4 % in the weak-
demand sectors (compared with an increase of 0.1 % in the 
Community). While they fell in the strong-demand sectors 
in all the countries studied, and especially in Italy. Denmark 
and Japan, real unit labour costs rose slightly on average in 
the weak-demand sectors in the Community and Japan. 
t See the earlier chapters in The Nell' Scri·in• En111om1·. Gcrshunv and Miles: 
Pinter 1983 and the discussion in 'The Growth or Service E~1ploymcnt: 
A reappraisal". Momigliano and Siniscalco. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro: 
Quarterly Re1•h•11·, No 142 and reforenccs cited therein. 
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Moderate-demand W eak-dcmand 
sectors sectors 
Real Apparent Real unit Real Apparent Real unit 
wages productivity labour costs wages productivity Jabour costs 
of labour of labour 
4.5 4,1 0,4 4,0 4,9 -0,9 
2.4 3.4 -1,0 2,9 4,1 -1,I 
3,4 2,6 0,7 2,8 2,2 0,6 
4,9 3,6 1,3 2,3 2,4 -0,I 
1,4 2,1 -0,7 3,0 2,7 0,3 
2,0 4.1 -2,0 2,4 3,6 -1,2 
1,2 1,0 0.3 1,4 0,4 1,0 
3,1 2,7 0,4 2,4 2,2 0.1 
0,9 0.6 0.3 I.I 1,1 -0.0 
4.6 5.8 -I.I 4.0 3.6 0,4 
(i) In the strong-demand sectors, the decline in unit labour 
costs was spectacular in Japan, owing to the remarkable 
increases in the apparent productivity of labour. Real 
unit l_abour costs in these sectors recorded slightly larger 
falls m Europe than in the United States. This was not 
characteristic of the economy as a whole. 
(ii) In the moderate-demand sectors. the dilTerential between 
productivity gains in industry in Europe and those in 
Japan was less pronounced than in the strong-demand 
sectors. Real wages rose sharply in these sectors in 
Europe (by 3.1 % a year). with the result that unit labour 
costs increased despite strong productivity gains. 
(iii) In !he weak-demand sectors, dilTerences in the growth of 
unit labour costs were minor. It is interesting to note 
th~ugh that costs in these sectors (steel, building ma-
terials, metal goods. textiles) rose faster in Japan (0,4 %) 
than in the Community as a whole (0, I %). 
The trend of real unit labour costs in these three categories 
of sector thus displayed very specific characteristics in each 
country. 
(i) With comparable real wage increases throughout indus-
tr~, but with extremely wide dilTerences in productivity 
gams between sectors, Japan found itself very comfort-
ably placed in the strong-demand sectors. By contrast, 
in the weak-demand sectors, movements in unit labour 
costs in Japanese industry were, on the whole. much the 
same as those in the other industrialized countries. The 
Earnings and labour costs 
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situation is thus highly asymmetrical. With international 
demand for their products growing rapidly, the strong-
demand sectors (electrical equipment and electronics, 
chemicals, information technology) are enjoying a con-
siderable advantage in terms of unit costs. It is around 
these sectors (including motor vehicles) that Japanese 
industry has been built up. 
(ii) In US industry, real wages increased only sluggishly in 
the different sectors of activity, but productivity gains 
were also quite modest. In the final analysis, the trend 
of unit labour costs was most favourable in the weak-
demand sectors. In the textiles sector, for example, real 
unit labour costs fell by 2,9 % a year between 1973 and 
1982. As mentioned above, it was also the sector that 
registered the lowest rise in producer prices in the United 
States. 
(iii) Overall, the trend of unit labour costs in European 
industry closely matched that observed in the United 
States, but for quite different reasons. In Europe, pro-
ductivity gains in industry easily outstripped those in 
the United States but, at the same time, real wage in-
creases were higher over time. 
2.3 Highly differentiated trends of real wages 
and labour costs in European industry. 
Compared with past trends (1973-82) recent movements in 
real wages (1982-85) are highly instructive. The growth of 
real wages per person employed in the Community slowed 
down appreciably (to 1,2 % a year between 1983 and 1985 
as against 2,9 % over the period 1973-82). No comparable 
slowdown was observed in the United States and Japan. 
where the trend discernible during 1973-82 continued. The 
policies of economic retrenchment introduced were, there-
fore, successful on the whole, with the change of trend being 
unmistakable, except in the United Kingdom. where per 
capita earnings have in fact been climbing in recent years 
(in the case of industry, by 3,0 % between 1983 and 1985, 
compared with 1.4 % between 1973 and 1982). Denmark 
and the Netherlands, on the other hand, have recorded falls 
in per capita earnings over the same period. Now these are 
also the two countries where the investment drive in industry 
has been by far the most vigorous in the Community. 
Real wage trends in recent years have had an unmistakable 
effect on unit labour costs. 
In the Community strong labour-productivity gains in indus-
try have, on the whole, combined with moderate real wage 
increases to bring down industry's real unit labour costs 
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expressed in national currency. There are, however, spec-
tacular differences from one country to another. The falls 
recorded in the Netherlands, Denmark and France (some 
4, 7 % a year on average over the three years 1983-85) 
are comparable with that registered in Japan (5,2 %). The 
performances in the first two countries mentioned are the 
continuation of earlier trends, while the improvement in 
France is attributable in part to the fact that real wages have 
been held in check. The performance in Germany over the 
past three years has been relatively mediocre but, there too, 
a definite change in trend compared with 1973-82 has been 
observed. Real wage restraint has also been a major factor 
in the decline in unit labour costs in Germany. The perform-
ance of Italian industry. on the other hand, whose costs 
were declining by close on I % a year up to 1982, lagged 
well behind the Community average in the period 1983-85 
(see statistical annex, Table 14). 
In US industry, the key to the satisfactory trend of unit 
labour costs was the vigorous growth of labour productivity. 
On average, real wages rose faster than in European industry 
(by 1,7 % between 1982 and 1985, compared with 1,2 % in 
the Community). 
The situation in industry in Japan deteriorated appreciably 
between 1982 and 1985. In 1985, real unit labour costs in 
industry are expected to fall more rapidly in the Community 
than in Japan. 
2.4 Relative labour costs expressed in common 
currency 
For a comparison of industry's unit labour costs as between 
trading partners, it is necessary to use a relative measure in 
common currency. 1 The movement of exchange rates then 
plays a key role. 
Over the period 1973-82, industry's relative unit labour costs 
expressed in common currency were static in the Com-
munity. In reality the level of Community industry's relative 
costs had started to decline appreciably in 1980 (falls of 
13,6 % in 1981 and 4,2 % in 1982 compared with rises of 
11,2 % in 1981 and 11,5 % in 1982 for United States indus-
try). With the base year 1972 = JOO, in 1980 the level of 
industry's relative unit labour costs in common currency 
stood at 119,9 for the Community as against 76.1 for the 
United States and 90.8 for Japan. In 1985. still taking 1972 
as the base year, the level of relative unit labour costs in 
1 Struc/1/r<' and Actil"ity of /111/11s1ry: A111111al Enquiry - Main r,•sulls /980/ 
8/, Eurostat. 1984. 
common currency for Community industry stood at 85,5 as 
against 89,6 for Japanese industry and 114,5 for the United 
States. The change over five years ( 1980-85) was therefore 
spectacular since it produced not only a return to the 1980 
situation but even a particularly competitive cost level. For 
the economy as a whole, the turnround is even more striking. 
Developments at the start of 1980, therefore, more than 
offset the deterioration in the Community's relative labour 
costs expressed in common currency over the preceding 
period and this reversal can be explained principally by the 
movement in effective exchange rates. 
United States industry was hit by the rise in the dollar's 
effective exchange rate. Even though real labour costs ex-
pressed in national currency fell between 1983 and 1985, 
United States industry has seen its relative labour costs 
expressed in common currency grow considerably since 1981 
and then explode in 1984. 
Japanese industry is experiencing a fairly erratic movement 
in its relative unit labour costs expressed in common cur-. 
rency, renecting the variations in the yen's effective exchange 
rate. Disregarding 1985, Japanese industry remains in a 
privileged position and its falls in relative unit labour costs 
expressed in common currency are regularly greater than 
for the economy as a whole. This situation can be explained 
by Japanese industry's productivity gains which appreciably 
outstrip the increases in compensation per employee and 
enable real unit labour costs to fall. 
In the Community, cost competitiveness is generally tending 
to improve both for the economy as a whole and for indus-
try. However, the progress recorded stems primarily from a 
more favourable effective exchange rate. 
Table 8 
Earnings and labour costs 
2.5 Summary 
A group of general conclusions · can be drawn from an 
examination of the structure of and changes in wage costs, 
productivity and real unit labour costs expressed in national 
or common currency : 
(i) The spread of levels of production labour costs in indus-
trial sectors is appreciably wider in the United States 
and Japan than in the Community. In certain Member 
States, the existence of machinery for uniform index-
ation over all sectors even tends to reduce this spread. 
Similarly, the structure of industrial employment is generally 
more rigid in the Community countries than in the United 
States and Japan. Thus, intersectoral mobility of labour is 
greater in these countries than in the Community industry. 
(ii) The smaller the growth of demand directed towards a 
sector, the more unfavourable is that sector's change in 
real unit labour costs. On the high-technology and 
strong-demand sectors, falls in real unit labour costs are 
recorded over the period 1972-82 in all the industrialized 
countries, particularly Japan. 
(iii) The performance of Japanese industry conceals very 
different situations from one sector to another. In the 
high-technology sectors, as a result of remarkable per-
formances in productivity, Japan is experiencing spec-
tacular falls in real unit labour costs whereas in the 
weak-demand sectors the cost performance of Japanese 
industry is comparable with that of the Community. 
(iv) Over the period 1982-85, real unit labour costs improved 
appreciably in certain EEC Member States, falling to an 
extent comparable with the falls in Japanese industry. It 
lndu try's relathe labour co ts expressed in common currency (1972 = 100) 
19 0 
19 5 
s,,'"'" Comm1~:,.1on dcpjrtment) 
B 
102.3 
80.9 
DK 
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F 
107. 1 
9 1.8 
87,2 
9 1. 1 
NL 
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89.6 
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remains to be seen whether the strong-demand sectors 
derived most benefit from these developments. 
(v) The Community countries have benefited from the rise 
in the dollar and the yen against the European currencies 
after 1980. Valued in common currency, relative labour 
costs in industry are therefore a priori competitive in 
the Community in 1985, especially in countries such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands, which have experienced 
particularly rigorous policies concerning real wages. 
3. Investment, capital and substitution of the fac-
tors of production 
This section discusses changes in industrial investment, fo-
cusing special attention on the way in which investment is 
allocated between sectors. The trends observed are attribu-
table in part to two factors: (i) the return on capital; and 
(ii) the productivity of capital; the latter being determined 
to a large extent by a whole range of factors (such as 
utilization of productive capacities and working time). 
The differences discernible in this respect between the three 
types of sector (strong-demand, moderate-demand and 
weak-demand) are particularly indicative of the mode of 
industrial development followed by each of the countries 
surveyed. 
Table 9 
Adjusted wage share in industry I 
PcrioJ 1972-73 
Industry Total 
cconom) 
EUR 7 74,6 74,1 
USA 77.1 73.8 
Japan2 59.1 73.8 
3.1 Compensation of employees and invest-
ment ratio 
The impact - expressed in terms of national currency -
of real unit labour costs goes a long way towards determining 
changes in total wages and salaries and hence in the share 
of value-added accounted for by the gross operating surplus. 
The increase in real labour costs was one of the reasons for 
the significant contraction observed until the beginning of 
the 1980s in the resources available to firms for financing 
investment. The adjusted wage share, that is to say, the 
compensation of employed and the income of the self-em-
ployed expressed as a proportion of value-added at factor 
cost in industry, 1 rose steadily in the Community throughout 
the 1970s (see Table 9) from 74,6 % in 1972-73 to 79,5 % 
in 1981-82, the latter figure matching that recorded for US 
industry at the time (79,8 %). The wage share though grew 
much faster in Europe (4,9 percentage points in the nine-
year period from 1972-73 to 1981-82) than in the United 
states (2,7 percentage points over the same period). In spite 
of the much more pronounced increases in real wages, the 
figures recorded for the adjusted wage share in Japanese 
industry (68,3 % in 1981-82) are significantly lower than 
those for the Community and the United States, although 
the wage share proper did rise by 9,2 percentage points over 
nine years. 
1 See for example Ba/a11ces of Paymellls: Geographical Breakdo,rn, Eurostat. 
Luxembourg. 
Pcnod 1981-82 Increase between 
the- I\\O periods 
Industry Total lndustr~ Total 
CX"OOOm) cconom) 
79,5 76,3 +4,9 +2,2 
79,8 73.8 +2.7 +0.0 
68,3 81.2 +9.2 + 7.4 
1 Compensation or employees and earnings of the self-employed as a proportion of gross \'aluc•addcd at factor cost. 
l The difTcrcm:c in Juran between the ligures obtained for industry and for 1he economy as a whole gi\cs rise to a number of qu~tions (income of the self-employed. specific nature of senices in 
Japan, etc.) 
Sounrs Eurostat, and Commission dcpurtmcnts 
Furthermore, the wage share increased more sharply in 
industry than in the economy as a whole. Such developments 
explain in part the fall in the investment ratio in industry 
(gross fixed capital formation expressed as a proportion of 
value-added in industry) (see Graph 6). Since 1973. the 
investment ratio in industry has declined steadily in the 
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Community but has risen significantly in the United States. 
Since 1982, the investment ratio in US industry has over-
taken that recorded for industry in the Community. while 
the figure for Japanese industry. after falling back between 
1974 and 1978 rose much more rapidly than in its competi-
tors. 
Investment, capital and substitution of the factors of production 
Compared with the situation in the other Member States, 
the investment ratio in industry in the Netherlands and in 
Denmark (since 1984) has risen sharply, to above the figure 
recorded in Japan. On the other hand, in 1985, the perform-
ance of the large Member States in this respect has lagged 
behind that of the United States, with none of them manag-
ing a return to the situation recorded in 1973 (see statistical 
annex, Table 16). 
In most Member States, the investment ratio showed a less 
marked decline in industry than in the economy as a whole 
while the share of value-added accounted for by wages and 
salaries imposed a greater constraint on industry than on 
the economy as a whole. The growing burden of labour 
costs has not, therefore, been fully reflected in the investment 
rate in industry. 
3.2 Investment and capital accumulation in in-
dustry 
Between 1972 and 1980, real gross fixed capital formation 
in industry grew by less than 5 % in the Community, 25 % 
in Japan and by 46 % in the United States, but 1980 was 
the year in which gross investment in European industry 
GRAPH 6: Investment ratio in industry 
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peaked. In 1985, real gross fixed capital formation in indus-
try is expected to fall short of its 1980 level in the Community 
but, for that same period, it wili probably show a rise in 
volume terms of 18 % in Japan and in the United States1 
(see Graph 7). 
The deterioration in industrial investment in the Community 
is such that the revival in investment between 1983 and 1985 
goes only a little way towards closing the gap separating it 
from the United States and Japan. The structural analysis 
in the following paragraph reveals that not all sectors have 
been affected to the same degree. 
Since 1973, but more so since 1979, the capital stock in 
industry has therefore grown at a much slower rate in 
Europe than in the United States or Japan. 2 In the United 
States, it continued after 1973 to rise at the same sustained 
rate as prior to the first oil shock, and the investment trend 
in recent years shows clearly that the capital stock in US 
industry expanded at a much firmer rate between 1982 and 
1985 than was the case in the Community. As a result, 
the Community is facing serious, deep-seated problems in 
renewing its productive apparatus (see Graph 8). 
Between 1973 and 1979, the gross capital stock in industry 
in the Community recorded a growth differential of 0,7 % 
compared to the United States and of 2,9 % compared 
to Japan. This difference became even more pronounced 
between 1979 and 1981 (3 ,2 % less than Japan) . 
In the case of the US, the average annual growth rate of 
gross fixed capital formation in industry was 3,5 % between 
1973 and 1982, and, given the trend of gross industrial 
investment in the period 1982-85, there is every reason to 
believe that the capital stock has continued to expand at 
this rate over the last three years. 
There was a very marked slowdown towards the end of the 
period in all the Community countries for which estimates 
are available (1982-85). In some of them, after allowing for 
wear and tear, and obsolesence of the gross stock, the net 
stock has probably contracted. 
1 The estimate for the period 1975-8 1 is assumed to apply to the period 
1975-82. 
2 ee M . Wegner. 'Die SchafTung von Arbeitspliitzen im Dienstleistungbe-
reich : / FO Scl111elldie11s1 6/85. 
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3.3 Capital stock, productivity and rate of re-
turn on capital 1 
Taking Community industry as a whole, the changes in the 
gross capital stock are thus giving cause for concern but we 
still need to identify those sectors in which investments 
are being made and to examine the reasons (profitability, 
productivity of capital) for the developments that are taking 
place. 
S1ro11g-de111a11d sectors 
In this type of sector (information technology, automated 
office equipment. electrical equipment, electronics. chemi-
cals, pharmaceuticals), the main conclusions to be drawn 
from an examination of investment and of the capital stock 
are the following: 
Firms in Europe that invested significantly more than their 
Japanese and US counterparts in these sectors at the begin-
ning of the 1970s have fallen way behind since the beginning 
1 An analysis of the gross rate of return on fixed capital and of the 
productivity of capital may pose certain problems because of the way in 
which the capital stock is calculated (see box). 
Table 10 
of the 1980s. In Europe, investment in growth industries 
has remained flat for close on 15 years. By contrast, US 
investment has grown steadily over the same period, while 
after 1978 Japanese industrialists managed to nullify the 
effects of the first oil shock. 
Taking the growth in real gross fixed capital formation, the 
gap separating the Community from the United States and 
Japan is still, therefore, much wider in these sectors than in 
industry as a whole. In terms of annual averages, it was 3,9 
percentage points vis-a-vis the United States and 3,5 points 
l'is-c1-1•is Japan in the period 1973-82. For the strong-demand 
sectors with a high technological content, the corresponding 
figures were 6,6 points and 6 points. And so it is in the most 
sensitive sectors that the gap has widened most. A sectoral 
analysis of profitability _and productivity indicators may go 
some way towards explaining this. 
In these strong-demand sectors, the gross rate of return2 
on invested capital calculated at replacement cost fell signifi-
cantly between 1972-73 and 1981-82, but more so in Europe 
than in the United States or Japan (see Table 10). Further-
' The gross rate of return is the ratio of the gross operating surplus to the 
gross stock of fixed capital. 
The producti\"it)· and profitabilit)" of the gross capital stock I in industry between 1972/73 and 1981/82 
(a\"erage annual growth rates) 
Strnni dcm,1nd Moderate demand Weak demand 
Gnhs Prod,11.:tt,it~ Gro,-. rate Grn,s Productivit\ Gross rate Gross Prodw:u,it, Gross rate 
l.'~1pttal 1,f ~n,,, l,f fl'lllrn c.1p11.1\ of gro;, of return capll.tl of g.ros·s of return 
,hx·k l',1Jlll,t1 ,(\11,;I,. llll 1..·apll,il: \{()Cl,. l.'.~lpll~iJ ShKk llll C,lplla\: stoclo. capital stock on capital: 
BJ 4,8 -0,6 -8,6 3.9 - 1.6 - 8.4 2,2 -1.7 -9.3 
D 3,7 -0.4 -6.0 2.9 - I.I -2.7 1,2 -2.2 -4.9 
F 5,3 -0.8 - 6.4 4.5 - 1.6 - 3,6 2,1 -2.1 -4.0 
I 3,3 1.6 - 1.9 2.5 0.1 - 1.8 2,5 0.1 0.4 
NL·1 :u -0.7 - I I. I 3.9 - 1.2 -8.0 2.3 -2.4 -10.7 
UK 2.8 - 2.0 -4,6 2.6 - 3.6 - 4.5 2.1 -5.7 -10.2 
EliR6 1 3.9 - 0.2 -6.I 3.3 -u -4.2 2,1 -2.0 -3.8 
LISA-' 4.8 -0.6 - 3.8 3.8 - 2.4 -7.6 2,1 - 1.5 -3.1 
Japan' 6,2 + 5.7 -4.8 6.8 - 1.2 -4.3 5.3 -2.3 -5.8 
1 S4.·c ~l,ti: I T.,hk 11 
: Intl\\' 1.-.,,1.· l,r 1h1.· l mh."\I St.1h.·, .md J.1p.tn. li~un.·, l'll ,.i1uc-.1Jd"'l.l ,It fot1.:h1r 1..:lht ,tn.· .1,.11l.1hk l,nl~ for rnJu~tr~ ,a\u1.·-.1JJcJ .11 m.arkct rrn:c, lcs, "~1gc~ .t.nd salJr1c..; f0r EL Rh. the l ·nucJ 
S1.,11.·, .ind J,IJ'l,lll Ill l1rd1.·r l\l JX'f11\II (lll1lf'.lrl'l'll 
I lkl\\1."\.'ll Ill:'~.-., ,lllJ \QSO-SI 
Snt,rl n I· Uflhl,ll ,lllll (_ 0 \1mn11"hlll 1,,kp,Hltnl'llb 
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more. in the Member States, the decline in profitability in 
strong-demand sectors was generally more marked than in 
the other sectors. Even more serious is the fact that, in terms 
of level, the profitability of invested capital is lower in the 
strong-demand sectors than in the other types of sector 
(weak-demand and especially moderate-demand sectors). 
This is different from the situation in the United States and 
Japan (see Table 11 ). 
It will therefore be even more difficult in Europe than 
elsewhere for strong-demand sectors to attract capital, and 
firms in those sectors will have fewer resources to invest. 
Table 11 
The relative levels of gross rates of return on the capital stock in the 
different types of sector ( 1980-81) I 
( I 00 = level for total industrial products in the area concerned) 
Strong Moderate Weak Total 
demand demand demand industrial 
products 
EUR6 71 126 88 100 
USA 114 79 128 100 
Japan 108 114 84 100 
1 This table docs not give the absolute values for the rate of return on the capital stock since 
they arc not in themselves significant because of the methods of calculation applied in each 
country. Howc\cr. a line-by-line comparison, i.e. between the different types of sector in 
each area. is sigmlicant. 
Sourn-J: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
The depressed level of investment by firms in growth sectors 
in Europe is also attributable to the fact that firms have 
difficulty in finding the capital they need to finance their 
investment plans. Firms vie for capital with general govern-
ment or with those wishing to invest abroad. 1 
A number of analyses have been made at the macroeconomic 
level of the gap between the rate of return on invested 
capital and the anticipated real interest rate on long-term 
government stock. A difficulty arises because of the need to 
calculate the forward-looking real interest rate. It is. of 
course. always possible to calculate this rate by deflating the 
nominal interest rate by the rate of price increases. The 
results thus obtained for the period 1973-82 show that the 
forward-looking real interest rate shows an upward tendency 
whereas the rate of return on invested capital is falling. 
' Sec J. Mortensen "Profitability, relative factor prices and capital/labour 
substitution in the Community. the United States and Japan. 1960-83", 
Europt•,m Economy. No 20, July 1984. 
Table 12 
Working hours in manufacturing industry 
D 
F 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
index 
hours per week 
index 
hours per week 
monthly index 
Source: OECD -· economic indicators. 
Period 
1972-73 
102,7 
43,8 
106,0 
40,7 
102.4 
Period Decrease 
1981-82 % 
98,2 -4,4% 
39,8 -9,1% 
100,0 -5,7% 
39.4 -3,2% 
99,5 -2.8% 
After 1981, the real interest rate earned by subscribers to 
government bonds was probably much higher than the rate 
of return on capital recorded by firms in three of the four 
large Community countries (Italy, United Kingdom, 
France). This situation also discourages the flow of capital to 
industry, making it even more difficult to finance industrial 
investments, especially in those sectors where the rate of 
return on the fixed capital stock is lowest, i.e. the strong-
demand sectors in Europe. 
Moderate-demand sectors 
The situation in these sectors in Europe is not as bad as in 
the strong-demand sectors. 
. Taking the period as a whole, investment in these sectors 
in Europe has experienced economic cycles of the same 
magnitude as in the United States and Japan (Graph 7), the 
trend being upwards between the mid- I 970s and 1980. In 
Europe though. these sectors were more badly jolted by the 
repercussions of the second oil shock than was the case in the 
United States and Japan, the decline continuing in Europe 
between 1980 and 1983. The revival in industrial investment 
in 1984 and 1985 in Europe will possibly not allow these 
sectors to return to a level of investment comparable to that 
recorded in 1980. 
Between 1973 and 1981.the fixed capital stock in these sec-
tors grew at a slightly faster rate in the United States (averag-
ing 3.8 % a year) than in Europe (3,3 %) but, given the 
evolution of investment in these sectors between 1982 and 
1985, the gap between Europe and the United states must 
clearly have widened further. 
The overall trend in the apparent productivity of capital 
(value-added per unit of capital stock) was altogether com-
parable in the Community and Japan. It is in these sectors 
that Community industry enjoys the highest gross return on 
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the capital stock. At first sight, therefore, it is not surprising 
that over the period 1973-81 it is in these sectors too that 
industrial investment in Europe has held up best. 
In the moderate-demand sectors, US industry recorded its 
worst performances in terms of the gross return on capital 
and capital productivity. This is due in large measure to 
the difficulties of the US motor vehicle industry, whose 
profitability collapsed between 1972-73 and 1981-82. How-
ever, the major investment drive undertaken in the industry 
and the restrictions imposed on imports of Japanese cars 
produced results, with the industry once again generating 
profits in the period 1982-85. 
In conclusion, the productivity of the capital stock in these 
sectors (transport equipment, food, industrial machinery, 
paper), which account for an important part of industrial 
activity in the Community, was much the same as that in 
the United States and Japan, and the rate of return on 
the capital stock fell proportionately less than in the other 
sectors. Even so, the 1980 recession proved particularly 
damaging for these sectors in Europe, where. after managing 
to keep pace in relative terms with the growth recorded in 
the United States and Japan, investment collapsed between 
1980 and 1983. 
Weak-demand sectors 
In these sectors (textiles, steel. building materials). existing 
productive capacities are, generally speaking. far in excess 
of what is needed, bearing in mind the outlook for demand. 
Already in the midst of extensive restructuring. these sectors 
were, therefore, harder hit by the recession than the other 
sectors. 
Unlike the other sectors, industrial investment was thus 
severely dented during the periods of economic recession 
but did not benefit from any sustained resurgence between 
1975 and 1985. These trends though have proved more 
damaging in Europe than elsewhere. Japan. for example. 
enjoyed a revival in industrial investment in these sectors 
after 1978. In Europe. investment in these sectors in 1985 
will probably be half the level it was in the early 1970s. 
There has therefore been a genuine collapse, and after 1978 
the fixed capital stock in these sectors remained virtually 
unchanged. In the United States, the fixed capital stock 
actually declined in 1981. 
Japan was the odd one out, with the weak-demand sectors 
benefiting from the general efforts made by Japanese indus-
try to boost industrial investment. However, here too, the 
underlying growth in the gross stock of fixed capital in these 
sectors faltered relative to the situation in industry as a 
whole after 1978. 
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The sound investment performance recorded by Japan in 
these sectors, which are beset by serious difficulties, cannot, 
in any event, be put down to a healthy situation with regard 
to productivity or the rate of return on capital. Indeed, 
in these sectors, the performance of Japanese industry is 
deteriorating more extensively than that of European or US 
industry, and the stagnation that set in in 1978 is expected, 
therefore, to become more pronounced throughout the 
1980s, with Japanese industry investing on an increasingly 
selective basis in the strong-demand sectors, where, by con-
trast, it has notched up remarkable performances. Therefore, 
if anything, the weak-demand sectors have benefited from 
a general climate that has been conducive to investment. US 
industry, on the other hand, has been less affected than its 
competitors in these traditional sectors. It should be pointed 
out that, in Japan, the rate of return on the capital stock in 
weak-demand sectors is below the average for industry as a 
whole, and this inevitably acts as a brake on fresh flows of 
investment into these sectors. 
In this respect, the situation in Europe is a curious one since 
the weak-demand sectors show an average gross rate of 
return on the stock of fixed capital that is higher than that 
in the strong-demand sectors and this does not facilitate an 
optimum long-term allocation of imestment. Examples of 
fresh investment will therefore be few and far between, and 
will be found primarily in the strong-demand sectors. 
3.4 Capital productivity and utilization of pro-
ductive capacity 
The decline in capital productivity in all the industrialized 
countries since 1983 is largely due to the low level of pro-
ductive capacity utilization, itself due to two factors: 
(i) The amount of time during which equipment is used has 
fallen in line with the reduction in working hours. Recent 
OECD studies show that in almost all the countries the 
growth rate of capital in relation to the number of 
persons employed is distinctly lower than the growth 
rate of capital related to the number of hours worked. 1 
(ii) The rate of productive capacity utilization, which indi-
cates the relationship between actual output and the 
potential output that could be achieved if all equipment 
installed were used. also declined significantly up to 
1982. though it increased again thereafter. 
1 OECD, 'Investment, capacity utilization and the rate of growth of pro-
ductivity·. November 1983. DSTI/IND'83.4l. 
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Weekly working hours 
Though statistics on working hours are rarely comparable 
in terms of level , it is possible to get some idea of the trend 
over the period being looked at here (1972-73/ 1981-82) in a 
number of major countries.Table 12 shows that the re-
duction in working hours in all the European countries for 
which figures are available (Germany, France and the Un-
ited Kingdom) was greater than that in the United States 
and Japan. 
These trends partly explain the decline in the effectiveness 
with which fixed capital has been used in some European 
countries in particular. In certain production processes, it is 
not always possible to offset the-reduction in working hours 
by making more intensive use of productive capital, and the 
reduction in working time thus could mean less effective 
utilization of the capital stock. 
Rate of productive capacity utilization 
In most of the industrialized countries, 1973 marked a peak 
in the rate of productive capacity utilization, one which has 
not been matched since (see Table 13). The decline in the 
rate of utilization of the capital stock has of course resulted 
in an appreciable decrease in capital productivity, when 
measured as the ratio of value-added to the gross capital 
stock but there is no undisputed adjustment method that 
will allow the rate of productive capacity utilization to be 
taken into account in the trend of capital productivity. 
Table 13 
Utilization of productive capacity in manufacturing industry 
Level 
1972- 1973 
B 83.7 
D 86,2 
F 86.9 
I 76.5 
L 84.6 
K 83.8 
E R 6 84.4 
u 85.-
1 
,\\CCU!t" for the fi"I h,1l[o[tht )Car. 
In most of the countries, the decline in the rate of productive 
capacity utilization has had a clear influence on the decrease 
in the productivity and profitability of capital. However, 
the 1982 recovery saw a significant increase in the rate of 
productive capacity utilization. 
3.5 The stock of industrial capital and its per-
formance in each economic area 
Each country or economic area is thus characterized by its 
own fairly marked pattern of development in its industrial 
investment, largely linked to the performance of its stock of 
fixed capital (profitability and productivity) in the three 
types of sectors. This · section summarizes the analyses of 
each of the major countries examined. 
(i) Japanese industry invested very heavily in all the indus-
trial sectors . In the strong-demand sectors, where there 
have been sharp price reductions as a result of economies 
of scale, the new capital installed incorporates the latest 
technology. This new, advanced-technology equipment 
allowed a substantial improvement to be made in capital 
productivity ( + 5,7 % a year on average over the period 
1973-82), in contrast to what happened in Europe and 
the United States (-0,2 % and -0,6 %). In addition to 
their performance in terms of capital productivity, the 
strong-demand sectors benefited from a very wide differ-
ential between the growth of labour productivity and 
increases in real wages, which were comparable for all 
the industrial sectors. 
(%) 
Level Dt..-crcnsc (°lo ) 1983 1984 1985 1 
198 1-82 between the 
two periods 
74.8 - 10.6 75.8 75.9 78,5 
78. l - 9,4 76,9 80.2 82,3 
82.0 - 5,6 81,5 81,9 82,6 
72.4 - 5,4 70,0 71,9 74,0 
77.6 -8.3 79.5 82,3 83,8 
73.4 - 12.4 76.6 82.5 84.6 
77.2 - 8,5 77, l '79, 1 81.0 
75,3 - I 1.9 75.2 8 1.7 81,0 
Sour,1• Bu,inc~ ,unc)) for the Communll) countnc,. 111.11n OECD 1.."Conom1c mdicjtors for the l'nitcd States. 
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By contrast, in the sectors in which demand is weak 
(steel, textiles, building materials), the average relative 
increase in unit labour costs in Japanese industry over 
the period was higher than the Community average. 
This increase in real wage costs went hand in hand with 
a significant increase in investment and capital/labour 
substitution. However, in these weak-demand sectors, 
the deterioration in the productivity performance of the 
Japanese industrial capital stock was even greater than 
that in the same sectors in Europe (-2,3 % on average 
as against -2,0 % in the Community and -1,5 % in the 
United States). 
(ii) us industry invested very heavily throughout the period 
in all sectors. In the weak-demand sectors (steel, textiles, 
building materials), it benefited from a decline in unit 
labour costs and would have been in a relatively strong 
competitive position if the trend of the exchange rate 
for the dollar had not significantly altered the facts of 
the situation after 1982. It is indeed in these sectors that 
inter-country comparison of the performance of the 
capital stock in terms of productivity and profitability 
is most favourable for the United States. 
By contrast, the performance of US industry in the 
moderate-demand sectors (motor vehicles in particular) 
is mediocre. In these sectors, significant increases in real 
unit labour costs go hand in hand with a very sharp 
deterioration in the profitability and productivity of 
capital. However, at the end of the period, the situation 
was improving. 
(iii) European industry presents fairly wide contrasts in per-
formances between the countries being considered. but 
overall it is characterized by a low level of investment 
in industry compared with the United States and Japan. 
This situation is partly due to the significant deterioration 
in the profitability and productivity of the capital stock over 
the 10 years. However, the decline in the growth rate of 
investment is also a factor in the poor performances of the 
capital stock in European industry. This is because the lower 
growth of investment means a slowdown in the introduction 
of the most recent capital equipment. This slow growth of 
capital in Europe in recent years coexists with two other 
trends: the increase in real wages and the decline in the 
return on capital. In this situation, faced with the increase 
in labour costs, firms opt on the one hand for more capital-
intensive development or move their production units to 
new locations, but on the other hand, since their profits 
are down, they cut their investment spending. European 
industry's capital stock is therefore probably proportionally 
older than the capital stock of industry in the United States 
or Japan, where the rate of new investment has allowed new 
technologies to be introduced. This situation might partly 
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explain the sharper deterioration in the apparant pro-
ductivity of capital in European industry. Clearly, however, 
this deterioration in productivity is also partly due to the 
decrease in working hours and in productive capacity utiliza-
tion rates. It is ultimately in the moderate-demand sectors 
that the deterioration in European industry's performance 
is least marked. Industries such as motor vehicles and agri-
food have certainly less to fear from comparison with the 
United States and Japan than do other industrial sectors. 
3.6 Total factor productivity 
Increased labour productivity (volume of value-added per 
person employed) reflects a whole series of influences deriv-
ing from an increase in a given production factor (capital 
stock per person employed, energy) or from an improvement 
in technology, for example. Calculating total factor pro-
ductivity allows us to assess the proportion of the growth 
in output that is not attributable to the growth of the various 
specific means of production considered in the analysis (lab-
our and capital), and the growth of total factor productivity 
is often regarded as amounting to a rate of technical pro-
gress. Factor productivity can also be considered a 'residual' 
component and may be interpreted in several different 
ways. 1 The growth rate of labour productivity may be ex-
pressed as the sum of the total factor productivity growth 
rate and of the contribution of capital/labour substitution 
to the growth of labour productivity (see footnote to 
Table 14). 
Table 14 shows, for industry as a whole. that about 1.4 % 
of the Community labour productivity gains between 1973 
and 1981 (2,8 % a year on average) was due to total factor 
productivity growth and 1,4 % to increased capital/labour 
substitution. Capital/labour substitution seems to play a 
much more important role in industry than in the economy 
as a whole: 50 % of the increase in productivity in industry 
is due to the increase in capital/labour substitution, whereas 
the proportion is only 37 % in the economy as a whole.2 
These differences are partly due to the way in which capital 
is defined in each case. Total factor productivity is calculated 
at the macroeconomic level on the basis of the total capital 
stock (including private households and general govern-
ment) which could give rise to a number of over-hasty 
conclusions with regard in particular to capital/labour sub-
stitution within the really productive part of the economy. 
1 On this suhjcct. sec D. Todd. 'Some aspects of industrial productive 
performance in the European Community: an appraisal". E11rop,•a11 Eco11-
omy. No 20. July 1984. 
' See E11ropea11 Eco11omy. No 22. November 1984. 
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An analysis of Table 14 allows a number of more precise 
conclusions to be drawn. 
In the weak-demand sector, increased labour productivity is 
essentially due to capital/labour substitution, whereas in 
the high-technology sectors the contribution of total factor 
productivity plays a crucial role. The contribution of capital/ 
labour substitution is therefore the key determinant of effec-
tive growth in the low-technology sectors. In those sectors, 
during the period 1973-81,factor substitution was respon-
sible for on average 75 % of the increase in value-added per 
employee in the Community, the United States and even 
more so in Japan, with productivity gains achieved through 
all production factors accounting for the remaining quarter. 
Recommendations regarding 'less capital-intensive' growth 
must therefore be advanced with caution, since any growth 
which is balanced in the long term must depend to a large 
extent on an increase in the capital/labour ratio. 
In the strong-demand and high-technology sectors, the in-
crease in productivity (per head) is largely due to the growth 
of total factor productivity (65 % in the case of Community 
industry, 55 % in the case of United States industry and 
72 % in the case of Japanese industry). The remarkable 
performance of Japanese industry in the high-technology 
Table 14 
Total factor productivity and relative contribution of labour and capital 
1973/1981 or 1982 or 1983 (average annual growth rate) 
Lust year Industry Strong demand 
of the period 
Produc- Total Weighted Produc- Total 
tiv. per factor change in tiv. per factor 
pcrs. cm- produc- capit./ pcrs. em- product. 2 
ployed 1 tiv. 2 lab. ployed 1 
ratio3·" 
8 1981 4,6 2,6 2,0 4.6 2,6 
D 1982 2,7 1,5 1,3 4.0 2,7 
F 1982 3,4 2,0 1.5 4,2 2,4 
I 1982 2,6 1,7 0,9 4,9 3,8 
NL 1981 3,3 1,5 1.8 2,6 0,9 
UK 1983 1,6 0,1 1.5 3,2 1.7 
EUR6 1981 2,8 1.4 1.4 4.0 2,6 
USA 1981 1,1 0.2 0,9 2,2 1.2 
Japan 1981 6.4 2,9 3.4 11.2 8.1 
sectors is thus due to the rate of technical progress, averaging 
8, I % a year in the period 1973-82. This means that the 
Japanese productive apparatus has a very great capacity 
to incorporate technological innovations and can do so 
extremely effectively in these sectors. 
As a general rule, leaving aside Japan's very particular 
situation in the strong-demand sectors, capital productivity 
is declining both in Community industry and in the United 
States and Japan. Some economists explain the slowdown 
in Japanese productivity growth by the fact that industry in 
Japan is approaching the limits of technology in a great 
many sectors. This explanation does not stand up to a 
sectoral analysis of productivity trends. It is rather in the 
most technologically sophisticated sectors that Japanese in-
dustry is the most highly competitive in terms of pro-
ductivity. The slowdown in productivity growth in Japanese 
industry taken as a whole is simply due to Japanese indus-
try's 'weaknesses' in the low-technology sectors. 
In the case of Community industry, the decline in capital 
productivity has not prevented fairly vigorous growth in 
labour productivity, resulting as we have seen from capital/ 
labour substitution. 
Moderate demand Weak demand 
Weighted Produc- Total Weighted Produc- Total Weighted 
change in tiv. per factor change in tiv. per factor change 
capil./ pcrs. em- product. 2 capit./ pcrs. cm- produc- in 
lab. ployed 1 lab. ployed1 tiv) capit/ 
ratio3·4 ratio3·4 labour 
ratio3•4 
2,1 3,8 1.9 1.9 4,5 2.5 2,1 
1,3 2,4 1,3 1,1 2,1 0,7 1,4 
1,8 3,5 2,0 1,5 2,2 1,0 1,2 
I.I 1,7 1,0 0,7 2,1 1,2 0,9 
1.7 3,6 1,8 1,8 3,1 1,2 1,9 
1,5 1,4 0,3 1,1 I.I -0.5 1.6 
1.4 2.5 1,3 1,2 2.0 0,7 1,3 
1.0 0,3 -0,7 1,0 1,0 0,3 0,7 
3.1 5.5 1.8 3,7 3.4 0,1 3,3 
.VB. Total fai:tor rroJuct1,·ity was 1.:akulatcd usin~ a prOOuction function with two factors. capital and labour. J · = A (t) / (K. l) where Vis the level of value-added produced from capital Kand 
labour L. .-4(1) rcprncnts total factor rroducti,·ity. of which technical progress is an essential component. We have (, ... 1) = a+s (k-1). where: 
I (, ... 1) is the p:rl"1\\lh rate llfla"4.lur rroductivity; 
: c, is the growth rate of total factor prOOuctivity or rate of tcchmcal progress; 
J J is the share f1f profits in ,aluc--addcd at factor cost in the base year; 
• (k,/) ,s the 3rowth rate of capital intensity per head. 
So.,rre".1 Eurostat and Comnu\.~ion dcr,artmcnts. 
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3.7 Capital/labour substitution 
The extent to which capital/labour substitution has contrib-
uted to labour productivity growth is quite comparable in 
the three industrial sectors in each major economic area. 
The growth of capital intensity per employee was about 
4,3 % for the Community, 2,9 % for the United States and 
6,3 % for Japan over the period 1973-81 (see Table 21 of 
the statistical annex). .·.-v·.n·,... , •" 
The fact that the capital/labour substitution process has 
taken place at a more or less comparable rate throughout 
all sectors would seem to indicate the importance of macroe-
conomic factors (interest rates, policy on wages)(see Graph 
9). Of course, there are differences between sectors: for 
example, the capital/labour substitution process was faster 
in the information technology and electrical equipment and 
electronics industries in most of the countries. Furthermore, 
the Community average masks significant differences be-
tween member countries. 
In some countries, the capital/labour substitution process 
took place at a faster rate in the period 1973-79 (Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Japan). A slowdown in the substitution 
process which began in the period 1979-82 continued from 
1982 to 1985 notably in Germany and the United Kingdom 
(see Table 15). 
Table 15 
Capital intensity per employee in industry 
(average annual growth rate) 
B 
D 
F 
I 
NL 
UK 
EUR6 
USA 
Japan 
I 1979-81 inslcad o[ 1979-82. 
. 
,, ,. 
Sourus: Eurostut and Commission Jcpartmcnts. 
1973-79 
7,0 
4,4' 
s;·1 · 
2,7 
6,0. 
4,3. 
1979-82 1982-85 
S,91 
4,2 2,4 
4,9 4,8 
2,5 3,6 
4.s• 
8,1 3,0 
s.01 
4.s• · 
4.7 
The high levels reached by the capital/labour substitution 
process have in practice meant a sharp fall in industrial 
employment in the member countries. Community industry 
was obliged to react to the economic crisis, and to its inability 
to adjust as rapidly as its competitors to structural changes 
in demand, by cutting its workforce in a bid to reduce total 
wages and salaries, especially since real wages were rising 
more rapidly than labour productivity, at least until the 
beginning of the 1980s. However, this reduction in total 
wages and salaries was not accompanied by sufficient indus-
trial investment. A situation has therefore developed in 
which the increase in capital intensity per employee is very 
high in Community industry because of a very rapid decrease 
in labour input, while investment remains insufficient com-
pared with that in the United States and Japan. 
. - ..,.-. ~· .n· ·.: ~'!., .... , 
· .. ;::·, .·t i 3.8 Summary 
:~;-- .~c,.S ")•• i' ·-~·,·:"'''.; _j :::• 
I. The level of industrial investment in Europe is not only 
insufficient to regenerate the fabric of industry, but the 
sectoral allocation of the investment carried out also raises 
problems. There is a danger that the strong-demand sectors 
which are the mainstays of growth might not have sufficient 
productive capacity to meet the growth in internal and 
external demand. It is in these sectors in particular that 
import penetration levels increased most sharply in the per-
iod 1973-82. Thus, in the period 1973-82, the average annual 
volume growth in GFCF for Community industry as a whole 
was 4,5 percentage points below that in the United States 
and 3, 7 points less than in Japan. In the same period, taking 
the strong-demand sectors. the gap in the average annual 
growth ofGFCF was 6,6 points compared with US industry 
and 6 percentage points compared with Japanese industry. 
The leeway which has built up is therefore considerable, and 
this gradual long-term slowdown in industrial investment 
must have had far-reaching effects on the fixed capital stock 
which has emerged as obsolescent from the crisis. 
2. This weakness in industrial investment in Europe is partly 
due to the deterioration in the profitability of the capital 
stock. In the high-technology sectors in particular. the de-
terioration in the gross rate of return on capital is greater 
in Community industry than in the United States and Japan. 
Hence the difficulty in raising the necessary finance. particu-
larly since the interest rates which subscribers can obtain on 
government bonds is higher than the rate of return on capital 
in firms in many European countries. ,.i; .. ~- · 
3. The appreciable deterioration in gross profitability is also 
due to: 
(i) the decline in capital productivity. which is itself partly 
due to a reduction in working hours and in the utilization 
of productive capacity; 
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(ii) the increase in real wages (between 1973 and 1982 in 
particular),which has been significantly greater in the 
Community countries than in the United States and 
Japan. 
Given the fall in their profits, European firms have cut back 
on investment very considerably, while at the same time 
seeking to reduce their total wage bill after 1982 in an 
attempt to avoid any increases in labour costs. The increase 
in capital intensity per employee thus reflects the cut-back 
in labour, while industrial investment remains insufficient 
compared with that carried out by the Community's part-
ners. 
4. The pace of capital/labour substitution in any one country 
has been more or less comparable throughout all sectors of 
industry, but the differences in the growth of capital intensity 
per employee as between countries are substantial. This 
would seem to show the importance of the impact of national 
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macroeconomic factors (interest rates, wage policy) on the 
capital/labour substitution process. 
5. In the low-demand sectors, the increase in per capita 
productivity is essentially due to capital/labour substitution, 
while in the strong-demand and high-technology sectors 
the rate of technical progress plays a key role. Thus, in 
Community industry, capital/labour substitution accounts 
for two thirds of the increase in per capita productivity in 
the weak-demand sectors, whereas it accounts for only one 
third of the increase in the strong-demand sectors. 
6. In the high-technology and strong-demand sectors, Ja-
panese industry shows a remarkable aptitude for incorporat-
ing technological progress into the production process. The 
annual growth rate of total factor productivity in these 
sectors between 1973 and 1982 was 8, I % in Japan compared 
with 2,6 % in Community industry and 1,2 % in US industry 
during the same period. 
-------------------------------
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Problems in using the capital stock for the purposes of economic 
analysis 
Studies on profitability1 have shown that the gross rate of 
return on invested capital calculated at replacement cost is the 
profitability indicator best suited for a general analysis of 
growth. At the level of sectoral economic analysis, this variable 
is estimated on the basis of the ratio of the gross operating 
surplus to the gross capital stock at replacement value. Some 
studies2 also apply a net rate of return on invested capital; this 
is obtained by calculating the net operating surplus (less interest 
payments and tax) as a percentage of the net capital stock at 
replacement cost. Unfortunately, calculations of net stock based 
on the capital stock less scrappings and depreciation need to be 
treated with caution since the depreciation calculations rely on 
mathematical formulae that provide only a rough reflection of 
the economic reality of obsolescence. From this point of view, it 
is 'reasonable' to look at the gross capital stock. The profitability 
analyses carried out here for the three sectoral classifications 
(strong-demand, moderate-demand and weak-demand sectors) 
are based on the gross rates of return on the capital stock at 
replacement cost. The perpetual inventory method has been 
used here to calculate the fixed capital stock.3 
At any rate, all the studies on the rate of return on the capital 
stock suffer from a wide margin of uncertainty as regards the 
estimates made of the capital stock. These were calculated using 
the perpetual inventory method and assume a constant average 
life for capital and constant rates of depreciation for the different 
stock components. Since the first oil shock, relative prices in 
industry have fluctuated markedly and a whole series of factors 
have created distortions between the theoretical estimates of the 
capital stock and the actual situation, and this has significantly 
affected the measures of the profitability and productivity of the 
capital stock. 
1 Sec J. Mortensen 'Profitability. relative factor prices and capital/labour substitution in 
the Community. the United States and Japan. 1960-83". op. cit. 
' T.P. Hill. Profiu and ra/es of murn. OECD. Paris, 1979. 
1 For the countries in Europe. sec Th. Paccoud, 'Le stock de capital fixc industricl dans 
le, pays de la Communautc Europccnne·. Etudes de comptabilite nationale. No 2. 1983. 
For the United States and Japan, national sources. 
(i) Higher energy and raw material prices 
The huge increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 have led 
to extensive scrapping of equipment, especially in the sectors 
heavily dependent on energy (refining, petrochemicals, ce-
ment, paper). The sharp reductions in energy intensity (en-
ergy consumption per unit of output) are evidence that 
equipment and complete production units have been re-
placed in a bid to conserve energy. This accelerated scrap-
ping, which the perpetual inventory method does not take 
into account, produces a higher capital coefficient than the 
calculations made. 
(ii) Accelerated scrapping 
Confronted with sluggish demand, many industrial sectors 
have been obliged to undertake severe capacity cutbacks. A 
good example here is the European steel industry, where 
productive capacity was reduced sharply between 1973 and 
1982, in response to changes in market conditions. Some 
production units in the chemical industry are working at 
under 60 % capacity and there is reason to believe that a 
fair proportion of its productive apparatus will never be put 
back into service. 
The reservations expressed here regarding the calculations incor-
porating the capital stock estimates are just as pertinent at 
sectoral level as macroeconomic level. Yet it is still possible to 
compare long-term trends in the countries surveyed provided, 
of course, it is assumed that, overall, the phenomena discussed 
above (accelerated scrapping, equipment life) come into play in 
the same way in all countries. This is a realtively strong hypoth-
esis but without it no comparison of trends is possible. 
Lastly, in view of the different methods used in each country to 
calculate the capital stock, it is virtually impossible to make 
any comparisons in terms of levels. Such comparisons between 
sectors in a particular country are possible but tricky. 
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Chapter III: The development of market services in the European Com-
munity, the United States and Japan 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development 
of market service activities in the European Community. the 
United States and Japan over the decade to the early 1980s. 
and to throw some light on why these developments have 
taken place. The term "Market services· is used to cover all 
services which can be the object of purchases and sales on 
the market. and which arc produced by a unit whose re-
sources arc mainly derived from the sale of its output. In 
the present study the term 'Total market services· covers a 
wide range of activities for example; wholesale and retail 
trade: lodging and catering services; all transport and com-
munication services; the services of insurance credit and 
financial institutions and personal and business services of 
various kinds (including the renting of dwellings). Market 
services excludes collcctin: services produced by general 
go\·crnmcnt. 
The chapter is divided into two parts: 
(iJ the first describes the changes in economic structure that 
ha\c occurred in the 10 years to 1982 and points to the 
increased importance of market service activities in the 
Community and the United States: 
(ii) the second examines the pattern of demand for market 
services and shows that. in recent years. in the Com-
munity. the growing demand for services hy industry 
has hccn the major innucncc on the growth of market 
scn·iccs output. 
The analysis 111 the first part of the text together with the 
supporting tables and graphs arc hascd upon the data given 
in the Eurostat sectoral data hank. 1 This hank provides 
data on value-added employment. in\·cstmcnt and related 
variables for the Mcmhcr States of the European Com-
munity. according to the concepts and definitions of the 
European System of Accounts (ESA) and the associated 
nomenclature of cn,rwmic acti\ itics. the NACF. 2 
Comparable data have also hccn prepared hy the Director-
ate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. for the 
United States and Japan. 
It should he stressed that there arc gaps in the data. For 
certain countries and certain acti\ity branches ohscn·ations 
arc missing for a numhcr of years. These gaps make it 
dirticult to construct figures for the Community of 10 
1 For a detailed dc,niption of this hank ,cc 'Studic, of nati,1nal accoun1' 
No 4 Strul'lural Data Base. Table, h, hrand, l!Jhtl-llJXI'. Furo,tat. 
l 11H4. 
1-'or a morl' deta1kd dl':-.l'npt1011 l\r thL' l'1..1ncl'ph and d1.:ll111tions u,ed Sl'l' 
annex. 
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countries. Consequently the figures given in the text. tables 
and graph, for the Community. are for the grouping of six 
countries - Belgium, FR of Germany. France. Italy. the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This group of 
countries accounted for more than 95 % of Community 
GDP in 1982. 
1. A comparison of changes in the structure of 
the European, American and Japanese economies 
This first section summarizes the more general changes in 
structure that have occurred. in the abO\e three economies. 
over the past decade. In particular attention is focused upon 
changes in: 
(i) the structure and the growth of value-added: 
(ii) employment and labour productivity: 
(iii) the structure of gross fixed imestment: 
(i\) earnings and gross profits. 
In the tables data are given for market services and. for 
comparative purposes. for manufacturing industry and the 
whole economy.·' 
1.1 Increased contribution of market services 
to total gross value-added 
There arc a number of ways in which the contribution of 
market services to total economic acti\·ity can be measured. 
One is to consider the the proportion of total gross value-
added (TGVA). measured at current prices. generated hy 
market services and to estimate how this proportion has 
changed. The a\ailahle data point to a significant increase 
in the \ alue-addcd contribution by market services. in the 
Community. the United States and Japan owr the period 
1970-72 to 1980-824 with the mo\·ement for the Community 
more marked than ebcwhcre. Owr the same period the 
contribution of manufacturing acti\ities fell. The details are 
set down in Tab!.: 1 In interpreting this table it should be 
kept in mind th:1t data are only given for the acti\·ities 
market sen ices. manufacturing and for the Wtals of each of 
the economics in question. Thus in 19SO-tC market scniccs 
·' The ,1thcr four acti, it) hrand1c, 1nduJ~d in the t,itab in th,' t,thlcs. hut 
fnr \\ hich data art.· lllll gi\l'll sc:paratd> an: ·Agril·tdtun .. ·. ft..)ft.'str) and 
fishing'. 'Fuel and P''''<'r'. ·Building an<l ,·,,nstru,·ti,,n· anJ ·:-.:,,n-mark~t 
Sl'l"\'li.'l'S . 
J T1.l impr,nl' the.: c:st1matil)ll l,r 1..·hang1..·:-. in lt..lllgi..·r-tt:rm trl'nd:-. tht.: ligun:s 
an· ha,t.·d llll 1hn .. ·c-~L':lr nH~, mg ~1,erag.c:s. 
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Table I 
Contributions of market services and manufacturing to total gross value-added, 1970-72 and 1980-82 1 
Based on data at current prices 
Market services Manufacturing industry 
1970-7::! Change 1980-82 1970-72 Change 1980-82 
D 35,8 5,6 41.4 35,6 -5,6 30,0 
F 40.4 4,5 44,9 28,5 -2,6 25,9 
I 38,8 0,7 39,5 28.3 0,5 28,8 
UK 40.1 0.9 41.0 31,2 -6.4 24.8 
EUR 62 38,8 3,5 42.3 31,0 -4,3 26,7 
USA 47,1 2.5 49,6 24.7 -3,5 21,2 
Japan 43.5 2.7 46,2 32.8 -4,6 28,2 
1 I o 1mpnnc the 1.":-.ttm,ll1on or d1angc" in longer-term trends. the ligurcs rn Tahlt.:s I to 9 ,ire hascd on thrL-e yc;:ir moving averages. 
(%) 
Total 
1970-72 Change 1980-82 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
2 l :nk,,. othcrn 1,c :-.l.ll,.:d lhroughout this nnt1..· th,: term f:t · R 6 co,cr, the grouping Gcm1an} { D) .,._ France (F) ... Italy {I) + United Kingdom (UK) + Belgium (B) + the Netherlands {NL). 
S1,11Ttt' rurn,tat aml c.·ommission service:-. 
Table 2 
Conlrihutions of market sen·ices and manufacturing lo total gross rnlue-added, 1970-72 and 1980-82 
Based on data at current prices 
Market :-.en 1,:c:-. M,rnufacturing industry 
!1>70- 7::! ('h,lngl' ]lJSO-X::! J47t) ... ::! Change 19SO·X~ 
D 36.7 4.6 41.J .l3.9 -2.9 31.0 
F 40.1 4.7 44.8 27.5 -0.3 27.2 
I 37.8 2.0 .19,8 29.3 2.3 31.6 
UK 40.0 2.X 42.8 29.8 -5.9 23.9 
FllR 6 38.8 J.7 42.:i 29.7 - 1.6 28.1 
l IS:\ 45.5 4.2 49.7 23.1 -0.9 22.8 
Japan 44.0 - 0.3 4J.7 28.7 5.7 J4.4 
.\',,11r11· I llh"t.11 .rnd ( \,mm1"wn 't.'n ll'\.'' 
" 
' "' 
TlHJl 
!9i0-11 Ch.ingc 1980-82 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
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and manufacturing contributed 42,3 % and 26,7 % respect-
ively to the total gross value-added of the Community. The 
remainder was accounted for by the other four main activity 
groups; Agriculture (3,3 %); Fuel and power (6,4 %); Build-
ing and construction (6.8 %) and Non-market services 
(14.5 %). 
The figures for the Community are the result of somewhat 
different changes in each of the four large Community 
countries. Thus in Germany, the increase in the contribution 
of services, and the decrease for manufacturing. were very 
marked indeed. On the other hand. in Italy. the current price 
data point to a modest increase in the contribution to the 
total by both market services and manufacturing. Jn the 
United Kingdom the increase in the contribution of market 
services was modest and the fall for manufacturing substan-
tial. although the latter movement was offset by the in-
creased contribution of energy producing activities. 
The data in Table I combine the effect of both volume 
and price movements. Changes in the contribution of each 
activity to total gross value-added based on constant price 
data (see Table 2) provide a measure of volume movements 
alone. 
The data show that. both for the Community and the United 
States. the increases in the contribution of market services 
to TGV A were greater. and the declines in the contribution 
of manufacturing were less marked when measured at con-
stant prices. than when measured at current prices; this 
contrast is also to be seen in the data for each of the large 
Community countries except Italy (see Table 2). Indeed. in 
Italy. the manufacturing contribution. when ~easured at 
constant prices. rose significantly. It is possible to explain 
these differing structural changes by noting that in Europe 
and the United States. over the period 1970-72 to 1980-82. 
the prices of manufactured goods increased more slowlv 
than prices in market services and indeed in the economv a·s 
a whole. so that any analysis based on current price data 
exaggerates the decline of manufacturing activities. 
However. it is for Japan that the contrast between the 
current and the constant price data is particularly marked. 
Thus although. when measured at current prices. the changes 
in the structure of value-added in Japan were similar to 
those observed elsewhere. a completely different picture 
emerges from the constant price data. with the contribution 
of market services falling (albeit modestly) and that of manu-
facturing increasing substantially. 
These movements rellect the small increase in the price index 
of gross value-added for Japanese manufacturing industry 
of 3,0 %. at an average annual rate. over the 10 years to 
1980-82. compared to an average annual increase of 7.2 'Yo 
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Table 3 
Average annual growth rates of gross value-added at market prices 
over two foe-year periods: (i) 1969-71 to 1974-76; (ii) 1975-77 to 
1980-82 
Based on data at constant I 975 prices 
r%, 
Market Manuf .. u.:turmg Total 
~n•~ mdustr) 
Ill (it) 
"' 
HJ) (I) (iiJ 
D 3.7 4.0 2.1 1.4 2.9 2.7 
F 5.4 3.7 4.9 2,0 4.3 2,6 
I 4,0 3.4 4.2 3.8 3,3 2.9 
UK 2.7 2.0 1.0 -2.2 2.4 0.8 
EUR 6 4.0 3.4 3.0 1.4 3,3 2.3 
USA 3,8 3,8 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.9 
Japan 5.0 1 5.1 5.3 1 8.8 4.7 1 5.6 
I 1970-7~!01975-77 
Source: Eurostat and Commission sen1ce~. 
for market services. The difference between these two growth 
rates. 4.2 percentage points. was much greater in Jap;n than 
in the Community or the United States.I 
Thus. when measured at constant prices. the shift in the 
structures of value-added in the Community and the United 
States towards market services was not repeated in Japan: 
instead manufacturing industry increased its strength and 
importance. 
The difference in volume movements are also illustrated by 
the growth rates of gross value-added as measured at con-
stant prices. These are summarized in Table 3. In the period 
to the early 1970s. in the four major European countries. the 
average annual growth rate of value-added in manufacturing 
was greater than that for the economy as a whole. whereas 
that for market services was broadlv the same or somewhat 
less. However there is now e\·idence. to suggest that the roles 
of market services and manufacturing h;~.e been reversed. 
Thus for the Community. over the period to 1980-82. the 
value-added growth rate for market services moved further 
and further ahead of both that for manufacturing. and for 
the economy as a whole. This experience was shar;d by each 
1 The average annual g.nn, th ratc-s of the price indexes of gross ,·alue-addcd 
for market sen ices and manufacturing. t,emc-.:n 1970-7~ and I 980-S2. 
were 9.5 °11 and~.) no f1..1r thl!' Communitv. and 6.8 °o and 6.0 °o fl.)f thL' 
Uniled States. · 
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of the major Community countries with the exception of 
Italy where gross value-added in manufacturing continued 
to grow significantly faster than the total economy. 
The change in the structure of growth in the United States 
was marked by a significant weakening in the growth of 
value-added in manufacturing whereas growth in market 
services remained close to 4 % per annum at an annual 
average rate. 
r •• \ 
In contrast in Japan the gross value-added. of market ser-
vices, in the five-year period to 1980-82, grew more slowly 
than the economy as a whole and growth in manufacturing 
accelerated sharply. 
1.2 A marked change in the pattern of employ-
ment, and in Europe, an improved labour 
productivity performance in market services 
In the European Community, the change in the pattern of 
value-added growth noted in Table 3 was associated with a 
change in the structure of employment with the numbers 
employed in market services increasing by 15 % (see Table 
4). This increase more than offset the decline in manufactur-
ing, and overall employment increased slightly. 
In the United States the steady growth of market services 
was associated with a massive increase in market service 
employment (33 %). There was also a very small increase in 
manufacturing activity employment. When account is taken 
of the increase in employment in other activity branches 
Table 4 
Employment: 1970-72 and 1980-82 
1970-72 
D 
. \;: f· 8 262 F 
·I 6 974 I ·', S 728 
UK " '9171 
EUR6 33 529 
USA 37 642 
Japan 21 249 
Change 
702 
I 538 
I 336 
I 053 
5 123 
12 282 
5 512 
8 964 
8 512 
7 064 
10 224 
38 652 
49 924 
26 761 
..,, .· 
(largely non-market services), then total employment in-
creased by more than 21 % over the I O years to 1980-82. 
In Japan, the vigorous growth of manufacturing gave rise to 
little change in manufacturing employment, whereas market 
service employment advanced strongly. 
In the Community, the United States and Japan the growth 
of gross value-added per head (labour productivity) in manu-
facturing industry has, in the past, been greater than that 
for the economy as a whole, whereas that for market services 
has been less. The explanation normally advanced for this 
difference is that the labour intensive and personal nature 
of many service activities makes it difficult for them to 
enjoy the kind of productivity gains that are normal in 
manufacturing industry. Indeed many economic commen-
tators have argued that this difference oflabour productivity 
growth rates, reflecting the nature of the production pro-
cesses for goods and services, accounts for the shift in the 
structure of employment towards market services that has 
occurred in Europe and the United States 
This pattern of labour productivity growth rates appears to 
have persisted until the mid- l 970s. However, there is some 
evidence that, in the major European countries (with the 
exception of Italy), the Community as a whole, and the 
United States, the gap between labour productivity growth 
rates in services and manufacturing has narrowed and that 
labour productivity growth in services has moved close to 
that for the total economy (see Table 5). This convergence 
of labour productivity growth rates occurred at the same 
. time as an underlying slowdown in labour productivity 
growth . 
.r 
;. ~: ': 
Manufacturing industry 
1970-72 Change 1980-82 
9 561 - I 347 8 214 
5 577 -429 5 148 
5 464 95 5 559 
8 098 - I 691 6 407 
31 019 -3 889 27 130 
19 178 948 20 126 
14 512 -26 14 486 
1970-72 
26 647 
20 942 
19 728 
24426 
100 180 
87 117 
54 630 
'.'I 
Total 
Change 
-692 
575 
I 190 
117 
I 199 
18 855 
5 490 
/'()(}()) 
1980-82 
25 955 
21 517 
20 918 
24 543 
IOI 379 
105 972 
60 120 
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Table 5 
Average annual growth rates of labour productivity o,·er two lhe-
year periods: (i) 1969-71 to 1974-76; (ii) 1975-77 to 1980-82 
Market Mjnuf.u.:1u11ng: l111.1l 
-.c:rv1cc:~ mdu,tr~ 
It) (11) ltl (II) ltl (II) 
D 2,9 2.8 3.9 , , 3.3 2.4 
F 3.1 1.8 4.1 3.8 3,8 2.5 
I :u 0.9 3.5 4.0 3.0 2.2 
UK 1.7 0.9 2.8 0.6 , , 0.9 
EUR 6 2.6 1.8 3.9 2.9 3.2 2.1 
USA 1.21 0.6 2.8 1 1.2 1.21 0.6 
Japan 2.6 1 2.7 5.8 1 8.4 3.8 1 4.4 
I JlJ70- 7~ hl llJ/(,_ .... 
.",'ouri c turo,rar and ( ·,,mm111111,1 11·r11( 1·1 
As the massive increase in employment would suggest labour 
productivity growth rates also declined in the Unitd States: 
indeed they were virtually negligible both in the service 
activity branch and for the economy as a whole in the five 
years to 1980-82. 
In Japan. la hour productivity growth for the whole economy 
remained substantially greater than in the United States or 
Europe. At the individual branch level however. productivity 
performances differed markedly. Gross value-added per 
head in market services grew at a steady 2.6 ° o per annum 
whereas in manufacturing activities a much more impressive 
average annual rate of 8.4 "lo was recorded towards the end 
of the period considered. 
The results for the four large Community countries given in 
Table 5 may he grouped into t\H1 categories. In Germany 
and the United Kingdom labour productivity growth in 
market services moved ahead of that for manufacturing 
activities and. in the former case. ahead of that for the 
economy as a whole. On the other hand. in France and Italy 
labour productivity growth in manufacturing maintained 
an impressive strength. whereas that for market services 
weakened considerably. 
By comparing Tables 3 and 5 it will he seen that. in the 
European Community and for the economy as a whL1Ie. 
output and la hour productivity growth were ·broadly the 
same. However. in the United States although output growth 
remained relatively vigorous.productivity growth was vir-
tually zero. particularly in the five years to 1982. so pointin!:! 
to a substantial increase in employment. 
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In Japan the growth of output remained perhaps I % ahead 
of output per head so ensuring that the impressive pro-
ductivity gains were not reflected in a loss in employment. 
For a more detailed examination of these points see box 
'Changes in employment and hours worked in certain mar-
ket service activities·. 
1.3 Market service activities increase their con-
tribution to total investment 
For the European Community the changes in the patterns of 
growth of gross value-added. productivity and employment. 
already noted. have been associated with changes in the 
structure of gross fixed investment and. as a consequence. 
of the capital stock. Thus over the decade to 1980-82. there 
was an increase in the proportion of the rnlume of total 
gross fixed investment undertaken in market services. offset 
by a decrease in the proportion undertaken by manufactur-
ing (see Table 6). When allowance is made for investment 
in dwellings. the increase in the total accounted for by 
other market service activities is even more marked. Thus 
following national accounts conventions investment in 
dwellings is included in the activity market services and 
Table 6 presents these data separately so as to reveal the 
changes in the contribution of market services in the nar-
rower sense. (However. it should he noted that a significant 
part. although hy no means all. of the structural shift which 
this disaggregation reveals. will be the result of investment 
undertaken by various financial institutions. for the purpose 
of leasing to companies engaged in manufacturing acti\·ities.) 
This change in structure. and its implications for the capital 
stock. when combined with the movements in labour pro-
ducti\·ity already noted. suggests there may have been a 
process of both capital widening and of capital deepening 
in the sen·ice activities. Such a process could well lead to a 
change in the nature of senice producing activities with 
perhaps less emphasis on labour intensive personal services 
and more on capital intensive services provided to enter-
prises (sec hox on 'Changes in employment and hours 
worked'). 
These developments are broadly reflected in each of the 
four large Community countries (see Table 6) with their 
magnitude being particularly substantial in Germany and 
the United Kingdom. countries where. however. in recent 
years investment by enterprises classified to market services. 
for the purposes of leasing to manufacturing undertakings. 
has been important (sec box ·The leasing L)f inwstment 
goods· for more details). 
In the United States Ll\'Cr the 10 years to 1980-82. there was 
no clear shift in the structurcs L)f imcstment away from 
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Table 6 
Contributions of market services and manufacturing to total gross fixed investment 
Based on data at constant 1975 prices 
(%) 
Market services Manufacturing industry Total 
1970-72 Change 1980-82 1970-72 Change 1980-82 1970-72 Change 1980-82 
D 50,8 5,1 55,9 20,8 -3,4 17,4 100 100 
F 53,6 2,0 55,6 19,0 -2,2 16,8 100 100 
I . 52,5 2,8 55,3 22,1 -3,3 18,8 100 100 
UK 50,6 4,8 55.4 18,1 -4,6 13,5 100 100 
EUR6 51,5 3,9 55,4 20,0 -2,9 17,1 2 100 100 
USA 50,4 5,0 55,43 11,5 2,3 13,83 100 100 
Japan 44,0 -2,6 41,4 22,7 -3,5 19,2 100 100 
1 The contributions in % for Market services excluding investment in dwellings are: 
1970-72 Change 1980-82 
30,5 D 
F 
23,0 
23,8 
23,8 
16,0 
7,5 
4,7 
7,0 
28,52 ·. ,;~ : 
I 
UK 
EUR6 
USA 
Japan 
l 1979-81. 
.\ 1978-80. 
Sourer: Eurostat and Commission services. 
24,3 
24,8 
22,l 
10,7 
6,1 
13,3 
0,9 
30,8 
26,7 
manufacturing and towards market services even when al-
lowance is made for the decline in investment in dwellings. 
In contrast to the developments observed for Europe and 
the United States there appears to have been, in Japan, a 
decline in the contributions of both market services and 
manufacturing activities to total gross fixed investment as 
between 1970-72 and 1980-82. However, an analysis of the 
year-to-year changes in structure shows that it was in the 
mid- l 970s that the contribution of manufacturing to total 
investment fell markedly, by some five percentage points. 
By 1980-82 the contribution was increasing again towards 
the levels recorded in the early 1970s. In contrast, the contri-
bution of market services increased over the first part of the 
decade but then fell somewhat. Over this period the declines 
in the contributions of manufacturing and market services 
were olTset by increases from the activities energy and non-
market services. These developments are also illustrated by 
the growth rates of investment set down in Graph I. The 
substantial increase in manufacturing investment occurred 
in the early 1980s at the same time as the acceleration in 
labour productivity in manufacturing activities given in 
Table 5. Over the same period investment in market services 
activities grew at a modest but relatively steady pace. 
In the United States, on the other hand, it was market 
services investment which declined after the first oil price 
shock and then recovered strongly whereas manufacturing 
investment continued to grow at a strong pace. 
In Europe the growth performance of market service invest-
ment was somewhat stronger than that of manufacturing 
throughout the 10-year period, a development which con-
firms the change in structure already noted. However, both 
rates of growth remained modest compared to those reached 
in the United States and Japan. 
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1.4 The growth of earnings per head in market 
services below that observed for manufac-
turing 
It can be argued that the increase in market service employ-
ment and, in Europe, the change in the structure of fixed 
investment, should be reflected in the development of earn-
ings per head, and indeed this does appear to be the case. 
Thus in the Community, the United States and Japan, 
through the I O years to 1980-82, earnings per head advanced 
more slowly in market services activities than in manufactur-
ing, although there is evidence that the growth rates were 
converging towards the end of the period (see Table 7). 
From these data, it is not possible to judge whether the 
slower growth in earnings in market services reflects actual 
difTerences in hourly earnings paid (for example) or the 
greater number of part time workers employed by undertak-
ings such as shops and hotels. 
The figures for the Community broadly follow developments 
in each of the large Member States with the exception of 
Italy where the growth of earnings per head in services had, 
by 1982, moved ahead of that for manufacturing. 
Similar results are obtained if growth rates for real earnings 
per head are calculated. Thus in Europe and the United 
States the growth of earnings per head in real terms, in 
market services, remained significantly below that recorded 
for manufacturing activities (see Table 8) and this lends 
support to the view that the growth of employment in 
market services has been partly in response to favourable 
developments in labour costs. 
1.5 In the European Community and the 
United States, the share of profits in value 
d~velops more favourably in market ser-
vices 
The movements in gross value-added, employment and earn-
ings per head already noted, imply a change in the structure 
of gross profits. Indeed there have been marked changes in 
the share of gross profits in gross value-added in market 
services and manufacturing as between 1970-72 and I 980-
82. Figures of relative gross profit shares for these two 
sectors are set down in Table 9. Thus, in 1970-72 the gross 
profit share in market services in the Community as a whole. 
was a substantial 49.4 % above that for manufacturing 
activities. However. a marked increase took place between 
1970-72 and 1980-82 with the relative market services gross 
profit share becoming 66.4 % greater than that for manufac-
turing. 
This increase in relative gross profit shares also occurred in 
the four large member countries with the exception of Italy. 
A similar increase also occurred in the United States with 
the relative gross profit share in market services rising to 
almost 100 % above the level for manufacturing. 
Table 7 
Average annual growth rates of the compensation of employees per 
head over two five-year periods: (i) 1969-71 to 1974-76; (ii) 1975-77 
to 1980-82 
(%) 
Market Manufacturing Total 
services industry 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
D 9,7 1 5,8 10,2 1 7,1 9,71 6,0 
F 12,5 1 12,9 14,41 14,1 14,8 1 13,6 
I 17.4 18,4 18,7 18,0 17,6 19,5 
UK 16,3 1 14,4 18,71 14,3 17,7 1 14,0 
EUR6 13,41 11,0 14,7 1 11,5 14,11 11,1 
USA 7,4 8,6 8,0 9,1 7,5 8,5 
Japan 16,71 7,2 17,01 7,4 17,21 7,2 
I 1970-72 to 1975-77. 
Sourn·: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Table 8 
Average annual growth rates of earnings per head deflated by the 
price index for gross value-added, over two five-year periods: (i) 1970-
72 to 1975-77; (ii) 1975-77 to 1980-82 
(%) 
Market Manufacturing Total 
services industry 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
D 3,8 1,6 4,2 2.9 3,8 1.9 
F 2,6 2.0 4,4 3,0 4,7 2,6 
I 4,0 0,8 5,1 0,5 4,0 1,8 
UK 1.6 0.4 3,7 0.4 2.9 0.1 
EUR6 3,2 1.6 4.4 2.1 3,8 1,8 
USA 0,7 0,6 1.6 I.I 0,9 0.5 
Japan 6,0 3.5 6,2 3,7 6.4 3,5 
Sourn·: Eurostat and Commission scniccs. 
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The picture for Japan is very different. Indeed, the relative 
gross profit share for market services fell by five percentage 
points over the decade to 1980-82. 
It can be argued that these changes in the structure of gross 
profits provide some explanation for the changes in the 
structure of fixed investment already noted. 
1.6 Summary of the points made 
For the European Community.: 
(i) The contribution of market services to total gross value-
added has increased markedly, broadly offsetting the 
fall in the contribution of manufacturing activities. At 
the same time, the pattern of growth of value-added has 
changed, with market services growing faster than the 
economy as a whole, and manufacturing activities more 
.slowly. 
(ii) There has been a marked increase in employment in 
services, and a decline in employment in manufacturing. 
Moreover, labour productivity growth in market services 
has been catching up with labour productivity in the 
economy as a whole. The growth of earnings per head 
in market services both in nominal and real terms has, 
however, remained below that observed for manufac-
turing. 
(iii) There is evidence of a shift in the structure of both 
investment and gross profits towards services although, 
to a limited extent, these changes will reflect leasing 
activities. 
The developments in each of the four large Member States 
have been somewhat different with both France and perhaps 
more notably Italy recording more vigorous performances 
by manufacturing activities, whereas in Germany and the 
UK the growth of manufacturing was much weaker than 
market services and the decline in employment more marked. 
For the United States: 
(i) There has been a marked increase in the contribution of 
market services to total output, largely offsetting the fall 
in the contribution of manufacturing. At the time market 
services output growth has remained vigorous, with the 
growth of manufacturing much weaker. 
(ii) The change in the pattern of output growth has been 
associated with a massive increase in market service 
employment and a small increase in manufacturing em-
ployment. Labour productivity growth has been negli-
gible in market services, and in the economy as a whole. 
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For Japan: .. . .. 
(i) The growth rate of manufacturing otitput has remained, 
in recent years, well above that for the economy as a 
whole, and for all the other branches, including market 
services. 
(ii) Nonetheless, because output per head in market services 
has advanced slowly, employment has expanded mark-
edly. 
2. The changing pattern of demand for market 
services 
'' i . ~. .' . . - . 
Part I sets down the broad changes in economic structure 
that have occurred in the European Community, the United 
States and Japan during the decade to 1980-82. In both 
Europe and the United States the contribution of market 
services to economic activity has increased; this is the case 
whether gross value-added, employment, investment or 
gross profits are considered. The purpose of this second part 
is to examine the factors on the demand side that have been 
associated with this change in structure. To begin with, the 
well-documented link between rising living standards and 
increases in employment in market services is confirmed. 
,, 
Table 9 
Share of gross profits in gross ,·alue-added in market services relative -
to manufacturing activities1 
Indices: Manufacturing = 100 
Market services Manufacturing industry 
1910-n 1980-8~ 1970-7~ 1980-8~ 
D 149.4 210.9 100 100 
F 163.1 187.9 100 100 
I 132.4 92,9 100 100 
UK 131.4 137.7 100 100 
EUR 6 143.2 166.4 100 100 
USA 164,6 191.7 100 100 
Japan 90.7 85.7 100 100 
1 For the purposes of this table. gross profits equal gross \aluc-addcd at market prices less 
compensation of employees corrected for the sctr..cmploycd. The share of gross profits in 
gross value-added equals gross profits divided by gross \·aluc-addcd. The relative gross 
profits share for markc1 scn·iccs equals the gross profits share for market services divided 
by the gross profit share for manufac1uring. 
Sm,nl': E.uroslat and Commission scn·iccs. 
This link is usually attributed to a change in the pattern of 
private consumption following a rise in living standards. 1 
This explanation is then examined and, in the case of the 
European countries, is shown to be inadequate. Rather the 
growth of market services owes much to the growth of the 
consumption of services by industry, as intern1ediate inputs 
into production. This finding throws light on the structural 
changes that have taken place within industry and services, 
and has implications for the debate on so-called de-indus-
trialization. 
To confirm the link between living standards and market 
service employment a start is made by plotting the pro-
portion of the employed labour force engaged in market 
services (see Table 4), against the level of real income per 
head, measured as gross domestic product, at constant 1975 
prices and exchange rates, per head. This is done for the 
Community, the United States and Japan in Graph 2. 
The graph shows that, for each of these economies, the 
link between the proportion of the employed labour force 
engaged in market services, and real income per head, is 
close. Moreover, in each case, the proportion of the labour 
force engaged in market services appears to be related to 
the level of constant price GDP per head, by a function that 
has the property of approaching an asymptotic value or limit 
as GDP/head increases. A possible asymptote is indicated on 
the graph. A number of functions exhibit this property. 
One particular relationship is based upon the exponential 
function: 
L5/L = a. exp (b/Y) [I] 
or log (L5/L) = log a+ b/Y 
where L5 denotes the number employed in market services, 
L total employment, and Y, GDP/head. 
This equation has the property that as Y increases so b/Y 
approaches zero and L5/L the value a. 
Equation [I] also has the property that the elasticity of 
changes in the employment proportion (Ls/L) with respect 
to changes in income (Y) is a declining function of the 
variable Y, implying that the rate of change of the structure 
of employment generally slows down as GDP per head 
increases. This property would appear, prima facie, to be 
plausible and so Equation [I] has been tested against the 
data. 
1 Sec the earlier chapters in Th,• N,•11· Sa,·ic,· Economy. Gershuny and Miles; 
Pinter 1983 and the discussion in 'The Growth of Service Employment: 
A rcappraisur. Momigliano and Siniscalco. Banca Nazionale dcl Lavoro: 
Q1111r1,•r/y R,·1·it·11·, No 14:? and refcren~'Cs cited therein. 
The changing pattern of demand for market services 
To permit ordinary-least least squares techniques to be used 
the hypothesis has been tested in its logarithmic form 
b 
log (L5/L)t = log a + - + et [2] 
· Yi 
where t denotes the time period of the observations and the 
error term et is normally distributed N(O,S2). 
The least squares estimates of Equation [2] using data for 
the Community of Six, the United States and Japan are set 
out in Table 10. 
The results show that: 
(i) The proportion of variance explained, R 2 , is more than 
90 % for the Community and Japan. The proportion 
is somewhat less for the United States but remains 
significant. All the regression coefficients are significant. 
Moreover, they have plausible magnitudes and the ex-
pected signs. 
(ii) The estimated employment elasticities for 1982, linking 
income per head and the proportion of the employed 
labour force in market services, are very close for the 
Community, the United States and Japan. Thus for each 
of these economies it is estimated that a I % increase in 
GDP per head will lead to 0,3 % increase in the propor-
tion of the total labour force employed in market ser-
vices. 
However as the discussion in the first part of this study has 
·shown, the results for the Community may not be a good 
guide to the developments in the individual community 
countries and so the hypothesis set out in Equation [2] has 
also been tested using data for Germany, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom (see Graph 3). The results are set out 
in Table 11 where it will be noted that the results again 
provide high levels of variance explained (R 2 ) and the expec-
ted signs for the coefficients. The results cluster closely 
around those for the Community. The market service 
employment proportion elasticity is highest for the United 
Kingdom and lowest for Germany. 
The estimates set out in Tables 10 and 11 show that for the 
European Community, the four large Community countries 
(considered separately), the United States and Japan, there 
is marked correlation between GDP/head and the propor-
tion of the labour force employed in the activity branch 
market services and in particular, that as GDP/head in-
creases so does the proportion of the labour force employed 
in market services. These conclusions are consistent with a 
hypothesis frequently repeated and discussed in the econo-
mic literature and often called the theory of stages of econo-
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GRAPH 2: GDP per head and the proportion of the employed labour force in market services: European Community, the United States 
;:; 
-t: 
"' 
and Japan 
50 % 
E 40 
20 
2.0 
60 
J.O 
GDP per head 
-1.0 
possible asymploLe 
82 Japan 
65 68 
EU R 6 
5.0 6.0 7.0 
Thousands of ECt.: per head Constanl 1975 price, and e,chan!,'< rat,:s 
G RA PH 3 · GDP per head and the proportion of the employed labour force in market senices: the four large European countries 
42 
40 
" u 
.... 
~ l!\ ~ 
u 
-t 
" E J(l 
·= ~ 
..S! 
~ 34 :::, 
2 
.!: 
"" ~ 12 C 
c. 
E 
u 
'-C JO ~ 
" i: 
u 
~ 
" 
28 c.. 
:!6 
.. 
68 
65 
1,8 
65 
2 J 
GDP per head 
82 
UK 82 
F 
D 
...L__--~---~---~---"---~ 
6 7 
Thousands of ECU per head. Constant 1975 prices .rnd exchange rales. 
mic growth. 1 This theory attempts to explain the relative 
growth of market services by suggesting that, as an economy 
grows and income per head increases, so the demand for 
services increases faster than the demand for consumption 
goods in general. As a consequence, the structure of con-
sumption changes and this change, combined with the assu-
med tendency for the production of services to exhibit a 
slower rate of labour productivity growth than the produc-
tion of goods, leads to the shift in the pattern of employment 
already noted. 
To complete the picture it is also usually asserted that the 
consumption of services is price inelastic. so that the more 
rapid rise in the price of services, due to slow labour produc-
tivity growth, has only a negligible effect on the volume of 
services consumed. 
Clearly it is important to establish whether these specula-
tions are consistent with the developments observed in the 
1 Sec 1hc earlier chaplcrs in TII<' Nell' Sen-ice Economy, Gershuny and Miles; 
Pinter 1983 and the discussion in "The Growth of Service Employment: 
A reappraisal'. Momigliano and Siniscalco. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro: 
Quarterly Rnicll'. No 141 and references cited therein. 
Table 10 
Employment in market services and GDP per head 
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European Community, the United States and Japan. Indeed 
the link between increases in GDP/head and the rise in the 
numbers employed in market services may be explained by 
the following developments on the demand side. · 
As already noted, there are changes in the pattern of private 
consumption, with market services accounting for an in-
creasing proportion of total household expenditure; how-
ever, it may also be necessary to take into account: 
(i) increased purchases of services as intermediate inputs 
into production activities; and 
(ii) an increasing contribution from international trade in 
services. 
2.1 For the European Community and the 
United States no clear shift in the pattern 
of private consumption towards market ser-
vices 
In this subsection. the point of departure will be 1975 - a 
year for which consistent input-output tables are available 
Least squares estimates of Equation (21 for the Community, the llnited States and Japan 
EUR 6 log (L,1L) 3.9143 I 510.6 
(0.0319) (128.0) 
USA log(L_,/L) 4.1262 I 948.5 
(0.0494) (280.1) 
Japan log(L,;L) 4.1268 I 512.1 
(0.0281) ( 104.4) 
t,um.itc,1 d,hl1c111c, ,,f n1.1rlct ,i:nK"".:~ cmplo~m.:nl PH'~'rt1on t/., /.l with rc .. pc."Cl to GDP head in fQM::! arc: 
H'R~ll.)ll~. 
!"SA lU07. 
J.,p.m o.~~-' 
• 
GDP/head 
• 
GDP/head 
• 
GDP.'head 
lhc least S4.1uan:'.\ regri:-. .. u,ns for EU R h and the l · S:\ Jrc ha~"\t on Jat.1 for I qho. ( 1.)65. I Q(\..°'I to J lJl'C. for Japan on data from 1970 to I QS I 
R2 0.9028 
R2 0.7634 
R2 0.9545 
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Table 11 
Employment in market services and GDP per head 
Least squares estimates of Equation (2( for the four large Community countries 
D log (L,/L) 3,7631 I 560.0 
(0,0295) (153,5) 
F log (L,/L) 3,9665 I 991,8 
(0,0363) (169,1) 
log (L,(L) 3,7819 1 003,8 
(0,0371) (95,6) 
UK log (L.f L) 4,0816 I 405,7 
(0,0477) 153,8 
Estimated elasticities of market services employment proponion (l,/l) \\ith respect to GDP/head in 1982 arc: 
D 0.243; 
F 0.331; 
I 0.305; 
UK 0.385. 
The least square regressions arc based upon dau, for the years 1960. 1965 and 1968-82. 
Sourer.: Eurostat. 
Table 12 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The allocation of the output of market sen"ice activities in the European Community. Data for 1975 
GDP/head 
GDP/head 
I 
GDP/head 
GDP/head 
NACE activity number Proponion or output allocated to: 
Intermediate Intermediate Final 
consumption consumption demand by 
hy industry' hy services 1 households' 
57 Wholesale and retail trade i~.5 7,7 64,7 
59 Lodging and catering services 6,7 11,0 82.3 
61 Inland transport3 34,2 24,9 31,4 
63 Maritime and air transport3 19,9 27,9 9,0 
67 Communication 19,1 45,8 31,8 
69 Services of credit and insurance institutions 7,5 73,7 16,2 
73 Renting 2,1 9,7 87,3 
79 Other services4 22,8 29,1 44,0 
Total excluding 57 and 735 19,2 34,5 38,7 
Total excluding 73 18,7 26,6 46,4 
Grand total 16,8 24,6 51,1 
Ex.pons or 
households' 
10,1 
9,5 
43,2 
3.1 
2.6 
0,9 
4.1 
7.6 
8.3 
7.5 
1 In this tahlc the term industry covers all activities c~ccpt market and ~on-market services; the term scn·iccs covers the sum of market and non-market services. 
Final demand by households includes c,i:pcndilurcs hy foreign lourisls in the Community . 
. l lncludinJ the relevant parts of activity 65: Auxihury transsxnt scrvicc!o. 
The ,um of NACE activity branches 71 + 75 + 77 + n. 
For the reasons justifying thi!,. grouping of activities sec annc,. 
Sm1rno: Eurostal; inp111-output tuhlc for 197~ for EUR 8 ([l:R 6 as defined plu!o lrcl:.tnd plu!<i l>cnnrnr~l. 
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R2 0,8732 
R2 0,9024 
R2 0,8802 
R2 0,8477 
(%) 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100,0 
100.0 
100,0 
100,0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
for each of the Member States of the Community and the 
Community itself. These data make it possible to calculate 
for the Community, the allocation of market service output, 
in 1975, to various categories of intermediate and final 
demand. The output allocation proportions are given in 
Table 12. According to the grouping of activities considered, 
final demand by households, in 1975, accounted for between 
one third and one half of market service output. Tables 13 
and 14 show how the proportion of private consumption 
devoted to market services has changed over the period 
1975 to 1982 for the European Community, the four large 
Community countries, the United States and Japan. 
Amongst the market services included in this analysis are 
those that might be considered, a priori, to have a high 
income elasticity such as expenditure on entertainment and 
cultural services, and expenditure in restaurants, cafes and 
hotels, etc. 
The figures in Table 13 show that the proportion of final 
consumption expenditure devoted to the purchase of such 
market services, in the European countries, increased so-
mewhat over this seven-year period. For the Community 
aggregate, the average annual rate of growth of market 
services expenditure at current prices was almost I % ahead 
of that for total expenditures. 
Such a result is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
income elasticity of market services is greater than unity. 
However. it is important to disentangle the effect of prices 
from the calculation. Thus the change in the proportion of 
expenditure on market services at current prices, noted 
above, could well reflect price movements and low price 
elasticities, in addition to movements associated with in-
come. Figures based on data at the constant prices are set 
out in Table 14. 
These show that for the countries of the Community, but 
with the exception of the United Kingdom, the income 
elasticity of market services is only just greater than unity. 
Thus, over the seven years to 1982, expenditure on market 
services in the Community increased at an annual average 
rate of about 2,4 % whereas the volume of total consump-
tion increased at an average annual rate of 2,3 %. 
For the United States, the volume growth of private con-
sumption of market services at 3,0 % has been slightly less 
than that for consumption as a whole (3,1 %). 
For Japan, the data used to calculate the growth of the 
consumption of market services have a much broader cove-
rage than those for the European countries. or the United 
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Table 13 
Final consumption of households: market services (% based on data 
at current prices) · 
Average annual growth rates Proponion of total consumption 
1975-82 devoted to market services 
Consumption of Total final 1975 1982 
market services1 consumption2 
D3 7,1 6,4 10,7 11,2 
F3 15,3 14,5 13,7 14,5 
t3 20,2 20,4 15,2 15,0 
UK3 14,6 14,3 22.7 23,2 
EUR63 12,7 11,6 14,6 15,6 
USA4 11,0 10,8 27,7 28,1 
Japan5 11,4 9,0 43,9 51,0 
' Final consumption codes 46 + 63 + 64 + 72 + 83 + 84 + 85 + 86 (sec ESA 1979). 
Exact ESA terminology: Final consumption of households on the economic territory. 
3 Source: Eurostal. 
4 Source: OECD; for the United States the definition of market services retained is close to 
that used for the European countries. 
5 Source:. OECD: for Japan the definition or market services retained covers all expenditure 
on services. 
· Table 14 
Final consumption of households: market services (% based on data 
at 1975 prices) 
A veragc annual growth rates Proportion or total consumption 
1975•82 dc\"oted to mark.et services 
Consumption or Total final 1975 1982 
market services\ consumption~ 
D3 3,4 1,9 10,7 11,8 
F3 3,1 3,4 13,7 13,8 
p 2.5 2,7 .15,2 14,5 
UK3 0,6 1,4 22,7 21,6 
EUR 63 2,4 2,3 14,6 14,7 
USA4 3,0 3,1 27,7 27,6 
JapanS 4,5 3,4 43.9 47,2 
1 Final consumption codes 46 .,. 63 + 64 + 72 + 83 + 84 .,. 85 .,. 86 (sec ESA 1979). 
Exact ESA terminology: Final consumption or households on the economic territory. 
-' s,,urct': Eurostut and Commission services. 
' SourCt': OECD; for the United States the definition or market scniccs retained is close to 
that used for the European countries. 
~ SourC"t's: OECD; for Japan the definition or marl.et services retained covers all expenditure 
on services. 
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States, and so considerable caution is needed in interpreting 
the figures. Nonetheless these do point to a growth of market 
services expenditure, at constant prices, significantly greater 
than that for total consumption (4,5 % compared to 3,4 %). 
Thus, for the European Community and the United States, 
the more vigorous growth in the output of market services 
(relative to manufacturing and the economy as a whole) in 
more recent years (see 'fable 3) and the associated rise in 
employment does not an~ar to have been entirely due to a 
marked shift in the pattern of private consumption in favour 
of private market services. Other components of demand 
for market services must have been growing vigorously. 
2.2 In the European Community, vigorous 
growth in the volume of consumption of 
services by industry 
As Table 12 shows, for the Community, a significant propor-
tion of the output of most service activities is purchased as 
intermediate consumption by industrial and service activi-
ties; indeed for many service activities 50 % of the output 
is accounted for by intermediate demand. 
Table 15 
The purchases of services by industry 
Data at current prices 
The Europe-wide annual enquiry 1 into the structure and 
activity of industry, provides a measure of the changes in 
the purchases of services by manufacturing industry. Table 
I 5 sets down the relevant rates and growth rates for the 
period 1975-8 I (the latter being the most recent year for 
which suitable data have been published). It will be observed 
that the growth of the value of purchases of both industrial 
and non-industrial services is in excess of the growth of the 
value of production, often substantially so. Consequently, 
for the Community, the ratio of the total purchases of 
services to production increased from 13,1 % to 14,9 % over 
the six years to I 98 I. 
Estimates of the associated rates of price increase over the 
same period are given in Table 16. On combining the value 
data in Table 15 with the price data in Table 16, it is possible 
to conclude that, for the Community as a whole, over the 
period 1975 to I 98 I the average annual growth rate for the 
volume of services purchased by industry was in the range 
3,5-4 % per annum. This compares to an average annual 
growth of manufacturing gross value-added in real terms 
for the same six-year period of 2,4 % per annum. 
1 Structure and Actfrity of Industry: Annual Enquiry - Main results /980/ 
8/, Eurostat, 1984. 
(%) 
A,cragc annual growth rates Ratio of expenditure on scniccs 
1975-MI to the ,11luc of production 
Purchases Purchases Value of Industrial scniccs Non-industrial seniccs 
of industrial of non-1ndmilrial production 
scnriccs:! scn·k-cs:! 1975 1981 1975 1981 
EUR1 13,7 12.7 10,6 3,2 3,8 9.9 11,1 
D 10,4 7,8 6,9 3,1 3,8 9,7 10.3 
F 14,I 13,l 6,3 15,1 15,9 
I 25,3 22,3 20,l 3.9 5.1 9.8 11,0 
UK 10.4 18,3 10,3 2,9 2,9 4.8 7.2 
1 The figures given for the European Community co,·cr those countries for which data arc a\'a1lahlc. For industrial scn:iccs the figures CO\'cr Germany + ltal) + the United Kingdom • 
Denmark. For non-industrial services: Gcnnany + Fruncc + Italy + United Kingdom. 
2 Purchases o~ industrial services cover repair and maintenance work. installation worl and technical studies. etc. Purchases of non·industrial services co\'C'r the cost of legal and financial services. 
communication trunsport, travel and other business scrvil.-cs and the cost orlcasing im·cstment goods. 
SournoJ: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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The difference between these two figures suggests that the 
growth of market service output and employment, in the 
Community, owes much to the rapid volume growth of the 
consumption of services by industry. 
Unfortunately it has not been possible to construct compa-
rable figures for the United States. For Japan certain estima-
tes have been made. However these lead to different conclu-
sions from those made for the Community namely that in 
Japan: 
(i) significantly more than 60 % of the output of market 
services, in 1975, was accounted for by final demand; 
(ii) the growth of the volume of services purchased by in-
dustry was broadly the same as the growth of market 
services output. 
2.3 Exports and imports of market services 
have grown rapidly 
The balance-of-payments data published by Eurostat 1 pro-
vide figures for total trade in services analysed both by type 
of service imported/exported and by geographical area of 
origin/destination. Using Eurostat's nomenclature and ter-
minology, an aggregate 'International trade in market servi-
ces· may be derived as the sum of the items set down 'in 
Table 17. 
These items when added together equal the total 'Services' 
given in Eurostat balance-of-payments tables, less 'Invest-
ment income' and 'Government transactions not indicated 
elsewhere·. neither of which have been considered market 
services in the strict sense. 
Table 17 summarizes the developments in international trade 
in services for the period 1975 to 1982. based upon data 
using this framework. Figures for total merchandise trade 
are provided for comparison. 
An examination of these data suggests that developments in 
international trade in ser\'ices may ha\'e been somewhat 
unfa\'ourable for growth and employment in the Commu-
nity. Thus for Community trade with non-Community 
countries. market service debits (or imports) measured at 
current prices grew slightly faster than credits (or exports) 
O\'er the seven year period to 1982. reducing the surplus on 
market ser\'ice trade from I 500 million ECU to virtually 
zero. 
1 Sec f\)f c:xampk Bal,mt',·, o(Paymcnts Gcngr'1phical RrcaAdmrn. Eurostat. 
Luxcmhourg. 
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However, it is possible to estimate the growth of exports 
and imports of services in volume terms; these estimates are 
set out in Table 18. The figures suggest that the difference 
between the growth in the volume of service exports, and 
the growth in the volume of service imports, is eve~ more 
marked than the differences for values. This further reinfor-
ces the idea that the overall export performance of services 
has been somewhat weaker than that for imports. Nonethe-
less, exports of market services still exhibited an impressive 
average annual volume growth of almost 7 %. 
Table 16 
The purchases of services by industry: value, price and implied volume 
mo,·ements. 
Average annual growth rates 1975-81 
Value Output pnccs: Implied volume 
Purchase of services bv in-
dustry 1 " 
EUR 13.0 9.1 3,6 
D 8,5 3.9 4.4 
F 15.03 10,8 3.8 
I 23.2 17,3 5,0 
UK 16.0 13.3 2.4 
Memorandum item: 
Industrial production 
EUR 6 10.6 8,0 2.4 
1 C1kulatcd by \\C1ghtmg together the figures for the purcha~cs of mdustrial and non-
mdus1rial -.i:rvil·cs gncn in Table 15. For ddinit1on of the C'ommunit~ aggregate sec footnote 
I to Tahk 15 
Implied \'aluc-addcd dcll.1tors. 
' Estimate . 
. \·ount• Eurostal and Comm1~~um \Cf\ ii..:l'" 
2.4 In the European Community, the growth 
of the consumption of services by industry 
and by services accounts for the major part 
of market services output growth 
It is possible to put all these estimates together and to show 
which components of demand (intermediate or final) have 
made the major contribution to the growth of market service 
output. in the Community, between 1975 and 1982. 
As already noted. Table 12 shows how the output of the 
various services acti\'ities distinguished in the 1975 input-
output tables for the Community is distributed in 1975 
between intermediate consumption (by industries and by 
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services), and final consumption (by households and by non-
resident consuming units). 
Between 1975 and 1982 the annual rate of volume growth 
of the output of market services in the Community (as 
Table 17 
measured by gross value-added) is estimated to have been 
3,2 %. 
The following estimates of volume growth rates (at annual 
averages for the seven-year period to 1982) can be drawn 
Community trade with non-Community countries/areas: merchandise and services' 
Average annual growth rates 197S-82 and net balances 
All non•Community coun1rics 
Merchandise (fob) 
Total market services2 
2.1 Transport 
2.2 Insurance on transport 
2.3 Travel 
2.5 Labour income 
2. 7 Other services 
Property income 
Banking 
Non-merchandise insurance 
Construction/engineering 
Films/broadcasting 
Other 
Expon (cr<dit) w.cights 1982 
(lOt.al goods and services credits 
equal to l(JO) 
61.7 
22,3 
6,9 
0,2 
3,5 
0,9 
10.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0,6 
2.5 
0.1 
6.6 
r% and millions of £Cl./) 
Gro"'1h rates Net balance 1975 Net balance 1982 
Credits Debits 
(Expons) ilmpons) 
13,8 
16,9 
13,3 
18,6 
14,3 
20.6 
20.5 
14,8 
17,6 
13,5 
19.1 
14.3 
18,6 
23,3 
7 275 
I 476 
751 
-40 
-2 317 
84 
2 998 
-442 
38 
I 292 
-165 
-5 815 
744 
3 982 
- I 379 
-46 
981 
7 638 
-89 
-3 123 
1 In this table the tcnn Community refer~ to the Communny of nine. 1.c. the present Commumt) c,cluding GrL~'Cc 
The numbers attai.:hcd to the headings arc those gl\cn in the Eurostat balance-of-payments tables 
Sm.,rn: Eurostat and Comm1ss1on scn-1ccs 
from the above discussion on the growth of demand for 
services: 
(i) intermediate consumption: 
e3,6 % for the consumption of services by industry ( 1) 
(ii) final consumption: 
e2,4 % for the consumption of services by households; 
e6,9 % for the export of market services. 
Given the requirement to balance demand and output for 
market services, the growth of market services output be-
tween 1975 and 1982 must equal the weighted sum of the 
growth rates of the components of demand for market 
services. The contribution of each component of demand to 
the growth of market services is given in Table 19. It can be 
shown that the growth of market services output balances 
the growth of demand provided that the intermediate con-
sumption of services, by the market service sector itself. 
t The estimate for the period 1975-81 is assumed to apply to the period 
1975-82. 
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grows in line with market service output; that is at an average 
annual rate of about 3 °1c, per annum. 
Thus. from the third line of Table 19 it will be seen that for 
the period 1975-82: 
(i) more than half of the growth of market services output 
is accounted for by the growth of intermediate consump-
tion by industry and by services; 
(ii) less than one-third of the growth of output is accounted 
for by the growth of household consumption of services. 
Similar calculations for the four large Community countries 
are given in Table 20. For three of the four large Community 
countries, the Federal Republic. France and Italy, the results 
obtained are close to those for the Community as a whole 
and the conclusions that can be drawn from these tables are 
broadly the same. For the United Kingdom. however. the 
results are somewhat different. In particular the combined 
contribution of the two components of final demand to 
market service output is virtually negligible and the estima-
tions needed to balance the table, point to the intermedia te 
consumption of services by services growing very vigorously 
indeed . 
The average annual growth rate of manufacturing industry 
output in the Community of Six, fo r the period 1975-82 is 
estimated to have been 1,6 % (compared to 2,4 % for the 
period 1975-8 1 ). Consumption of the services by industry 
are estimated to have grown at an average annual growth 
ra te of about 3,5 % in volume terms. The faster rate of 
growth of services consumption, compared to manufactu-
ring outp ut, is an indica tion of both : 
(i) the rapid development of specialist service acti vities serv-
ing industry; 
(ii ) the separa tion of certa in technica l service activities from 
manufactu ring industry itself, and their deplacement to 
the service sector. 
T he la tter structural change will renect the externa lization 
of se rvice acti vities by manufacturing industry in response 
to the demands of efficiency, technica l change and the pres-
ence of economies of sca le. 
2.5. Summary of points made 
T he regressions set out in thi s section confi rm the close link 
between the number employed in market services and the 
level of G DP/head . It has been a rgued tha t thi s link could 
be due to consumers spending an increased proportion of 
Table 19 
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their income on services as their real incomes rise (tha t is to 
say tha t services have a high income elasticity) . The sub-
sequent analysis suggests this is only part of the explanation. 
A more important development has been that, as the .Euro-
Table 18 
Community trade in market services with non-Community countries' 
Average annual changes 1975-1982 
Credits (exporLs) 
Total market services 
Transport 
Insurance on transport 
T ravel 
La bour income 
Other services 
Debits (imports). 
Tota l marke t services 
Transport 
Insurance on transport 
T rave l 
Labour income 
Other services 
Value 
16,9 
13 ,3 
18,6 
14,3 
20,6 
20,5 
17,6 
13,5 
19, l 
14,3 
18,6 
23 ,3 
(%) 
Estimated Implied 
priccs2 volume 
6,9 
6,0 
9,4 8,4 
4,5 
10,2 
10,1 
8, I 
4,3 
8,8 9,5 
5,1 
9,0 
13,3 
1 In th is table the te rm Co mmunity refers to the Community of nine. i.e. the p resent 
Community excl udi ng Greece. 
Impl ied dcn ,1tors fo r the item export s o f services given in the na tional accounts statistics. 
Sour<'t': Eurosta t •ind Commission services. 
T he growth of services output in the European community (EUR 6) the balance between demand and output 
Weights from input-out put ta bles fo r 19751 
Esti ma ted volume growth rat.:s2(%) 
o ntributi on to growth of services 
outpu t·\ 0 o) 
1 Fl.,r dcli111t11.1n of .tct1\1t~ grnuptnj; sec T able 11 .11uJ unnn . 
~ l: tim.,tcd tl\"(r,t~-c .mnuul gro"th mtcs 1975·S2. 
lntcmtcdiatc 
consumption 
by ind ustr) 
0.1 92 
3.6 
ac tivity 
0.69 
' l here,, .1 01.h~ht dt'-'.·n·1,,tm·} OC I\H'C ll th1.• sum of the 1.·mnj)\mcnb. and 1he to tal g.l\cn. due 10 round mg. 
S1111ric· l· urn,t,11 und ( \ unn11\SH,n !-C'T \ ll'1:3 
Compo nr.:nt s of demand fo r services 
lntcnrn:dia tc Final Exports Total 
consumption consum ption of services 
by se rvices of ho useholds 
0.345 0,387 0,076 I.OOO 
3. 1 2.4 6,9 3,2 
1.07 0.93 0.52 3,2 
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pean economies have expanded, so the purchase of services 
by industry (and by services) has grown rapidly. Thus in 
Europe, the growth of services is closely linked to the growth 
of industry in the broad sense. 
Consequently the link between GDP/head and market ser-
vice employment in the Community, reflects more the 
growth of indirect demand for services, as a result of the 
increased consumption of services by industry and services, 
rather than the growth of direct demand itself. The attached 
box 'Changes in employment and hours worked in certain 
market service activities' ~ provides further evidence, on the 
employment side, for this conclusion. 
3. Overall conclusions 
The above discussion leads to the following conclusions; 
(i) · Part I has shown how in terms of the growth of value-
added and employment, market services have increased 
in importance over the past decade, particularly in the 
European Community and the United States. The move-
ment has been less marked in the case of Japan. More-
over, in the European countries, labour productivity 
growth has been catching up with that observed for 
Table 20 
Part A 
manufacturing, traditionally the activity where labour 
productivity growth is most vigorous. There is also evi-
dence of a shift in the balance of investment and profits 
away from manufacturing. The data are consistent with 
the view that the growth of employment in market 
services has benefited from the lower growth of earnings 
per head in service activities, both in nominal and in 
real terms. 
(ii) The discussion in Part 2 leads to the conclusion that, 
for the large European countries, the major part of the 
recent growth of market services has been due to the 
increased purchase of services by industry (and by servi-
ces themselves) rather than the growth of the consump-
tion of services by households. This development is likely 
to reflect an important structural change, namely the 
separation of certain technical service activities from 
industry and their reallocation to services. This amounts 
to a change in the boundary of manufacturing or in-
dustrial activities, and throws doubt on the notion that 
Europe has been experiencjng, in recent years, a process 
of de-industrialization. This conclusion is consistent with 
the change in structure commented upon in Part I, 
insofar as it affects value-added, employment, producti-
vity, investment and gross profits, to the extent that this 
change in structure reflects the shift in the boundary of 
industrial activities. 
The growth of services output in Germany: the balance between demand and output 
Weights from input-output tables for 19751 
Estimated volume growth rates2(%) 
Contribution to growth of service activity output3(%) 
For definition of activity grouping sec Table 12 and annex. 
Estimated average annual growth rates 1975-82. 
Intermediate 
consumption 
by industrJ 
0,219 
4,4 
0.96 
1 There is a slight discrepancy hctwccn the sum of the components. and the total gi\·cn. due to roundiniz. 
Components of demand for scn·ices 
Intermediate Final Exports Total 
consumption consumption of scn1ccs" 
by services of households 
0,345 0,388 0,048 1,000 
3,7 3,4 5,3 3,8 
1.28 1,32 0,25 3,8 
• These growth rates refer to the total of exports of services as defined for the purpose of the Eurostat balance of payments and the national accounts. They therefore rcrer to a broader aggregate 
than that included in Table IS. 
Sourc·r: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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The growth of services output in France: the balance between demand and output 
Weights from input-output tables for 19751 
Estimated volume growth rates2(%) 
Contribution to growth of service activity output3(%) 
For definition of activity grouping sec Table 12 and annex. 
Estimated average annual growth rates 1975-82. 
Intermediate 
consumption 
by industry 
0,289 
3,8 
1,10 
l There is a slight discrepancy between the sum of the components. and the total given. due to rounding. 
Overall conclusions 
Components of demand for services 
Intermediate Final Exports Total 
consumption consumption of servicesi 
by services of households 
0,219 0,404 0,088 1,000 
4,1 3;1 ;;_1 5,2 3,7 
0,90 1,25 0,46 3;7 
4 These growth rates refer to the total of exports of services as defined for the purpose of the Eurostat balance of payments and the national accounts. They therefore refer to a broader aggregate 
than that included in Table 18. 
Sourn•: Eurostat and Commission services. 
1 ·' 
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., 
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The growth of senices output in Italy: the balance between demand and output 
Intermediate 
consumption 
by industry 
Weights from input-output tables for 1975 1 0,176 
Estimated volume growth rates2(%) 5,1 
Contribution to growth of service activity output3(%) 0.88 
·,. _•.;i_ 
\I•• 
Components of demand for services 
Intermediate final Exports Total 
consumption consumption of services" 
by services of households 
0,328 0,421 O,o75 I.OOO 
2,8 2,5 J,4 ~.l 
0,92 1.05 0,26 3,1 
1 For dclinition or ac1i,·ity grouping sec Tahle I:! and annex. 
F.stimatcJ a,eratte annual grm\lh rates 1~7S-X:!. : .-" 
·' Then: 1s u shght discrepancy bet\\-CCn the sum of the components. and the total given. due Ill rounding. 
" These ~JO\\th ro1tcs n:fcr to the total or c,pon~ of scniccs .is defined for the purpose of the Eurostat balance of payments and the national accounts. They therefore refer to a broader aggregate 
than that included m Table 18. 
Sc»1r,-r: Eurostat und Commission scr\'iccs. 
,, 
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Table 20 
Part D 
The growth of services output in the United Kingdom: the balance between demand and output 
Components of demand for services 
lntcnnediate Intermediate Final Exports Total 
consumption consumption consumption of scn:iccs4 
by industry by services of households 
Weights from input-output tables for 19751 0,164 0,362 0,328 0,146 1,000 
Estimated volume growth rates2 (%) 2,4 4,2 0,6 -0,9 2,0 
Contribution to growth of service activity 
output3(%) 0,34 1,59 0,20 -0.13 2,0 
1 For definition of acll\ll)' grouping sec Table 12 and annex. 
Estimated aYcrage annual growth rate~ IQ75-82. 
1 Thett is a slight discrepancy between the sum of the components, and the total given. due to rounding. 
~ These growth rates refer to the total of exports of scrv1cn as defined for the purpose of the Eurostat balance of payments and the national accounts. They therefore refer to a broader aggregate 
than that included in Table 18. 
Souru: Eurostat and Commission scn.·iccs. 
ANNEX 
Explanation of the terms and symbols used in the tables 
The tables set down data for the total market service activity, 
distinguished by the NACE-CLIO nomenclature (as used to 
compile the Community's input-output tables) established 
according to the concepts and definitions of the European 
System of Accounts (ESA). In addition, in Tables 1 to 9, 
comparable data. are given for the branch 'Manufactured 
products', and for the economy as a whole. Further details 
of the ESA concepts and definitions are given in the volume 
European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) 
Eurostat 1979. 
For reference purposes the total for 'Market services' 
(NACE-CLIO code No 68) equals the sum of: 
56 Recovery and repair services, wholesale and retail trade 
services equal to the sum of: 
55 Recovery and repair services 
57 Wholesale and retail trade 
59 Lodging and catering services 
61 Inland transport services 
63 Maritime and air transport services 
65 Auxiliary transport services 
67 Communication services 
69 Services of credit and insurance institutions· 
74 Other market services equal to the sum of: 
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71 Business services provided to enterprises 
73 Renting of real estate 
75 Market services, education and research 
77 Market services: H"alth 
79 Other market services. 
The figures given in the tables for the European Community 
are for the aggregate EC 6 which is the sum of Belgium (B) 
the Federal Republic of Germany (D). France (F), Italy (I), 
the Netherlands (NL) and the United Kingdom (UK). The 
proportion of total Community GDP accounted for by this 
aggregate, in 1982. was 95.1 %. 
The data for the United States ( USA) and Japan (J), which 
have been brought into line with the concepts and definitions 
of the ESA. are derived from national sources. 
In certain tables there are minor discrepancies between the 
totals given and the sum of the individual components. 
In constructing input-output tables activity 56 often plays a 
special role in balancing the tables and so it has been exclu-
ded from the analysis of Part 2. Activity 73. which includes 
substantial imputed transactions for the housing services 
consumed . by owner-occupier households, has also been 
excluded. 
Many of the points made in the text depend upon a compari-
son of measures of gross value-added for market services 
and manufacturing. As a rule it is more dillicult to measure 
the value-added of market services than it is for manufactu-
ring activities, and the measures for the former may be 
subject to a wider variance than those for the latter. This 
point should be borne in mind when interpreting the data. 
Changes in employment and hours worked in certain market 
service activities 
The analysis set out in Part was concerned with changes in 
the structure of employment at a relatively macroeconomic 
level, and showed the increased importance, particularly for the 
European Community and the United States, of total market 
services both from the point of view of employment and of 
gross value-added. Part 2 showed that, in Europe, increases 
in intermediate demand for services by industry and services 
themselves accounted for the major part of the growth of the 
output of market services. It can be shown that this development 
is also reflected in changes in the structure of market service 
employment itself. Unfortunately, owing to a lack of data for 
earlier years. it is not possible to estimate changes in the structure 
of market service employment for the Community as a whole, 
nor for the Community of Six (D + F + I + UK + B + NL) 
for which details are given in the main part of the chapter. 
However, it is possible to observe changes in the structure of 
market service employment for the following grouping of six 
countries D + F + I + NL + B + DK which accounted for 
some 82 % of Community GDP in 1982. Data for this grouping 
of countries are given in Table I. In the table the total activity 
branch market services has been subdivided into five smaller 
service branches of which 'Other market services' covers a wide 
range of activities including the activity group 71 'Business 
services provided to enterprises'. From Table I it will be seen 
that, in all three economies, the proportion of total market 
service employment accounted for by 'Credit and insurance' 
and 'Other market services' taken together increased markedly 
between 1970-72 and 1980-82, and the increase appears to be 
greatest for the Community. A whole range of services provided 
to enterprises are included in these two activities and this change 
in structure is consistent with the results given in Part 2 of 
Chapter 3. This interpretation of the data is also confirmed by 
a recent analysis of employment trends in the Federal Republic 
Table 1 
Changes in the structure of market service employment 
Retail and wholesale trade 
Lodging and catering 
Transport and communication 
Credit and insurance 
Other market services 
Total market services 
1 EllR b • D + F + I + NL + B + DK. 
S1>t1rn•, Eun.ls tu I 
Changes in employment 
of Germany and the United States. 1 It must also be noted that, 
in all three economies, there was a drop in the proportion of 
total market service employment accounted for by 'Retail ,and 
wholesale trade', and by 'Transport and communication'. 
These developments in employment trends in certain service 
activities are confirmed by the data given in the annual publica-
tion of Eurostat Employment and Unemployment. 
Trends in employment in NACE class 8 'Banking and finance, 
insurance, business services and renting' between 1980 and 1983 
are given in Table 2 together with trends for the total of service 
employment (including 'Non-market services'), NACE classes 
6-9, for the aggregate D + F + NL + B + UK + DK (which 
accounted for 83 % of Community GDP in 1983). 
Table 2 shows that business service employment continued to 
grow more vigorously than total service employment between 
1980 and 1983 despite the sharp decline in industrial production 
between 1980 and 1982 and only a modest recovery in 1983. 
Moreover the growth of employment for females was much 
greater than that for males. 
The improved labour productivity performance of market servi-
ces in Europe, noted in Table 5 is based on calculations of 
growth rates of value-added per head. However, the data on 
hours worked per week available from Eurostat suggest that the 
result would be broadly the same if account was taken of changes 
in the weekly hours worked per full-time employee. 
1 See M. Wegner. 'Die Schaffung von Arbcitspl8tzcn im Dicnstleistungbcrcich': 
IFO Schnel/dienst 6/85. 
(%) 
EUR61 USA Japan 
/970-7! /980-82 /970-72 /980-82 /970-72 /980-82 
44,7 41,2 39,5 38,7 42,9 40,7 
8,3 8,2 11,2 11,3 13,5 14,8 
17,2 16,0 I I.I 9,7 14,9 13,1 
6,1 6,9 5,9 6,3 4,7 4,6 
23,8 27,6 32,4 34,0 23.9 26.8 
100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 2 
Trends in employment in certain service activities 
Indexes 1980 = I 00 
1980 1982 1983 
NACE Class 8: Total 100 102,1 103,0 
of which: Female employees 100 103,6 105,0 
NACE Classes 6-9: Total services 100 100,6 100,9 
Memorandum item; Industrial 
production 100 96,2 97,1 
Souru: Eurostat. 
Thus on the basis of the data set out in Table 3 there is no 
evidence that hours worked per week in services, taken as 
a whole, have evolved significantly differently from those in 
industry. 
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Table 3 
Weekly hours worked 
Indexes 1973 = 100 
NACE Class 
Industry 2 
3 
4 
Services1 6 
7 
8 
9 
1 These codes stand for the following NACE classes: 
6: Distributive trades, hotels, catering. repairs; 
7: Transpon and communication~ 
1973 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
8: Banking and linancc insurance. business services. renting: 
9: Other services. 
Sourc~: Eurostal. 
1981 1983 
94,4 94,1 
94,7 95,2 
94,6 95,0 
94,3 94,6 
93,9 93,6 
95,7 96,4 
94,1 95,6 
The leasing of investment goods 
The leasing of investment goods 
In Part I a change in the structure of investment in the European 
Community was noted (see Table 6) with (apparently) market 
services making an increased contribution to total investment 
and the contribution of manufacturing industry declining. It 
was noted, however, that these figures could be influenced by 
changes in the extent to which capital goods are leased by one 
enterprise (the user) from another (the owner). The data upon 
which the investment analysis given in Table 6 is based, provide 
a measure of the ownership, rather than the use, of investment 
goods. However, some information is available on the patterns 
of ownership and use of investment goods, for two of the large 
Community countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United Kingdom. 
For some years the IFO Institute has published data for the 
Federal Republic of Germany giving the distribution of fixed 
investment and the capital stock by both user and owner 
industry/activity group. The investment data are summarized in 
Table I where it will be seen that: 
(i) the differences between the structures of fixed investment 
by owner and by user, increased markedly between 1970 
and 1982; 
(ii) consequently although between 1970 and 1982 there has 
been a shift in the structure of fixed investment when ana-
Table 1 
lysed by user activity, this change in the structure is mnch 
less marked than when analysed by owner activity. Indeed, 
on the former basis the increase in the contribution of 
market services to total fixed investment between 1970 and 
1982 is perhaps half the increase measured on the latter 
basis. 
For the United Kingdom a similar though somewhat less detai-
led analysis is possible. This is set out in Table 2. Here again it 
will be noted that the impact ofleasing is to modify substantially 
the shift in the structure of investment between 1975 and 1982 
(the former year being the earliest one for which data on leasing 
are published). Thus on the ownership concept the contribution 
of market services (in the narrower sense, that is excluding 
dwellings) to total investment increased from 23,7 % to 31,3 % 
over this seven-year period. However, when allowance is made 
for leasing and the figures are converted to a user basis, the 
increase in the market services contribution was a more modest 
six percentage points, from 23,0 % to 29,0 %. 
In conclusion therefore, it would appear that on the basis of the 
limited information available, perhaps as much as one quarter 
to one half of the shift in the structure of investment, noted in 
Table 5, in favour of market services, reflects the increased 
importance of leasing activities. 
The Federal Republic of Germany: the impact of leasing on the structure of fixed investment'· 2 
Based on data at constant 1976 prices 
(%) 
1970 1982 
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) 
Manufacturing3 24,0 24,7 0,7 17,9 20,8 2,9 
Market services3 46,9 46,0 -0,9 56,1 51,9 -4,2 
- Retail and wholesale trade 5,0 5,9 0,9 4,6 6,7 2,1 
- Transport and communications 8,3 8,5 0,2 8,9 9,4 0,5 
- Credit and insurance 1,5 1.6 0,1 1,8 2,5 0,7 
- Ownership of dwellings 25,8 25,8 25,1 25,I 
- Other services 6,3 4,2 -2,1 15,7 8,2 -7,5 
Market services, excluding dwellings 21,1 20,2 -0,9 31,0 26,8 -4,2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
1 Sot., .... /FO Sn,J;ni :ur SrnJcru,forschunR Num. 6, lnvcstitioncn und Anlagc, .. nnogen der Winschafiszwcigc nach Eigentiimcr- und Bcnut.zx:rkonz,:pt. Gerstenberger, Heinz,: and 
Voslcr-LudwiJ. 
Key to columns: (i) Structure by ownership: (ii) Structure by user: (iii) Difference. 
J The fiaurcs arc drawn from an analysis based upon the otricial Gcnnan classification of activities. 
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Table 2 
The United Kingdom: The impact of leasing on the structure of fixed investment 1, 2 
Based on data at constant 1980 prices 
(i) 
Manufacturing3 16,2 
Market services3 23,7 
- Retail and wholesale trade, hotels, etc. 6,0 
- Transport and communications 10,4 
- Financial and business services 7,3 
Total 100,0 
Sower: Dcpanment or Trade and Industry and Central Statistical Office. 
Key to columns: (i) Structure by ownership; (ii) Adjustment for leasing; (iii) Structure by user. 
1975 
(ii) 
0,7 
-0,7 
-0,7 
(%) 
1982 
(iii) (i) (ii) (iii) 
16,9 11,5 2,3 13,8 
23,0 31,3 -2,3 29,0 
6,0 7,7 7,7 
10,4 7,0 7,0 
6,6 16,6 -2,3 14,3 
100,0 100,0 100,0 
J Data according to national industrial classification. The total for market scrviccs excludes dwellings and ccnain other services. These figures arc therefore not directly comparable with 
those in Table I. 
'if.' •. ! 
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Chapter 4: Technological progress, structural change and employment 
Technological progress acts both as a supressor as well as a 
creator of employment: long-run economic growth results 
mainly from improvements in production technology and 
new product innovation. Technological innovation can help 
eliminate structural unemployment in the Community but 
only if an economic strategy based on knowledge-intensive, 
high-value-added structures which revitalises our level of 
international competitiveness is implemented. 
In this chapter the role of technological change as the driving 
force of economic growth will be examined. Because of the 
growing interdependendency of the world economy vari-
ations in the relative innovativeness of individual countries 
should explain the shifts in geo-economic power evidenced 
in the preceding chapters. 
The association of rising levels of Community unemploy-
ment with the introduction of new technologies highlights 
the importance for policy-making of a clear analysis of the 
processes by which technological change either helps to 
create new employment or supresses existing positions. Un-
resolved debates among economic growth theorists assume 
very real importance as Community policy-makers debate 
the best strategy to relaunch the growth process and reverse 
the trend towards increasing unemployment. 
The process whereby advances in science, technology and 
techniques affect such economic aggregates as the rate of 
investment and the demand for labour, is complex in reality: 
this chapter will attempt to outline some of the main charac-
teristics and manifestations at stages along innovation tra-
jectories so as to distinguish the main determinants of the 
evolutions described in the preceding chapters and suggest 
a framework for future policy consideration. 
The argument will be advanced that a long-term strategy for 
science. technology and innovation is an essential element of 
economic and social policy. It must also take into account 
the strategics of our major international competitors. Brisk 
competition between Community firms must be encouraged; 
national champions should not be replaced by a policy of 
sheltered Community champions. The direct employment 
content of high technology production industry is low. prob-
ably only 3 % to 5 % of employment in the most advanced 
economies: the real importance lies in its role as a generator 
of new wealth and in the application of high-tech com-
ponents. materials and production technology in a host of 
other sectors so as to ensure their continued competitiveness 
and viability. The possession. access and capacity to exploit 
the latest technologies is essential to the health of a full 
employment economy. New technology may be used to 
revive the competitiveness of traditional sectors thus alleviat-
ing the social distress associated with structural adjustment. 
Thanks to its unparallelled flexibility and accessibility it 
offers great potential for regional development. 
If new technology is to expedite structural change the inno-
vation absorption capacity of the receptor society must be 
developed, otherwise innovation cannot take root. Some 
Community members lead the world in their contributions 
to science and technology yet many persons in these societies 
remain involuntarily unemployed because the infrastructure 
which would enable the conversion of these advances into 
useful employment has not been developed. 
The employment-destructive effects of new process tech-
nology is especially witnessed and highlighted when large 
numbers of organized workers are made redundant. New 
product innovation, on the other hand, can lead to invest-
ment growth: in the case of a major advance in generic 
technology it can lead to an historically-significant economic 
boom, but only in those societies whose institutions are 
changing pari passu so as to exploit the beneficial effects of 
the technology wave. 
1. From invention to innovation 
The source of invention and technological advance is re-
search. Incremental innovations are important at the micro-
economic level but untargcttcd research may have major 
macroeconomic effects. Because such knowledge is highly 
transferable the beneficial economic effects may be reaped 
· in an economy different from the invention source country. 
The nature of invention is changing and the rate of techno-
logical change accelerating. 
There are many different types of innovation. each having 
different effects on economic parameters and social organ-
ization. In simple terms science is concerned with 'know-
why': technology with 'know-how·. Idealistically innovation 
is the successful production and commercialization of a 
continuum of activities which starts at the scientific discover-
ies of fundamental research and leads on through develop-
ment to the commercialization of the technology. But prac-
tice is more complex. 
Since scientific advance is the formulation of laws and know-
ledge about the physical world without any economic con-
sideration such fundamental research is only undertaken in 
universities or scientific institutes and laboratories. A very 
limited number of large commercial firms do conduct what 
they refer to as fundamental research but such activities 
should be more precisely referred to as basic industrial 
research. 
99 
Technological progress, structural change and employment 
So, one might consider the research conducted at CERN 
seeking to unify the fundamental forces of nature as funda-
mental research, while that at the Joint European Torus 
(JET) into harnessing thermonuclear power for electrical 
generation as basic industrial. 
Applied research is also original investigation but is directed 
towards practical applications: experimental development 
draws on the above type of research to assist in the pro-
duction of new products, processes and operational systems. 
Again, the essential characteristic is that of novelty. New 
technology results when such advances in science, engineer-
ing and organization are applied to the industrial arts. 
So one should distinguish between invention, which is the 
conceptualization of a new product or process, and inno-
vation which is the transformation of such a programme 
into a new or improved product or process for commercial-
ization in the market place. 
Since it is successful innovation (e.g. the development of 
penicillin as a medicine or of bio-engineered human inter-
feron) which leads to the generation of employment, rather 
than scientific discovery (the original identification of the 
penicillin effect or of the structure of DNA, the blueprint 
of genetic organisms) we will emphasize the role of the 
innovator/entrepreneur rather than that of the inventor/ 
scientist, while attempting to identify why Europe seems less 
capable than its trading partners at the economic and social 
exploitation of the fruits of European insight. Because the 
economic effects of advances made by scientists in their 
laboratories can differ greatly from the effects of advances in 
technology made by engineers, and the process of diffusion 
through the economic network adopt very different traject-
ories, we will outline some major types of innovation by 
origin and consider how they disrupt existing economic 
structures. 
Technological innovation is evidenced mainly in the form 
of new or improved products and processes. Of course, the 
distinction may not be so neat in reality; a new computer 
may be regarded as a product innovation by the computer 
sector but as a process innovation to a firm using it for 
production control. Still, such distinctions are important: 
there are higher levels of risk associated with the introduc-
tion of a new product (e.g. a new aeroframe built of carbon 
fibre and composites) than incremental improvements to 
existing products (e.g. a more critically shaped airfoil using 
existing alulithium). 
The generality that innovation flows from scientific advance 
does not always hold true: the first industrial revolution. 
based on steam power, resulted from the contributions of 
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artisans and toolmakers and owed little or nothing to pure 
science. In this instance, technological practice preceded the 
scientific explanation of energy generation and conservation. 
But such pervasive, or generic technologies as electricity and 
bio-engineering, which have had and will have a profound 
efffect on the structure of industry and on the international 
specialization in such new activities, have had their origin 
in advances made in fundamental research: the theories of 
electromagnetism led to the birth of the electrical industry, 
while research conducted in the UK into the structure of 
genetic material led US scientists to the idea of specially 
engineered genetic structures. The electronic revolution was 
spawned by basic industrial research, which resulted in the 
transistor. This discovery fuelled the growth of the data-
processing industry in the US, and those sectors pivotal for 
Japanese post-war economic growth based on consumer 
electronics. 
Untargetted basic research conducted within the Com-
munity into the body's system of immunization was to lead 
later to the unexpected discovery of monoclonal antibodies, 
a medical breakthrough on a par with that of antibiotics. 
But, as in the case of pencillin, raddr. jets, early computers, 
the patent rights were taken out by US firms. This latter 
characteristic of technology, its high level of international 
mobility. help explain why a country with a proven record 
at invention may not subsequently excel at innovation. 
It is estimated that over 90 % of mankind's total heritage 
of scientific knowledge was contributed since the last world 
war: the sum of such knowledge is expected to double again 
within the next 15 years. A more recent characteristic of 
new technology is that its advance is being augmented by 
powerful new instrumentation and the confluence of ad-
vances in other areas of science and technology. The advance 
of chemistry in 19th century Germany was largely the result 
ofa painstaking process of trial and error. a game of molecu-
lar roulette: advances made nowadays into such genetically 
re-engineered products as insulin and interferons are now 
specifically designed thanks to advances in theory combined 
with such advances in instrumentation as the electron micro-
scope and the computer. Placing of communications satel-
lites in geostationary orbit by the Ariane launcher is only 
possible because of the timely confluence of the necessary 
scientific and technological conditions. Had the design of 
rocket motors not been sufficiently advanced such satellites 
could not reach such an orbit: without the data-processing 
hardware and software based on miniaturized semiconduc-
tors the craft could not be controlled. never mind navigated 
to a precisely calculated orbit. It is becoming apparent 
that the main characteristic of the economically significant 
scientific advances which have the most pervasive impact on 
large areas of economic activity, is that they are multidiscipli-
nary, often resulting from a timely confluence of a number of 
theoretical and technological breakthroughs each of which is 
vital to success. Examples of such confluence breakthrough 
are the development of radio and TV, the semiconductor, 
atomic fission, programmable computers and biogenetics. 
Confluence inventions depend mostly on the contributions 
of scientists: by far the most numerous advances in tech-
nology result from the efforts of engineers giving rise to 
incremental improvements of products and processes. Be-
cause such incremental advances in technology do not in-
volve the great uncertainties of long-lead-time fundamental 
research, they incur the lowest level of technical and com-
mercial risk, but play a major role in determining relative 
competitiveness, especially between existing firms. This form 
of innovation has constituted a key strategy of Japanese 
medium and long-term economic policy and is allied to 
innovation in production engineering and quality control. 
The aggregate effect of such incremental technological inno-
vation is probably as significant economically as that of 
the historically rare scientific breakthroughs, but the latter 
probably have a much more pronounced effect on long-term 
investment cycles and international shifts in comparative 
advantage. ' 
2.Innovation 
Innovation is when the economic rewards of human inven-
tiveness and insight are first realized; the economic risks 
and costs increase progressively with each stage of market 
introduction. This market introduction stage is the weak 
link of Community science and technology policy: it results 
not so much from a technology gap as from an institutions 
gap. 
Innovation is the initial commercialization of invention: it 
includes the conducting of market research, raising the vari-
ous stages of finance, hiring management and workers, in-
vesting in production plant and equipment, and setting up 
the distribution network. In some cases e.g. new model 
atomic power stations, the invention may be innovated sim-
ultaneously, whereas in others there is a long delay before 
commercial potential is realized, e.g. the theory of coherent 
light was theorized at the turn of the century. a prototype 
laser produced in the 1960s and only commercialized for 
domestic use in the 1980s in digital electronic systems. 
The objective of an entrepreneur or innovating firm is to reap 
the supernormal profits which market leadership confers on 
those who can protect their invention from imitation and 
internalize the commercial rewards. Some other products or 
processes are first innovated primarily for reasons of na-
Innovation 
tional security (early jet engines), national prestige (lunar 
and planetary probes), industrial safety (early robots in 
nuclear installations), or skill shortages (the stimulus to 
numerically-controlled machine tools in Japan). But the 
normal objective of innovation at the private firm level is 
the maximization of output from resource inputs and/or the 
introduction of new products which are expected to satisfy 
latent demand ahead of potential competitors. 
It is this hope of tapping the reservoir of unrealized, latent 
demand for new products which has driven entrepreneurs 
to undertake the high risk, delayed revenue-profile of novelty 
investment rather than the normal profit expectations of 
competitive mature product investment. It is this challenge 
which leads to the birth and death of firms at a micro level 
and, later, to structural change at a macrosectoral level when 
the innovation is diffused among other firms. It is the relative 
ability of the fabric of an economy to convert the advances 
of science and technology made at home and abroad into a 
socially useful activity which determines relative rates of 
long-term economic growth. 
The commercialization stage of innovation is generally con-
sidered to involve far larger financial expenditure than the 
technical research stage, hence greater financial risk. 1 The 
risk of market failure is probably greater than at the engin-
eering stage, the classic example is that of Concorde which 
has had a brilliant technical record. 
In the case of limited-differentiated product innovation, e.g. 
a new 32-bit microprocessor, the time lead is of the essence: 
· economic scarcity profits may be made in the first few 
months before a competitor with a differentiated design 
specification puts a competitor product on the market and, 
as the cost performance curve drops with production experi-
ence, the competitor's price may be consistently but profit-
ably undercut. The spoils of innovation victory are awarded 
to the leader. 
A good example of such competitive pricing is that of one 
US 16-bit chip whose price dropped from USO 250 in 1979 
to USO 40 in 1983, to about USO 12 in 1985. It is not 
1 The imaginative and successful Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program of the US National Science Foundation makes do with 
a maximum grant of USO 50 OOO for the first phase of scientific or 
engineering research. The most promising of these may then qualify for 
phase II funding of between USO 200 OOO and 500 OOO. After this the 
firms must obtain private commercial financing. The experience of the 
last few years has been to award an SBIR grant to one in 10 applicants. 
just half of the projects have brought products or services into being, a 
quarter generating commercial sales of which a quarter were exported. 
These results would suggest a very high success rate. Private venture 
capital firms might fund only one in 30 applications. 
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unusual for the real cost of mainframe computers to drop 
by 20 % to 30 % per annum. 
Were a frequency distribution of innovation to be drawn 
with cost on the vertical axis the resulting histogram would 
appear highly skewed towards the axis and with a long tail 
indicating a great number of innovations costing relatively 
little. It is this high cost of major innovations which led 
Schumpeter to suggest that innovation is so risky that mon-
opolistic market structures are most conducive to its spread. 
This is probably an oversimplification, though there are 
exceptionally high financial thresholds to entry into software 
language, data networking, submicron chip production, to 
cite a few examples. 
It is the facility whereby budding US entrepreneurs have 
easy access to finance for innovation, together with a cultural 
and institutional climate favourable to risk-taking which is 
frequently proposed as the explanation of the greater ability 
of the US economy, compared with Europe, to socially 
exploit the fruits of human ingenuity. Europe's ability to 
undertake successful intellectual investment and absorb its 
army of educated unemployed, bears little relation to its 
ability to win Nobel prizes for natural science. Banks take 
a jaundiced approach to loaning to entrepreneurs when they 
may only hope to charge a marginally higher interest rate 
and the projects entail a risk order of much higher magnitude 
compared with that of mature cycle investment and, es-
pecially, portfolio and property investment. Individuals are 
deterred from high risk, delayed liquidity venture capital 
investment if the commercial climate is unfavourable, back-
up component and service supplies not readily accessible 
and personal tax rates on eventual rewards deemed punitive. 
It is suggested that the greater flexibility of US institutions, 
such as the tax breaks olTered for participation in research 
and development limited partnerships (RDLPs) accounts for 
the greater success of that country at converting invention 
into gainful employment. According to the US National 
Science Foundation I during the period 1953-73 small firms 
produced about half of the major US innovations, or four 
times as many as large firms for each R&D dollar. yet 
received less than 4 % of all Federal R&D funds. 
In the case of the Community our frequency distribution 
would tend to be much less skewed than that for Japan, 
indicating a greater emphasis on long lead research and 
investment-intensive innovation. The Japanese strategy in 
the past was to concentrate on incremental innovation of 
existing technology, with the major part of the effort concen-
trated on advances in process and manufacturing tech-
' /111·,•ntion M,11111g,•me111. Vol. 10, No 4. April 1985. 
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nology. This strategy reduced risk, increased the pro-
ductivity both of capital and labour and promoted the 
development of a manufacturing base both cost-competitive 
and quality-oriented. When otherwise unavailable the tech-
nology was purchased abroad via licences (a situation which 
has now been reversed) and effort concentrated not on 
reinventing the technological wheel but in improving its 
mode of manufacture and final quality. The Japanese learn-
ed the importance of global economies of scale, but they did 
not overlook the importance of the home market as a test 
launching pad from which innovative products were intro-
duced. 
The more one examines cases of internationally successful 
innovation the more one is drawn to investigation of insti-
tutional obstacles as the main impediment to the conversion 
of successful invention to successful innovation. Until re-
cently it was difficult to argue that Europe's lack of innova-
tiveness was due to a technology lag: unfortunately that 
situation is also changing. 
In a very interesting study of national patterns of innovation 
Chakrabarti. et al. 2 found that between 1953 and 1973 the 
US share was falling. The US and Japan targetted more 
towards the consumer goods sectors than did European 
firms. The UK has a strong bias towards 'radical' innovation 
while Japan tended towards 'improvements'. In Japan inno-
vations occurred under conditions of greater competition, 
had more devoted to internal use of the firm, but practically 
none originated among small firms. 
3. The diffusion of new product technology 
When an innovation is diffused its economic elTects are felt 
at a macrosectoral level. But intellectual property rights to 
the technology are even more important than the high-tech 
products themselves. The pattern of international transfer 
of technology is being alTected by the trend from multina-
tional to global production. Some country's fiscal and tarilT 
strategies may need to be adjusted to this new reality or they 
will force themselves into a situation where they have to 
choose between ownership of enterprises with low employ-
ment potential and the importation of mobile employment 
positions. 
2 A. Chakrabarti. S. Feinman and W. Fuentivilla. The Cross-National 
Comparison of Patterns of Industrial Innovations·. The Columbia Journal 
of World Business, New York. Vol. 17. No 3. Fall 1983. 
An innovation is diffused when one or more firms other 
than the innovator introduce the new product or process. 
Normally the inventor will have filed an invention patent 
which confers exclusive rights to the inventor and protection 
from imitation by others. 
Ideally a patent is granted to a non-obvious invention of a 
highly differentiated piece of technology, e.g. the specific 
chemical structure of a novel prescription drug, which con-
fers a temporary monopoly right on the inventor. On the 
expiry of the patent (usually less than 20 years, though 
the 50-year copyright protection of computer software is a 
conspicuous exception) other firms are then free to imitate, 
as is now happening to the patent rights on colour television. 
The temporary monopoly conferred on the innovator should 
serve as a reward for the risks of R&D and, ideally, as an 
encouragement to further research. Much depends on the 
national patent system, in the US and Japan new micro-
organisms may be granted patent protection but this is not 
yet true for European researchers. 
But many technological advances lack blatant non-obvious-
ness and may be imitated, legally or illegally, especially by 
foreign competitors resident under different jurisdictions. In 
many cases it is possible to circumvent a patent by designing 
small differences into a competing product, examples such 
as the suspension of an automobile, machine tool, memory 
chip or personal computer spring to mind. (In the case of 
genetic engineering a rival who gains hold of even a minute 
quantity of a new micro-organism can achieve replication 
within hours.) So the innovation becomes diffused very soon 
after initial market introduction. 
In the case of a small firm lacking a developed market 
structure the right to exploit the technology may be sold by 
licence to a third party, usually a firm in a foreign country 
with a market network not encroaching on that of the 
innovator. Examples of such licensing are those for the audio 
tapes, float glass, colour TV and digital recorders. In this 
case the innovator may gain very substantial revenue with 
which to conduct further R&D, but the benefits to the 
national economy appear not in the form of exports or 
domestic employment, but as an inflow for royalties in the 
national balance of payments. 
There would now appear to be a major change of strategy 
and organizational structure on the part of the most inter-
nationally competitive firms. The previous strategy of the 
multinational firms establishing production facilities over-
seas. with products frequently tailored to meet local tastes, is 
being replaced by production of standardized products for 
global and not just multinational markets. The key to this 
change in strategy would frequently appear to lie in the 
Diffusion 
distinction between the product itself and the technology 
and technical standards which are embodied in it. 
The increased interdependancy of national economies leads 
to increased globalization and st;mdardization of pro-
duction; this means that a firm which manages to impose 
its propriatory standards on such new technologies as audio 
and digital recorders, data communications network archi-
tecture, computer software, may expect not only to reap 
substantial rewards from licensing agreements but to exer-
cise through this function a great influence on commercial 
developments for that technology worldwide. At a macro-
economic level a country which succeeds in imposing its 
technical standards on world markets becomes a net exporter 
of invisible items reflected in its balance of payments. Its 
interest would then lie in opposing protectionism and all 
tariff barriers to trade in goods, especially those on which 
it is being paid a royalty by a licenced manufacturer. 
The strategies whereby globally-competitive firms diffuse 
and gain acceptance for their own technical standards has 
changed considerably in recent years. In the field of con-
sumer electronics, for example, the increasing ingenuity of 
strategies over the years for colour TV, video recorders, 
analogue and digital audio equipment and home computers, 
are instructive. 
For a firm wishing to achieve global competitiveness a large, 
unified,but non-protectionist internal market provides an 
invaluable base, especially for products whose scale econom-
ies are being increased by new production technology. This is 
particularly true when the presence of a number of domestic 
rivals is opportune to stimulate further competitiveness. A 
lower level of purchase tax compared with that imposed on 
the domestic market of foreign competitors will accelerate 
market penetration and a reduction in production costs 
along a sharply-declining cost-performance curve. 1 Tariff 
protection may help domestic producers increase market 
share at the expense of foreign competitors, but can prove 
strategically defeating if domestic producers exploit it to 
maintain less-than-globally-efficient production structures. 
In a technologically-dynamic sector a tariff may be con-
sidered as offering a time-advantage to a domestic producer, 
e.g. if his technology is a year behind that of a foreign 
market-leader in a sector where the sales price is being 
reduced by 30 % each year, a 15 % tariff may be considered 
as having a six-month reduction effect on the technology 
gap. But such tariffs usually only encourage the foreign 
1 In this regard it is interesting to note a proposal by an extra- Community 
country to grant a three year purchase-tax holiday to new-technology 
products. 
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producer to further reduce production cost, thus improving 
competitiveness and international market share. It may also 
encourage the foreigner to establish production facilities 
behind the tariff wall, thus further eroding the market share 
and employment potential of the domestic producer. 
A serendipity effect of the US space programmes of the 
1960s was the development of data communications network 
standards among a host of subcontractors: this helps explain 
the high international specialization of US information-
technology firms in the 1980s and provides evidence of the 
attractions of early market entry and definition of standards 
in frontier technologies. The latest US space initiative will 
almost certainly have a similar effect on many emerging 
technologies of the late 1990s. It is to ensure that Europe 
will not miss out entirely on this coming wave of new 
technologies that the Community has launched its proposal 
'Towards a European technology community' 1 in June 1985. 
The Community must maintain international specialization 
in a range of technologies with substantial manufacturing 
facilities and employment-generation within member econ-
omies. It would be invidious if diffusion of Community 
inventiveness was invariably undertaken abroad, encour-
aged by internal inflexibilities, while incentives were simul-
taneously offered to foreign firms to replace direct exports 
to the Community by establishing assembly plants in a 
Member State. The long-term effect would be the reduction 
in European ownership of enterprises for the sake of exter-
nally-determined employment. 
4. Process technology and productivity growth 
The object of process innovation is the improved pro-
ductivity of labour and capital, particularly as a response to 
increased competitiveness of our trading partners. But the 
replacement of variable cost labour by programmed auto-
mation is not always economically or socially efficient if 
such technology is imposed on sub-optimal manufacturing 
systems. Input productivity growth will increase demand for 
both capital and labour factors if demand for the final 
product is positive, but market shares will be captured by 
the most competitive trading partners. 
The object of process innovation is increased productivity 
of labour and/or capital: new technology is the means to 
this end. When a new process technology affects technique 
in a particular sector its economic effects, when diffused 
1 COM(85) 350 final. 
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throughout the sector, is macrosectoral; when a new process 
technology such as information technology is pervasive to 
all sectors its effects are macroeconomic as across-the-board 
advances in productivity accelerate the growth rate of the 
entire economy. The virtuous cycle of productivity, profita-
bility, investment is conceptually applicable both at the 
micro and macroeconomic levels. 
In Chapter 2 evolutions of productivity are calculated for 
the factors labour and capital. These increases result from 
two major trends; capital deepening as relatively greater 
amounts of capital of fixed technical capacity is combined 
with labour, and what one might call 'capital enrichment as 
technological advance enhances the capacities of capital 
equipment relative to its cost, i.e. the incremental capital/ 
output ratio begins to decline. The latter developments were 
especially encouraged when, as in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the real cost of labour increased rapidly and its supply 
was restricted by reduced working hours. This reduced the 
risk to capital-producing firms of incurring the threshold 
costs of R&D into numerically-controlled machine tools, 
robotics and programmed automation which reduced the 
demand for labour relative to the output potential of the 
new capital goods. It also changed the mix of demand for 
labour of varying skills as semi-skilled workers performing 
repetitive tasks were made redundant and skilled program-
mers, electronics engineers and specialized supervisors were 
recruited. 
In some cases European firms reduced their variable costs 
as they made variable-time production workers redundant 
but increased fixed costs as they recruited professional salar-
ied staffs and bought more advanced capital equipment. 
Investment in flexible manufacturing systems and robotiza-
tion will not necessarily improve the competitiveness of a 
firm if it substantially increases the fixed cost of professional 
supervisory and maintenance staff while the new capital 
equipment cements suboptimal engineering and production 
procedures. 
The impact of new technology on demand for factor inputs 
depends on the type of process involved. In the case of 
continuous processes such as an oil refinery or chemical 
plant, labour costs generally represent only a small pro-
portion of costs so research is directed towards capital 
productivity, e.g., a lower use of energy by developing less-
hostile-environment reactions. 
It is in the mass production of discrete products that the 
public is most conscious of the pace of innovation. Despite 
automation waves in the I 930s and 1960s this form of 
production is still intensive in its demand for medium-skilled, 
repetitive-task labour. Since new information technology 
in the form of programmed automation and management 
systems (which includes computerized design, computer-
controlled machine tools, robots and materials handling 
equipment, production and inventory management) is ide-
ally suited to replace most human repetitive tasks, the effects 
of process innovation in this case has been directed at 
improving labour productivity as well as capital pro-
ductivity. 
The Chapter 2 data show that it is in those sectors where 
the diffusion of new technology is fastest that growth of 
capital productivity is highest, i.e. the relative increase in 
capital input is less than that of the increase of output (in 
which case the indices are positive). The data show strong 
evidence of this new trend, especially in Japan and Italy. So 
the fear of capital-shortage unemployment is less justified. 
This is particularly true of product sectors for which price-
elasticities of demand are positive and relatively high. As 
demand for such products increases more than proportion-
ately as selling price falls, the demand for capital and/or 
labour inputs can rise in such sectors. The evidence appears 
to sustain the separate argument in section 2 of this chapter 
that demand for new technology products tends to stay 
relatively high over time and leads to increasing demands 
for inputs which are sufficiently strong to more than offset 
a combination of rising productivity of both capital and 
labour. In economic terms the inward shift of the entire 
production isoquant raises the marginal revenue product of 
both inputs under conditions of elastic demand. In our open 
trading world the increases in demand for factors will benefit 
those economies achieving the highest level of sectoral com-
petitiveness. It is this competitive pressure which is speeding 
up the rate of international diffusion of technology. 
5. National financing of R&D 
The pattern of R&D expenditure by objective differs greatly 
from one Member State to another. Many defence projects 
are suitable for dual use and this can considerably advantage 
sectoral competitiveness. Conventional estimates of com-
parison of R&D intensity may overestimate that for the 
Community and the US but underestimate that for Japan. 
In 1981, the latest year for which internationally comparable 
data is available, the Community gross expenditure on R& 
D (GERO) reached 44 100 million ECU; US GERO equal-
led 1.5 times that of the Community, while in Japan it 
equalled half that of the EC at 21 400 million ECU. 
Because of the undervaluation of the yen, and the lower 
cost of conducting R&D in Japan. the above calculations 
National financing of R & D 
considerably underestimate the magnitude of the Japanese 
effort. Since there is a considerable element of duplication 
of effort within the Community money values tend to exag-
gerate the real effort here also, so it is probably true to claim 
that Japanese real civilian R&D effort now approaches that 
of the Community civilian effort, though with much greater 
skewing towards the development end of the spectrum. 
A characteristic of the most technologically dynamic econ-
omies is their tendency to denote over 2 % of annual GDP 
to R&D. In 1981, the Community average was just over 
2 %, a figure equalled by France, but exceeded by the UK 
at 2,4 % and Germany at 2,5 %. Other members spent less, 
such as the Netherlands with 1,9 % and Italy with I %. 
That same year Japan recorded 2,4 % and the US 2,5 %. 
The US has budgetted 2,88 % of estimated GDP for R&D 
in 1985. 
The share of government-financed R&D in gross national 
expenditure on R&D also differs considerably between 
Member States. The Community average stood at 48 % in 
1983. Some countries had shares below this average: Be-
lgium (31 %), Germany (42 %), Italy (47 %), and Nether-
lands (47 %). Other countries exceeded the average: UK 
(50 %), Denmark (52 %), France (58 %), Greece (72 %), 
Ireland (74 %). Government-financed R&D is usually con-
centrated on basic and applied research while private firms 
normally specialize in experimental development. 
Defence R&D can have major commercial multiplier effects 
if the new products and processes are 'dual-use' such as jet 
engines, airframes made from new materials, opto-elec-
tronics, very high speed integrated circuits and their manu-
facturing processes. 
. "jj ;-
Because of its various defence and space commitments the 
public share of US GERO in 1983 exceeded 50 %. In 1982 
the Japanese Government financed 24 % of natural science 
R&D. A notable feature of GERO programmes is the vari-
ation between different countries in commitment to defence 
R&D as is illustrated in Table I, which shows the structure 
of R&D budgets in 1983 and 1984 for the Community. 
(For a detailed analysis of Member State R&D budgets by 
objective and their recent trends, the annual report of the 
Community Statistical Office, 'Government financing of R& 
D in Community countries' should be consulted.)For the 
Community as a whole, public R&D appropriations are 
shown to have grown by an average annual 2, I % between 
1975 and 1983. 
) . 
.... . 
In the USA government allocations to R&D were estimated 
at USO 45 500 million in 1984, with USO 15 800 million de-
voted to civilian research. R&D budgets increased by an 
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Table 1 
Breakdown of R&D budgets by objectives in 1983 and 1984 
D F NL 
1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 
I. Expioralion and exploitation 
of the Earth 2.2 2.2 3.0 2.0 1.6 u 0.8 0.6 
2. lnfrastructun: and general 
planning of land use 3.2 2.3 3.5 3.5 1.0 I.I 5.6 4.6 
3. Conuol of environmental pol-
lution 
r8 r5 r9 r Prot.cclion and improvement 5.8 5.6 5.3 6.1 4. of human health 3.2 3.8 3.9 2.5 
5. Production. distribution and 
rational utilization of energy 16.9 15.0 7.3 7.9 23.3 20.7 4.4 4.7 
6. Agricuhural production and 
1echnology 2.1 2.4 3.4 4.7 4.1 4.7 7.6 5.0 
7. Industrial production and 
technology 11.0 11.6 12.9 11.7 19.3 20.6 I0.9 9.4 
8. Social structures and relation-
ships 3.7 2,4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 5.8 3.8 
9. Exploration and exploitallon 
o(spacc 4.3 3.9 4.5 5.8 4.6 7.3 3.9 25 
10. Research financed from gen· 
eral univenity funds 32.1 33.0 { 10.3 r··5 r7.0 26.3 31.8 51.5 
11 Non-oriented research 9.2 11.4 16.2 5.5 9.8 
12. Oilier research 1.5 1.0 1.3 I.I I.I 3.9 
Total financing of ovil R&D 91.6 90.2 70.3 68.7 93.9 91.1 97.0 96.9 
13. Defence 8.4 9.8 29.7 31.3 6.1 8.9 3.0 3.1 
Total financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sourer: Directorate-General for Scientt. Rocarch and Dc,.·elopmcnl. 
annual average 2,3 % in real terms 1975-83, with a 0,9 % 
increase for the civil component. Just over half of US 
GERO, estimated at USD 100 OOO million in 1984, was 
financed directly by private industry. It is probable that in 
1984 some seven or eight firms in data processing, telecom-
munications and advanced systems management spent over 
USD 500 million on R&D, with expenditures of the top two 
exceeding USD 2 500 million each, i.e. more than the total 
turnover of many fragmented Community firms in such 
sectors, or in excess of the total allocated to the Esprit 
programme over the five years of its existence ( I 500 million 
ECU, 1984-88). 
Gross expenditure on R&D in Japan in 1982, at yen 6 500 
thousand million, equalled about 2,2 % of GDP. A low 
fraction, 2,5 %, of the public allocation was devoted to 
defence, while half was allocated to the Education Ministry 
for the general advancement of knowledge, but this presum-
ably includes a certain amount of basic indlistrial research 
including new materials. Since 1975 GERD increased by 
7,4 % in real terms annually. 
It was in order to strengthen the Community's technological 
base and restore lost competitiveness that the Commission 
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(%) 
B UK IRL DK GR EUR 10 
1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 
3.5 2.6 0.6 1.7 0.8 0.6 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 
4.0 2.6 I.I 1.5 7.5 6.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 
r2 t r9 r r (7.9) 2,1 6.4 (10.7) 5.1 7.6 3.5 4.2 4.6 3.6 
7.9 7.8 5.3 4.8 2.9 2.3 I0.5 7.2 II.I 10.3 
2.9 6.7 4.0 5.0 31.4 29.3 9.3 7.2 3.5 4.2 
16.6 11.3 6.6 8.6 20.6 24.9 19.0 18.0 11.S 11.8 
(12.2) 5.2 0.8 0.7 8.2 8.0 (6.7) 2.9 (2.5) 1.7 
5.1 6.7 1.9 2.3 1.2 1.6 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.4 
{ 36.5 {'4.6 r9.0 r5.I r·.s (29.6) 27.7 21.0 (34.6) 32.9 
11.4 5.1 2J 15.4 10.6 
1.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 
99.6 99.5 50.0 50.4 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.8 75.7 75.2 
0.4 0.5 50.0 49.6 0.2 0.2 24.3 24.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
proposed the launching of a true European technology com-
munity. This framework is compatible with and complimen-
tary to the French Government's Eureka initiative which 
was formally adopted by 17 European countries and the 
Commission on 17 July 1985. 
Some existing programmes pr-0vide evidence of the positive 
results which can be achieved when European firms cooper-
ate with each other: these include research programmes 
such as Esprit, industrial programmes such as Airbus and 
strategic programmes such as the European Space Agency. 
If Europe is to harness the new technologies to achieve its 
social and economic objectives then a genuine European 
technology community must: (i) exploit to the maximum 
the Community dimension of a continental market and 
network of research institutes.facilities. and common techni-
cal standards; (ii) promote the greatest possible synergetic 
effects from the interactions of national and Community 
programmes, possibly with an additional Community contri-
bution and participation of non-member countries. 
Among the main types of R&D projects which might be 
promoted are: (i) generic technologies such as microelectron-
ics and optronics whose applications spread throughout the 
industrial fabric, improving productivity and creating new 
product employment; (ii) development and exploitation of 
joint facilities for basic research, such as those already under-
way at CERN in Geneva and JET at Culham; and (iii) 
strategic technology-intensive programmes such as space 
exploration or telecommunications, where the 'critical mass' 
of the continental market is essential to commercial success. 
As Community-financed R&D programmes normally cover 
only the precompetitive phase, this initiative must be com-
plemented by efforts to improve the market, fiscal, regulat-
ory and social environment for entrepreneurship and inno-
vation so as to encourage rapid commercial exploitation of 
results by Community firms. 
6. Technological change and trade specialization 
Trade theory provides powerful arguments in favour of free 
trade but does not take sufficient account of how knowledge 
as a factor can change competitive advantage. Policies ad-
opted by trading partners to hasten technological change 
are having especially disruptive effects on the competitive 
prospects of the smaller Member States. Community ex-
porters are losing competitive edge in the most technolgoi-
cally exigent markets. 
Since the last world war the volume of international trade 
has grown at an even greater rate than that of world pro-
duction. The GATT system is underpinned not just by 
fear of l 930s-style protectionism but by the intellectually-
compelling arguments of international trade theory. This 
demonstrates how free trade and specialization with a mini-
mum resort to tariff or quantitive restrictions is mutually 
advantageous for all participants. 
It may be argued here that international trade theory does 
not take sufficient account of the role of intellectual capital 
as a factor of production. as a determinant of the fastest 
growing sectors of international trade, as the main determi-
nant of structural change and of the inexorable shift of 
economic power from the North Atlantic littoral towards 
the Pacific basin. 
One criticism of pure trade theory centres on the fact that 
economically useful knowledge is treated as a datum. as 
exogenously determined. which falls like manna from heaven 
and may be instantly and freely transferred among the 
community of partner nations. In Ricardian theory com-
parative costs are determined on the supply side by the 
relative overall productivity of factors of production in each 
country. The pattern of trade is thus determined by price 
differences between the partners. The more modern theory 
Technological change and trade specialization 
of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson emphasizes the variations 
between countries of endowment in the factors of pro-
duction. This factor price equalization model presumes that 
the techniques of production are similar in each country 
and, since technology is presumed to be a free good, equally 
diffused internationally. 
If it may be argued that since conventional theory focuses 
on secondary determinants, resulting policy orientation may 
become misdirected. A useful distinction may be drawn 
between the concept of comparative advantage and that of 
competitiveness. Comparative advantage, or specialization, 
is relative commercial strength of a sector compared with 
other sectors within the same economy. Competitive advan-
tage is the relative strength of a firm relative to a competitor 
firm in another trading country. Following from this distinc-
tion, a firm may enjoy a comparative advance in its particu-
lar sector, but may remain at a competitive disadvantage in 
the international marketplace because the foreign competi-
tor enjoys one or more incentives such as investment grants, 
government-financed R&D, undervaluation of the currency, 
low interest credits, non-tariff barrier protection. The dy-
namic objective of such inducements is to convert a competi-
tive advantage into comparative advantage. This distinction 
is especially relevant to a sector based on accumulated know-
ledge, experiences economies of the learning curve, involves 
high-risk delayed-liquidity investment, and shares other 
characteristics of the lengthy innovation process (e.g. the 
development of a new high speed microprocessor or bioengi-
neered enzyme). These are the main characteristics of those 
industries which have spearheaded the transfer of economic 
power towards the Pacific basin. They are based on know-
how rather than on fixed natural resources. In an age when 
economic strength is based on accumulations of knowledge, 
a factor highly mobile internationally, some nation States 
have realized that by creating a social and economic environ-
ment conducive to knowledge and favourable to high-risk 
investment, a competitive advantage can be created for firms 
in related sectors by means of a range of State-sponsored 
inducements. Then, when the firms have achieved a level of 
comparative advantage over some or all of its competitors, 
these props may be removed or directed to even newer 
sectors. By stimulating the innovation absorption capacity 
(institutions, social and economic framework) of an economy 
the public authorities can foster the development, firstly of 
competitive advantage, then of structural competitiveness, 
leading on to comparative advantage. So. in a dynamic 
context and with increasing openness of world markets 
forcing the pace of technological progress, comparative 
advantage in high value-added sectors can be created by 
perceptive. long-term public policy. Contrariwise. the failure 
of public authorities to adapt sufficiently rapidly to the 
changing facts of economic life, by attempting to re-
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vive technologically obsolescent sectors, by refusing to adopt 
the institutional framework to the new realities, weakens the 
structural competitiveness of an economy and leads directly 
to the increase of structural unemployment. 
The competitiveness of a sector will also be advantaged if a 
national defence or space budget finances an R&D dual-use 
programme considered too risky for a firm under pure 
market conditions. This phenomenon is presently posing 
considerable difficulties for many Community economies in 
their attempts to define a long-term strategy for knowledge-
intensive, high value-added sectors. They frequently find 
that in technologically dynamic sectors with mounting R& 
D threshold costs, they are being commercially pre-empted 
by foreign competitiors, including US firms, enjoying 
government-finance through defence and space pro-
grammes. The competitiveness of the European civil aviation 
sector has been severely handicapped by the ability of US 
firms to transfer the fruits of federally-funded R&D for 
military aircraft to civilian models. 
On the other hand, many Community members with very 
open trading markets face considerably higher risks invest-
ing in new sectors as compared with foreign competitors 
who enjoy scale economies of a larger domestic economy: 
this is especially the case in competition with Japan where 
a range of non-tariff barriers impedes import penetration of 
new products, thus greatly enhancing the effective scale 
of domestic market. It is the increasing realization of the 
difficulties faced by most member economies in entering 
innovative sectors based on global economies which has 
led to the adoption by the Commission of precompetitive 
collaborative research projects in information technology, 
telecommunications, biotechnology and basic industrial 
technology. 
Evidence of the above developments is provided by the 
record. The share of the Community of Ten in total indus-
trial world (OECD) high-tech trade, fell from 58 % in 1963 
to 43 % in 1983; that of the US fell from 27 % to 21 %, 
while that for Japan rose from 5 % to 23 %. (This includes 
automobiles and machine tools due to recent R&D trends 
in these sectors.) 1 Excluding intra-Community trade, the EC 
figure fell from 35 % to 23 %, while that for EFTA countries 
fell from 8 % to less than 7 %. Although these figures do 
not include certain strategic items, high-tech service sectors 
such as software, nor allow for multinational ownership. 
they provide hard empirical evidence of the shift of competi-
tiveness in new technology production towards the Pacific 
area. 
' The run list was published in E11ropem1 Eco110111y No 16 or July 1983. 
Although more selective than the strong-demand sectors in Chapter I 
the results or both calculations correspond. 
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Table 2 shows how the advanced-technology industries of 
the Community and other OECD countries performed from 
1963 to 1983: here the performance of the total of high-tech 
sectors is related to an OECD average of 1,00, with the 
value of each country's high-tech exports weighted for its 
importance in total OECD manufacturing exports (e.g. if a 
country accounts for 5 % of total OECD manufacturing 
exports but 7 % of OECD high-tech exports its index is 
calculated as 7 /5 = 1,4). The table shows succinctly the 
seriousness of Europe's decline as a producer of knowledge-
intensive exports - the score for some countries would 
be still lower if their record for total manufacturing, the 
weighting factor, was not even worse than that for the 
sectors retained. 
Table 2 
Evolution of comparative advantage1 in hi~h-technology trade 1963-
83 (OECD anrage = 1.00) 
COLNTRY 196) 19i0 1978 198) 
Belgium/Luxembourg 0,65 0.72 0,81 0,80 
Denmark 0.65 0.70 0.63 0.58 
France 0,93 1.00 0.96 0.84 
Germany 1.20 1.06 0.99 0.97 
Greece 0,07 0.07 0.16 0.13 
Ireland 0,42 0.61 0.92 1.14 
Italy 0,83 0.87 0.65 0.56 
Netherlands 1.10 0.85 0,68 0,61 
UK 1.02 0.94 0.92 0,91 
EUR 10 1.01 0.94 0.88 0.82 
USA 1.27 1.18 1.27 1.26 
Japan 0.72 1,07 1,27 1.36 
Canada 0.47 1.34 1,28 1.29 
Spain 0,33 0,44 NA ' 
Australia 0,46 0,57 0,60 0,47 
Sweden 0,69 0.88 0.95 0,91 
Switzerland 1.53 1.35 1.07 0.94 
OECD: rest 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.30 
OECD: total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
I The indc., orcomparati,c ~,dvantagc ('.'>pccializ.ation) is cakulati..'<l as fr,llows: 
X
11
:IX
1 
.\',l:.\' 
11·lit•r,· \, ,::- cxrx"lrls or product ; by countr) i: !: X, = hltal "orld cx(X,rts or product j: 
X, = total exports of manufactures b) country,:!:.\' = total world exports of manufactun.--s. 
Data for Spain and Austraha not ;.1va1lahk al umc of calculauon !!O nN mdudcd m OECD 
totals for I 98~ 
Table 3 provides a bird's eye view of high-tech trade flows 
by direction. The Community exports to highly diversified 
world markets : the US (expecially if one excludes aircraft 
and parts) and Japan concentrate more on the industrialized 
world. The net deficit of the EC with the US is evidenced 
- this would be even greater were services such as software 
and US-owned high-tech production facilities in Europe 
allowed for . The non-reciprocal nature of Japan's trading 
policies are also clearly evidenced. 
7. Innovation and structural unemployment 
In each economy the employment-potential of new tech-
nology is determined mainly by relative innovativeness and 
changing sectoral economies of scale. High-tech is not itself 
a major source of employment but its wealth-creating poten-
tial leads to high multiplier effects : long-run employment 
depends on maintenance of technological and commercial 
initiative vis-a-vis trading partners in a large range of sectors 
appropriate to the economy's size. 
Here the effects of technology on employment rates are 
considered in isolation from such other major determinants 
as changes in demography and participation rates. Techno-
Table 3 
High-tech trade flows by direction, 1963 and 19831 
Partner 
Reporter EU R EFTA USA 
EU R (22,6) 7,6 5,2 
EFfA 3,0 0,9 
USA 4,1 0,8 
Japan 0,4 0,2 1.7 
Total OECD 30,7 9,5 8,8 
EC ( 10) (20, 1) 4,4 4,4 
EFfA 2,5 1.2 
u A 5,2 1,1 
Japan 3,7 0.8 9.5 
Tota l OECD 31.7 7,2 20.8 
s •. of D 15 980 mllhon m 196J. us'• of SD 252 630 mill ion in 1983. 
DDR . Pohmd. CzcchosloH,\. iu . Hungul') . Romania, Dulgllria . 
Innovation and structural unemployment 
logical innovation is the main catalyst of structural embolism 
and growth in competitive economies, hence the main deter-
minant of the long-term rate of employment and unemploy-
ment.In the short-run such change may lead to inc;reased 
unemployment especially in the case of process innovation 
and replacement-product innovation. Where new product 
innovation and its multiplier effects on supplier and tertiary 
sectors does not come onstream to offer alternative employ-
ment the social effects will be severe especially if adequate 
training and education schemes are not provided. However, 
the global effects of the most recent industrial revolution 
would appear to be similar to those past - social disruptions 
during the structural change followed by a long-term in-
crease in employment as the spin-off effects of the newly-
innovated product sectors and their equipment, component 
and service suppliers more than counterbalance the earlier 
losses. According to a recent OECD report1 'new technol-
ogies have had little net effect on total employment in OECD 
countries as a whole. Although the evidence is inconclusive, 
it does suggest that recent technical change has had a small 
positive effect on overall employment' . 
1 Technology and Employment, DSTI/DSTI/85.3, OECD Paris, January 
1985. 
Japan USSR Other Arab China World 
CM EA2 OPEC3 
1963 
0,6 0,3 0,6 1,2 0, 1 57,7 
0,2 0, 1 0,2 0,2 0,1 7,8 
1,1 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,0 27,0 
0,1 0, 1 0,1 0,0 5,1 
1,9 0,5 1,0 1,9 0,1 100,0 
1983 
0.6 0.6 0,3 2,8 0,1 42,9 
0,1 0.2 0, 1 0,5 0,0 6,5 
1.9 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,2 20,5 
0,1 0,1 1,8 0,2 23,4 
2.7 0,8 0,6 6,3 0,6 100.0 
I Algcrin. L1b)'u. Iraq. Sa udi Arubiu. Yemen (North). outhcm Yemen. Bahrain. Kuwait. Abu Dhabi. Dubai. Ras-al-Khaiman. Emirates. Qatar. Oman. 
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At the individual country level the effects vary greatly, but 
as a general rule there is a close correlation between rising 
levels of unemployment and falling levels of trade specializa-
tion in technology-intensive products. This would appear to 
be especially true for the smaller industrialized countries 
as the trend towards globalization seems to increasingly 
disadvantage smaller scale producers. So individual econom-
ies could be affected by two main factors, firstly a relative 
lack of innovativeness due to infrastructural, institutional 
and cultural factors and, secondly, the effects of new process 
technology on scale economies. -'· , ,_ , · ·.,;.,_ ,. "· .·, ·"" 
Where technological change affects scale economies and the 
relative competitiveness of firms and countries, it directly 
affects employment prospects. There would appear, prima 
facie, to be a contradiction between the claims of greater 
flexibility offered by new process technology and increased 
globalization of production. This dilemma might be resolved 
if we attempt to distinguish between the applicability of 
such new technologies as programmed automation to the 
following major sectoral groupings. 
In the case of limited-differentiated products whose tech-
nology is inexorably advancing and for which demand is 
elastic, such as consumer electronics. information tech-
nology has led to increasing economies of scale and global-
ization of markets. In this case, a time-lead in market pene-
tration is of the essence so as to reduce marginal cost ahead 
of other competitors. Although internal markets provide an 
important marketing base they never offer scale economies 
sufficiently large to allow a number of domestic competitors 
to achieve global scale, except possibly in the case of the 
large US internal market. Examples of such products are 
personal computers and their programmes, video tape re-
corders and digital audio systems. 1 
In the case of products having a medium level of differen-
tiation new process technology appears to have reduced 
economies of scale as information technology reduces the 
diseconomies of production flow discontinuities. The classi-
cal case is that of automobile production where difTerent 
models may be further personalized to suit individual combi-
nation of optional extras. This development has greatly 
increased the competitiveness of some smaller-scale Euro-
pean producers whose future was considered in doubt before 
the real advantages of flexible manufacturing was realized. 
. ' \•,·-· .. _, 
1 In the case of video-recorders it is estimated that internationally competi-
tive production is in excess of I OOO OOO units per annum, a figure not 
achieved by any one Community producer but exceeded by a number of 
Japanese firms. 
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In the case of highly-differentiated products characterized 
more by creativity and craft than technological know-how, 
the flexibility potential of the new technologies may revive 
the competitiveness of such traditional products, especially 
in high-wage economies. The symbiosis of data processing 
and transmission affords the prospect of increasing decentra-
lization of production location, in parallel with rapid man-
agement information, since product transport costs are usu-
ally not a deciding factor under high differentiation. Typical 
example of such low-scale economy sectors are the haute 
couture textile, fashion, ceramics and silk enterprises of the 
Prato and other towns and regions in Italy, which specialize 
in highly-original, top-quality arts and crafts. 
Where the demand for the products of these three classifi-
cations is elastic the absolute demand for factor inputs 
may increase though technological advances cause a relative 
increase in the productivity of labour and even of capital.2 
The potential for employment increase will be greatest in 
differentiated product sectors, less so or negative the more 
homogenous the product becomes, especially if technological 
operational standards force a considerable product uniform-
ity. But the speed with which fully programmed automation 
and management systems (PAM) will be comprehensively 
diffused has been greatly exaggerated, as major problems 
of data communication between equipment and the great 
investment cost are underestimated. It is considered by in-
dustrial analysts that full PAM systems will only achieve 
widespread diffusion in the mid- l 990s, though some highly 
innovative firms should succeed earlier. The employment 
effects in mature though technological advancing product 
sectors, such as automobile production, will probably be 
similar to that experienced by agricultural labourers with 
the introduction of mechanization at the turn of the century. 
Though the shedding of labour may continue for some years 
in firms which are not diversifying product range, it is 
possible that for some firms and countries the most intensive 
period of redundancies has passed. 
For workers made redundant by firms which lack alternative 
opportunities at least three problems arise. Firstly, their 
existing qualifications and skills may mismatch those in 
alternative positions due to changing production technology; 
2 The optimum rate of variable input usage depends. inter alia. on marginal 
productivity, elasticity of product demand, proportion of total costs 
accounted by each input, and the marginal substitutability of each factor 
input which determines the elasticity of input demand. Resource input 
decisions of the enterprise depend on competition conditions in the 
resource market so that if the marginal cost of factor labour is rising 
relative to the marginal cost of factor capital (in the long-run as a result 
of technological advance) then capital will tend to be substituted for 
labour and prospects of eliminating structural unemployment are re-
tarded. 
secondly, there may be a reduction in demand for low-skill 
workers in favour of highly-skilled technicians, or a 'skill-
twist' as it has been dubbed in the US; thirdly, alternative 
employment may only become available in another location 
and institutional arrangement for accommodation purchase 
and rental in some countries militate greatly against residen-
tial transfer, as do restrictions on transfer of pension rights. 
A concomitant of improving employment potential and thus 
of reducing structural unemployment must be the intensifi-
cation of national training and retraining programmes for 
unemployed workers and constant in-house retraining for 
staff in competitive, innovative firms. In some sectors pro-
gress is retarded by a shortage of specialist skills, while 
women with considerable aptitudes in fields such as pro-
gramming are subject to discrimination. 
The direct employment potential of high-tech industry is 
quite low, probably only 3 % of manufacturing and 2 % of 
service employment in the most advanced countries. (In the 
US it is estimated that only 1,5 % of the 600 OOO new 
businesses started in 1983 were in high-tech, while of a total 
of 16 million new non-farm jobs created between 1972 and 
1983 the high-tech sectors accounted for 3 % to 14 % of 
the total depending on definition used.) But it is in the 
characteristic of high-tech industry as an originator of new 
wealth, intensive in human capital rather than raw materials 
and imported energy, that its real effects are witnessed as it 
stimulates the creation of other wealth-generating supply-
sectors, revitalizcs older industries and has multiplier effects 
in the wealth-distributing sectors. Many of these new activi-
ties are outlined in the Commission's proposal 'Towards a 
European technology community'. As was witnessed in the 
Innovation and structural unemployment 
past new sectors of activity unimagined at present by the 
business community should arise to outpace currently favou-
red winners, and generate further employment among com-
ponent suppliers and distributers. 
The social cost of the increasing rate of structural change is 
most distressing but the inexorable advance of technology, 
frequently pushed by the exigencies of defence and space 
programmes, seems beyond the capacity of any one nation 
to control, least of all those smaller economies most affected. 
Globalization of competitiveness poses an additional prob-
lem hence the importance of the Commission initiative to 
eliminate all internal Community trade barriers by 1992. 
Such Member States may hope to exploit niche sectors as 
have some smaller members in certain areas of biotechno-
logy, but must remain ever wary that success in these areas 
will eventually entice market entry or takeover bids by 
established firms constantly seeking to diversify product 
range. 
As long as the US strategic imperatives dictate government 
funding of frontier technologies with potential dual use and 
the protected nature of the Japanese market provide an 
invaluable launching pad for domestic innovators the pros-
pects for smaller trading partners in wealth-creating, know-
ledge-intensive sectors remains doubtful. Europe's best hope 
of reducing structural unemployment lies in outlining a 
strategy which takes account of these two global factors, 
maximizes the potential of its pool of scientists and engineers 
by directing a greater proportion of its research efforts to 
employment potential programmes and evolves to show 
. that a society which maintains its continued aspirations 
to civilized, caring standards can, and must, also become 
dynamic, competitive and innovative. 
111 
a • J( 
t . 
Statistical annex 
This statistical annex presents time series of annual data for the countries of the European 
Community, the United States and Japan, for the total of manufacturing indu~try and the 
following three sectoral groupings defined according to the NACE-CLIO classification of 
activities: 
Strong-demand sectors: 
electrical equipment and electronics; information technology, automated office equipment 
and precision instruments; chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Moderate-demand sectors: 
rubber and plastics; transport equipment; paper, pulp, packaging and printing; food, 
drink and tobacco; industrial machinery. 
Weak-demand sectors: 
textiles leather and clothing; steel and metal ores, metal goods; construction materials 
and non-metallic minerals. miscellaneous products. 
The data for the European countries have been taken from Eurostat sources. Unless 
otherwise stated, the framework of definitions used for the data up to 1982. is that of 
the European system of accounts (ESA). The figures for 1983. 1984 and 1985 are estimates 
and forecasts made by the services of the Commission. based on the most recent data 
from national surveys following national definitions. Thus they are not always comparable 
with the ESA data for earlier years. Nevertheless every effort has been made to ensure 
the continuity of the series. Data for manufacturing industry are not available. on the 
ESA basis. for Greece and Ireland. The data for the United States and Japan are from 
national sources 1 but the original activity classifications have been adjusted by DG II to 
bring them into line with the NACE-CLIO nomenclature, and only those data compatible 
with the ESA definitions have been chosen for analysis. 
1 For the USA. Department ,,r Commerce and Survey of current husiness: for Japan. National accounts. 
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Statistical annex 
Table 1 ·;j 
Domestic demand (percentage growth rate) .. ·r-.,3';. -~ ; ... .• :1 J. I •::...-;;·1; :,, 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 5,2 4,7 2,5 6,2 4,2 -2,5 2,9 3,5 9,2 
1973 14,6 15,8 5,1 8,4 18,2 14,9 19,1 11,3 17,0 19,0 
1974 8,3 2,2 2,4 10,0 11,8 5,7 5,9 6,4 -1,9 0,9 
1975 -7,7 -11,8 -4,0 -10,8 -10,7 -2,1 -3,5 -6,6 -8,3 -5,6 
1976 ' 12,1 15,4 8,8 8,5 13,2 9,3 2,9 8,5 9,6 12,7 
1977 '' 0,5 -0,5 -0,5 2,2 -1,2 10,5 1,8 1,1 8,7 5,4 
1978 4,3 -0,7 0,1 1,7 0,8 3,7 1,8 1,3 7,6 3,3 
1979 7,3 7,3 8,4 4,1 8,0 3,1 1,6 6,1 4,6 14,4 
1980 -0,5 -2,3 2,1 2,8 9,0 -0,l -14,3 -0,0 -4,6 14,7 
1981 -4,0 -2,9 -1,8 -1,8 -4,6 -3,1 -5,3 -2,9 1,1 2,3 
1982 0,4 1,5 -6,2 1,7 -1,7 2,8 1,0 -1,6 -4,8 4,7 
1973/1982 2,9 1,4 1,6 2,3 3,5 3,8 -0,2 1,9 2,3 6,4 
1983 -0,6 5,6 3,1 -1,2 -7,7 0,3 5,5 0,9 6,7 3,6 
1984 2,9 8,8 3,4 1,1 4,8 5,8 4,7 3,4 9,9 10,2 
1985 1,3 6,5 2,7 1,2 2,1 3,2 4,1 2,9 3,5 5,8 
1982/1985 1,2 7,0 3,1 0,3 -0,4 3,1 4,8 2,4 6,7 6,5 
Strong demand 
1972 12,3 4,1 5,6 9,1 5,4 3,8 4,8 6,4 17,0 
1973 20,2 26,5 10,5 14,4 19,2 17,9 23,5 15,2 14,4 23,5 
1974 14,0 14,0 11,0 18,1 20,0 17,0 6,9 13,3 0,2 17,0 
1975 -10,4 - 13.3 -5,2 -8,2 -7,3 -9,0 -2,5 -6,1 -5,2 -11,7 
1976 15,0 15,9 14,2 11,4 15,9 11,0 7,0 12,3 11,9 19,5 
1977 6,6 2,2 4,6 2,9 -1,2 17,6 5,4 4,2 9,6 12,4 
1978 7,7 -0,4 0,3 7,1 11,3 9,7 6,4 5,3 9,4 9,0 
1979 17,1 11,6 12,4 5,5 8,5 1,4 3,1 8,7 9,0 21,4 
1980 -4,7 1,0 2,6 4,4 12,6 -1,2 -13,1 1,0 -0,6 32,5 
1981 1,0 -4,0 2,6 3,0 -3,3 6,2 1,8 1,7 3,9 10.7 
1982 3,0 -0,8 -3,8 4,2 3,2 -5,7 4,5 0,6 -1,3 10,6 
1973/1982 6,0 3,9 4,9 5,7 7,1 6,1 2,9 5,2 4,8 13,5 
. Moderate demand 
1972 4,5 2,7 0,2 4,4 4,3 -5,1 2,4 1,8 5,5 
1973 9,7 13,8 2,9 7,7 17.8 18,3 19,0 10,6 18,1 20,4 
1974 3,8 3,9 -0,2 7,7 6,0 3,7 9,9 4,9 -0,8 1,1 
1975 -1,9 -10,5 -2,0 -9,3 -10,3 1,8 0.7 -4,1 -5,3 -1.9 
1976 6,7 11,5 8,8 6,7 9,8 9,0 1,0 6,8 6,9 6.9 
1977 1,2 1,7 -2,8 2,9 -0,4 11,2 0,9 0,6 8,3 3,0 
1978 4,7. 0,6 1,8 1,5 2,7 1,3 -0.0 1,5 7,4 3,4 
1979 5,9 4,1 8,3 4,0 5,6 5,1 0,5 5,2 3,6 13,4 
1980 -1,1 -1,3 -0,0 2,8 7,9 -1,0 -10,6 -0,4 -4,6 7,8 
1981 -3,0 -1,8 0,4 -0,0 -1,6 0,6 -6,7 -1,5 -1,2 -0,0 
1982 4,2 1,8 -5,2 3,5 -1,5 0,7 0,3 -0,7 -1,4 1,3 
1973/1982 2,5 1,6 1,4 2,3 2,8 4,4 0.3 1.9 2.3 4,8 
Weak demand 
1972 3,3 8,3 3,6 6.3 3,4 -2.3 4,5 4,0 8,6 
1973 18,9 14,7 4,6 6,2 19,1 10,3 13.3 9.5 17.2 14,6 
1974 11,2 -5,9 1.0 8,8 14,8 5,4 -0,5 5,2 -3,9 -6,8 
1975 -14.3 -13,2 -5,1 -15.2 -13,5 -7,4 -9,5 -10,4 -12.6 -4,6 
1976 17,9 22,6 6,0 10.1 15.9 8,2 4,6 9.0 8.3 14,1 
1977 -3.5 -5,6 -0,7 -0.0 -1,4 4,8 1.0 -0.0 7.9 3,7 
1978 1,0 -3,2 -2,0 -2.1 -5,8 3,0 2,4 -1,5 6,5 -1,4 
1979 4,5 11,1 6,1 3,1 10.7 0,6 2.6 5,6 3.4 10,9 
1980 3,0 -5,8 4,2 2.9 Q,6 2,2 -19,5 0,4 -6,7 9,0 
1981 -8,4 -4,2 -7,l -7.3 -8.4 -6,5 -3,7 -7,0 2.2 -2,8 
1982 -6,6 2,1 -8,8 -2.0 -5,2 -3,3 -0,5 -4,9 -11,6 1,2 
1973/1982 1.4 -0,l -0,1 -0,l 2.6 1.4 -2,1 0,2 0,5 3,0 
(ll A,1,ralJC •nnual ~rowth rut< (1972-n)l(l981-82); 1982 198S 
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Table 2 
(Production - Exports) as percentage of domestic demand 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 47,3 62,1 85,4 82,7 84,8 51,1 82,3 92,1 93,9 95,8 
1973 44,4 60,2 85,1 81,6 83,4 50,0 78,8 91,3 93,7 95,1 
1974 42,1 58,9 84,8 79,4 82,5 45,7 75,9 90,6 92,7 94,4 
1975 42,7 59,2 84,2 81,5 84,8 48,2 79,4 91,4 93,5 95,0 
1976 39,5 57,5 82,8 79,1 83,1 46,6 77,3 90,6 92,9 95,1 
1977 38,5 58,9 82,2 78,6 83,1 48,1 76,9 90,3 92,8 95,6 
1978 37,8 58,8 81,8 78,5 82,4 46,9 76,4 90,1 91,4 95,9 
1979 34,3 59,3 80,9 77,2 80,4 41,3 75,1 89,5 91,3 94,8 
1980 27,3 59,2 79,5 76,8 80,4 39,3 74,6 88,7 90,7 94,6 
1981 23,9 57,0 78,6 76,2 80,4 38,3 76,5 88,6 90,5 95,0 
1982 19,6 56,3 77,8 75,1 80,3 38,9 75,6 88,5 90,5 94,8 
1973/1982 -24,1 -4,5 -7,1 -6,5 -3,8 -11,9 -4,5 -3,2 -3,3 -0,5 
1983 14,7 57,3 77,3 74,8 80,5 33,7 72,6 88,0 90,3 95,1 
1984 8,1 56,8 75,8 73,8 79,5 30,7 69,5 87,3 89,1 95,1 
1985 7,2 57,3 74,9 73,2 78,7 28,7 67,4 87,0 88,8 95,0 
1982/1985 -12,4 1,0 -2,9 -1,9 -1,6 -10,2 -8,2 -1,5 -1,7 0,2 
Strong demand 
· 1972 29,1 32,1 82.4 74,4 76,0 22,2 78,9 90,7 94,4 96,3 
1973 27,6 32.1 81,5 73,0 73,6 24,0 73,8 90,0 93,7 95,8 
1974 18.1 30,2 81,0 70,0 72,6 20,3 66,7 89,1 92,7 95,0 
1975 22,6 30,2 80,2 72,7 75,9 17,9 74,5 89,5 93,5 95,4 
1976 19,8 28,9 78,6 69,2 72,9 14,5 70,6 88.6 92,2 95,1 
1977 23,8 29,I 78,3 68,6 71.5 22,5 70,9 88.2 92,2 95,5 
1978 22.0 27,9 77,1 67,6 70,4 22,9 70,2 87,3 90,7 95,8 
1979 20,7 28,9 75,8 66,3 66,5 9,8 68,2 86.7 90,7 94.9 
1980 13,0 26,0 73,6 66.1 66,0 1,7 69,4 85,5 90,2 94,9 
1981 10,7 23,9 71,7 64,5 63,6 2,4 66,9 83.8 89,8 95,2 
1982 8,0 22,1 70,5 62,2 63,0 -0,1 65,8 83,0 89,8 94,8 
1973/1982 -19,0 -9.1 -10.8 -10.3 -11,5 -21,9 -10,0 -6,9 -4,2 -1,1 
Moderate demand 
1972 55,7 72,6 87,6 84,7 85,7 63,5 84,6 93,4 94,3 96,1 
1973 52.2 70,5 87,9 83,9 84.4 62.1 82,5 92,9 94,1 96,0 
1974 51.5 70,7 87.9 82,6 84,7 59.8 81.0 92,6 93.2 95,0 
1975 53,3 68,9 86,8 84,2 85,0 62.4 82,7 93.1 94.1 95,3 
1976 48,6 67.4 85,8 82.1 83,7 62,1 82,0 92,7 93,7 95,7 
1977 48,0 69.2 85,0 81,8 83.6 61.4 81,3 92,3 93,6 96.2 
1978 48,5 69,6 85,0 82,I 82,7 60.1 80,5 92,4 92,6 96.5 
1979 46,1 71,4 84,9 81,7 81,5 55.4 79,8 92,2 92,3 95,8 
1980 42,9 73.1 83,9 81,6 81.0 56.5 80.4 91,9 91.7 95,4 
1981 39,8 70,1 82,2 80,6 80.4 55,3 81,6 91.4 91.7 95,8 
1982 35,7 70,5 81.6 79,9 81.1 56,0 80.4 91,5 91,9 95,9 
1973/1982 -16.2 - 1.2 -5,9 -4.0 -4,3 -7.1 -2.5 -1.7 -2.4 -0,2 
Weak demand 
1972 44,0 59,2 84.4 84,0 87,4 47.3 80.6 91.1 93.0 95,2 
1973 42.3 56,2 84.0 82.6 86.2 45.6 76.0 90.0 93.1 94.2 
1974 42.1 54,3 83,6 80.3 84,3 40,8 72.6 89.0 91.9 93,7 
1975 37.6 57,6 83,4 82,3 88,3 41.8 76.9 90.2 92.8 94.5 
1976 37.0 55,0 81.6 80.0 86.8 39,3 73.0 89.0 92,1 94.7 
1977 33,0 55,4 81.1 79,3 87.1 40.9 72.8 88.7 91.8 95.0 
1978 30.7 54,5 80.7 79,1 87,1 39,8 73.3 88.7 90.1 95.4 
1979 25.4 53.7 79.3 76,7 84,9 36.6 70.8 87.4 90,2 94,1 
1980 13.7 51.3 77.9 75,9 85,3 32,8 68,0 86.3 89.6 93.8 
1981 8,5 49,9 78.3 76,3 86.9 32,2 73,8 87,4 89,2 94.4 
1982 I. I 47,9 77,6 75,2 86.3 33.1 73,9 87,3 88,9 93,8 
1973/ 1982 - 38.3 -8,8 -6.3 -7.6 -0.~ - 13.8 -4.4 -3.2 -4.0 -0,6 
(I) Chan~<il9KI-K~)-i197~-7.1); l'IK~-19K~ 
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Table 3 
Total imports as percentage of domestic demand 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 52,7 37,9 14,6 17,3 15,2 48,9 17.7 7,9 6,1 4.2 
1973 55,6 39.8 14.9 18,4 16.6 50,0 21,2 8.7 6,3 4.9 
1974 57,9 41,1 15,2 20,6 17,5 54,3 24,1 9.4 7,3 5,6 
1975 57,3 40,8 15,8 18,5 15.2 51.8 20,6 8,6 6,5 5.0 
1976 60,5 42,5 17,2 20,9 16,9 53,4 22,7 9.4 7.1 4.9 
1977 61,5 41,1 17,8 21,4 16,9 51,9 23,1 9,7 7,2 4.4 
1978 62,2 41,2 18,2 21.5 17,6 53,1 23,6 9,9 8.6 4,1 
1979 65,7 · 40,7 19,1 22,8 19,6 58.7 24.9 10.5 8.7 5,2 
1980 72,7 40,8 20,5 23.2 19,6 60,7 25.4 11,3 9,3 5.4 
1981 76,1 43,0 21,4 23,8 19,6 61.7 23,5 11,4 9,5 5.0 
1982 80,4 43,7 22,2 24,9 19.7 61.1 24.4 11,5 9,5 5.2 
1973/1982 24,1 4,5 7,1 6,5 3.8 11.9 4,5 3.2 3,3 0,5 
1983 85,3 42,7 22,7 25,2 19,5 66,3 27.4 12,0 9.7 4.9 
1984 91,9 43,2 24,2 26.2 20,5 69,3 30,5 12,7 10.9 4.9 
1985 92,8 42,7 25,1 26,8 21.3 71,3 32.6 13.0 11.2 5.0 
1982/1985 12,4 -1,0 2.9 1,9 1,6 10,2 8.2 1.5 1.7 -0,2 
Strong demand 
1972 70,9 67,9 17,6 25,6 24.0 77,8 21,1 9,3 5,6 3.7 
1973 72.4 67,9 18,5 27,0 26.4 76,0 26,2 10.0 6,3 4.2 
1974 81,9 69,8 19,0 30,0 27.4 79,7 33.3 10.9 7,3 5.0 
1975 77,4 69,8 19.8 27,3 24,1 82,1 25,5 10,5 6.5 4.6 
1976 80,2 71.1 21.4 30,8 27,1 85.5 29.4 11.4 7.8 4.9 
1977 76,2 70,9 21,7 31.4 28.5 77.5 29.1 11,8 7.8 4.5 
1978 78,0 72.1 22,9 . 32.4 29.6 77.1 29.8 12.7 9.3 4.2 
1979 79,3 71,1 24,2 33.7 33,5 90.2 31.8 13.3 9.3 5.1 
1980 87,0 74,0 26.4 33,9 34.0 98.3 30.6 14.5 9.8 5.1 
1981 89,3 76,1 28,3 35.5 36.4 97.6 33.1 16.2 10.2 4.8 
1982 92.0 77.9 29,5 37,8 37.0 100.1 34.2 17,0 10.2 5.2 
1973/1982 19.0 9,1 10,8 10,3 11.5 21.9 10.0 6.9 4.2 1.1 
. Moderate demand 
1972 44,3 27.4 12.4 15,3 14.3 36.5 15.4 6.6 5.7 3.9 
1973 47,8 29,5 12.1 16.1 15,6 37.9 17.5 7.1 5.9 4.0 
1974 48,5 29.3 12,1 17.4 15.3 40.2 19.0 7.4 6.8 5.0 
1975 46,7 31.1 13,2 15.8 15,0 37,6 17.3 6,9 5.9 4.7 
1976 51.4 32,6 14,2 17,9 16,3 37.9 18.0 7.3 6.3 4.3 
1977 52.0 30,8 15.0 18,2 16.4 38.6 18.7 7,7 6.4 3.8 
1978 51.5 30.4 15,0 17,9 17.3 39,9 19.5 7.6 7.4 3.5 
1979 53,9 28,6 15.1 18.3 18.5 44,6 20.2 7.8 7.7 4.2 
1980 57,1 26,9 16,1 18.4 19.0 43.5 19,6 8.1 8.3 4,6 
1981 60.2 29,9 17.8 19.4 19.6 44,7 18.4 8,6 8.3 4,2 
1982 64.3 29,5 18.4 20.1 18.9 44,0 19.6 8,5 8.1 4.1 
1973/ 1982 16.2 1.2 5,9 4.0 4.3 7.1 2,5 1.7 2.4 0.2 
Weak demand 
1972 56,0 40.8 15.6 16.0 12.6 52.7 19.4 8.9 7,0 4.8 
1973 57,7 43.8 16.0 17.4 13.8 54.4 24.0 10,0 6.9 5.8 
1974 57.9 45,7 16.4 19,7 15.7 59.2 27.4 11.0 8.1 6.3 
1975 62.4 42.4 16.6 17.7 11.7 58.2 23.1 9.8 7.2 5.5 
1976 63.0 45,0 18.4 20.0 13.2 60.7 27.0 11.0 7.9 5.3 
1977 67.0 44.6 18,9 20.7 12.9 59.1 27.2 11.3 8.2 5.0 
1978 69,3 45.5 19,3 20.9 12.9 60.2 26.7 11.3 9.9 4.6 
197Q 74,6 46.3 20.7 23.3 15.1 63.4 29.2 12.6 9.8 5.9 
1980 86.3 48.7 22.1 24,1 14.7 67.2 32.0 13.7 10.4 6.2 
1981 91.5 50.1 21.7 23.7 13.1 67,8 26,2 12.6 10.8 5.6 
1982 98.9 52.1 22.4 24.8 13.7 66.9 26.1 12.7 11.1 6.2 
1973/1982 3!U 8.8 6.3 7.6 0.2 13.8 4.4 3.2 4.0 0.6 
(ll Chun~c(l~SI-S1)-(IQ72,7Jl; IQS5,IQS1 
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Table 4 
Imports extra as percentage of domestic demand 
B DK D .. NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 12,6 18,7 5,8 5,6 5,5 12,9 11,9 8,0 4,5 3,6 
1973 13,6 20,2 6,2 6,1 6,0 13,6 13,8 8,7 4,6 4,1 
1974 15.3 20,7 6,4 7,3 6,3 15,0 15,0 9,4 5,5 4,8 
1975 13,9 20,0 6,6 6,4 5,5 14,5 12,2 8,6 4,9 4,3 
1976 14,9 20,4 7.3 7,2 6,1 15,1 13,2 9,4 5,6 4,2 
1977 14,9 19,7 7,7 7,5 6,1 15,4 13,1 9,7 5,7 3,7 
1978 15,l 19,2 7,9 7,4 6,4 15.6 13,3 9,9 6,6 3,4 
1979 17,0 18,7 8,4 8,2 7,3 17,6 13,7 10,5 6,7 4,3 
1980 21,0 19,2 9,5 8,8 7.4 19,0 14,5 11,3 7,2 4,6 
1981 22,8 21,1 10,3 9,3 7,2 20,5 12.5 11,4 7,6 4,2 
1982 22,6 19.9 10,6 9,6 7,2 20,6 12,5 11,5 7,5 4,5 
1973/1982 9,6 1,0 4,5 3,5 1,5 7,3 -0,3 3,2 3,0 0,5 
Strong demand 
1972 12,9 28,2 6,9 7,9 6,6 20,3 11,6 9,3 4,2 2,5 
. 1973 12,3 29,4 7,2 8,3 7,2 18,8 14,1 10,0 4,8 2,9 
1974 15,6 30,3 7,1 9,5 7,5 21,0 16,9 10,9 5,4 3,5 
1975 14,6 31.1 7,8 8,8 7,4 21,6 13,3 10,5 4,8 3,3 
1976 16,2 30,8 8,8 10,0 8,1 22,5 14,4 11,4 6,0 3,6 
1977 16,1 29,0 9,1 10,7 8,9 21,8 13,8 11,8 6,0 3,3 
1978 17,9 28,9 10,2 11,3 9,7 22,5 14,4 12,7 7,2 3,1 
1979 18,I 27,6 10,5 12,l 10,6 27,l 14,8 13,3 7,2 3,8 
1980 20,7 29,3 12,1 13,0 11,2 31,0 15,1 14,5 7,7 3,9 
1981 21,8 31,7 13,6 14,1 12,9 35,4 16,6 16,2 8,3 3,8 
1982 21,3 31,4 14,3 15,5 12,7 36,7 17,3 17,0 8,3 4,1 
1973/1982 9,0 2,8 6,9 6,6 5,9 16,5 4,1 6.9 3,8 1,3 
Moderate demand 
1972 8,4 13,5 4,6 5,2 4.5 11,1 9,2 6,6 4,2 3,2 
1973 8.8 14.7 4,7 5,7 5,0 12,I 10,0 7,1 4,2 3,3 
1974 10.0 15,4 4,8 6,7 4,7 12,1 10.6 7,4 5,0 4,1 
1975 9,3 14,7 4,9 5.6 4,3 11,6 9,0 6,9 4,3 3,9 
1976 9.4 14,9 5,2 6,2 4,7 11,1 9,4 7,3 4,8 3,5 
1977 9,2 14,9 5,6 6,5 4,6 11,3 9,6 7,7 4,9 3,0 
1978 8,8 14,3 5,6 6,2 5,2 11,7 9,7 7,6 5,5 2,6 
1979 10,3 13,2 5,7 6,4 5,6 13,4 9,3 7,8 5.7 3,3 
1980 12,4 13,1 6,4 6,6 5,6 13,5 9,8 8,1 6,1 3,7 
1981 14,4 16.1 7,9 7,1 5,6 14,6 8,8 8,6 6,3 3,4 
1982 14,5 14,0 7,7 7,1 5,4 14,3 8,9 8,5 6,2 3,3 
1973/1982 5,8 0,9 3,2 1,7 0,7 2,9 -0,8 1,7 2,1 0,1 
Weak demand 
1972 18.2 22,9 6,6 5,2 6,1 11.9 15,6 8,9 5,2 4,4 
1973 19.9 25,1 7.1 5,6 6.6 13,2 19,0 10.0 5.2 5,3 
1974 20.7 24.6 7,7 7,0 7,3 15.7 20,6 11,0 6,2 5,8 
1975 20,0 23.4 7,7 6,4 5,9 15.1 16,7 9,8 5,7 5,0 
1976 21,5 24,5 9,0 7,0 6,6 17,5 19,0 11,0 6,5 4,9 
1977 21,8 23,9 9,3 7,4 6,5 18,3 18,8 11,3 6,6 4,5 
1978 22,6 23.4 9,3 7,2 6,2 18,0 18,8 11,3 7,9 4,1 
1979 25,7 23,8 10,2 8,6 7,6 18,7 20,5 12,6 7,9 5,4 
1980 33,0 25,2 11,5 9,8 7,6 20,9 22,2 13,7 8,6 5,7 
1981 35,7 25,0 11,3 9,7 6,7 21,1 16,5 12,6 8,8 5,1 
1982 36,8 25,1 11,8 9,8 7,0 21,5 15,8 12,7 9,0 5,6 
1973/1982 17,2 I. I 4.7 4.4 0.5 8,7 -1,2 3.2 3,7 0,6 
(I) Change ( 1981-82)·( 1972-73); 19K5-19K2 
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Table 5 ; :11F,· 
Exports as percentage of production 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 56,6 36,3 20,1 18,6 18,3 49,8 18,8 11,1 5,4 9,4 
1973 58,9 36,0 21,8 19,5 16,9 50,8 20,4 11,5 6,1 8,5 
1974 60,8 38,9 24,6 22,0 18,5 55,9 23,l 13,4 8,0 11,2 
1975 59,6 40,1 23,9 22,1 19,6 52,9 21,8 13.5 8,3 11,9 
1976 62,l 37,6 25,1 22,6 20,2 54,8 23,7 13,5 8,0 12,6 
1977 62,9 37,6 25,7 24,2 22,2 51,5 24,6 14,3 7,4 12,7 
1978 63,4 38,6 25,7 24,0 23,7 52,2 24,4 14,2 7,7 11,5 
1979 66,3 38,7 25,9 25,4 24,1 58,2 24,1 13,8 8,6 11,3 
1980 73,0 42,0 27,0 24,7 21,8 60,7 26,0 14,4 10,1 12,9 
1981 76,9 46,5 29,2 26,0 24,5 63,6 23,5 15,9 9,9 14,1 
1982 81,3 46,3 31,3 25,7 24,5 63,5 23,2 16,0 9,1 14,2 
1973/1982 21,4 10,3 9,3 6,8 6,9 13,2 3,7 4.6 3,7 5" ,-
1983 86,2 45,7 30,4 26,7 25,6 68,3 24,0 16,0 8,0 13,8 
1984 92,4 45,5 32,3 28,6 26,1 71,4 26,2 16,9 7,8 14,5 
1985 93,5 44,8 33,7 29,6 27,0 73,5 27,9 17,4 7,7 14,8 
1982/1985 
\· 
12,2 -15 
t ,• 
2,4 3,9 2,5 10,0 4,7 1.4 -1,4 0,6 
58,0. 
Strong demand 
1972 71,6 30,4 26,0 24,9 82,4 26,2 16,5 8,0 12,5 
1973 73,4 55,9 32,3 27,7 24,1 81,l 29,0 16,9 9,3 11,6 
1974 82,7 59,6 34,3 31,1 27,8 85,1 37,6 19,6 12,l 13,4 
1975 78,7 59,5 32,5 30,2 25,5 86,3 32,2 18,9 11,5 14,5 
1976 81,7 60,2 34,2 32,0 26,3 89,2 35,4 19,4 11,6 16,3 
1977 78,4 61,2 34,1 33,8 29,8 82,2 35,3 20,2 11,1 16,3 
1978 80,4· 62,6 35,0 34,5 28,0 81,8 34.6 20,2 11,9 15,5 
1979 80,l 61,6 35,1 36,6 31,5 92,6 35,1 19,9 13,4 15,5 
1980 87,7 67,0 36,8 35,4 29,0 98,7 35,9 20,5 14,9 16,4 
1981 89,9 71,0 38,7 37,1 33,8 98,2 35,2 22,4 14,4 17,8 
1982 92,4, 73,5, 40,4 37,7 34,1 100,1 34,9 22,7 13,6 17,8 
1973/1982 18,7., . 15,2 8,3 10,5 9,4 17,4 7,5 5,9 5,4 5,7 
Moderate demand 
1972 42,0 35,~ 21,5 17,6 15,8 40,2 16,9 10,9 6,1 10,7 
1973 44,8 36,0 23.1 18,2 14,8 41,2 17,3 11,3 6,8 10,0 
1974 45,l 37,8 25,3 19,9 16,2 43,6 18,6 12,8 8,7 13,1 
1975 44,S' . 39,9 '· 25,4 21,4 17,8 41,2 19,3 13,5 9,2 13,7 
1976 49,2' 36,7 26,5 22,0 18,6 42,4 19,4 13.4 9,0 14,8 
1977 49;7 
.. 
35,7 27,7 23,1 20,0 39,9 19,8 13,9 8,1 15,6 
1978 48,S. 36,0' 26,7 22,4 21,4 40,2 19,9 13,2 8.4 14.1 
1979 51,0 35,8 26,5 23,4 21,0 44,2 19,3 12,7 8,9 13,5 
1980 ·54,5 37,7· 28,0 22,2 20,0 45,6 21,0 13,5 10,2 16,1 
1981 59,5 42,1 30,6 23,4 21,7 49,0 19,8 15,0 10,6 17,6 
1982 63,8 41,2 33,0 22,8 20,5 48,9 19,5 14,9 9,2 17,4 
1973/1982 18,2 5,7 9,5 5,2 5,8 8,2 2,6 3,8 3,5 7,2 
Weak demand 
1972 66,0 27,9., . 12,9 16,3 18,4 43,2 17,8 8,6 2,6 6,9 
1973 66,4 .. 21). 14,7 17.4 16,2 45,1 20,5 9,1 3,3 5,8 
1974 65,7. 30,9, : 18,1 20,0 17,2 50,4 22,2 10,8 4.4 8,8 
1975 68,5 30,8 , 17,0 18.8 19,1 48,0 20,0 10,5 4,4 9,0 
1976 67,6 28 8;· 17,5 18,5 19,4 50,2 24,0 10,3 4,1 8,7 
1977 70,5 30:6 '. 17,8 20,6 21,5 47,6 26,3 11,5 3,6 8,3 
1978 72,5 33,0 18,4 20.8 24,3 48,9 25,4 12,0 3,8 7,1 
1979 77,1 . 34,0. 18,9 22,0 24,4 53,0 25,8 11,8 4,6 7,2 
1980 87,2 40,r · 19,3 22,2 21,0 56,8 28,l 12,0 6.3 8,0 
1981 92,2 45,0 20,6 23.3 24,0 59,9 22,0 13,2 5,1 8,3 
1982 99,0 44,8 22,1 22,9 25,2 59,1 21.4 13,4 4.7 8,7 
1973/1982 29,4 17.4 7,5 6.2 7,3 15.4 2,6 4,5 1,9 2.1 
(ll Chansc(l981-82Hl971-73t 1985-198~ 
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Table 6 
Share of total OECD exports 
R DK D F NL UK EUR JO USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 5,81 1.5 I 17,20 8,73 6,51 5,33 9.13 26,78 15,43 11,02 
1973 6.02 1.57 18.75 9,01 5,78 5,44 8,46 26,80 15,43 10,53 
1974 5,66 1.46 18.47 8,66 5,84 5,47 7,89 27,25 16,23 11,92 
1975 5,26 1,56 17.45 9,47 6,39 5,29 8,41 28,26 16,81 11,26 
1976 5,35 1.44 17,76 9,03 6,1 I 5.42 7,86 26,50 16,34 12,20 
1977 5.36 1.40 18,12 9,20 6,59 5,20 8,50 27,90 15,16 12,96 
1978 5.40 1.37 18.04 9,06 6,97 5.07 8,78 27,62 14,85 13,02 
1979 5.35 1.37 18.08 9,64 7,33 5,19 8,87 27,04 15,26 11,38 
1980 5.25 1.37 17.47 9.35 6,93 5,01 9,45 27,25 16,35 12,43 
1981 4.63 1.37 16.25 8,74 6,85 4,62 8.00 26,65 17,92 15,16 
1982 4,58 1.38 17,25 8,50 7,02 4,73 7,86 26,61 17,20 14,62 
1973/1982 -1.32 -0.16 - 1,23 -0.25 0,79 -0,71 -0,87 -0,16 2,13 4,11 
1983 4,70 1,46 17,04 8,58 7,28 4,95 7,53 26,60 16,85 15,94 
Strong demand 
1972 4,38 1.13 20,17 8,07 5,54 7,21 8,96 28,08 17,63 13,15 
1973 4,55 I. I 1 21,63 8,52 5,10 7,32 8,39 27,96 17,51 12,36 
· 1974 4,60 1,08 20,97 8.34 5,46 7,90 8,46 28,80 17,98 11,99 
1975 4,65 1.13 19,47 9,00 5.41 7,56 8,93 29,29 18,13 11,81 
1976 4,61 1,08 19,81 8.54 4,96 7,54 8,24 27,67 18,16 13,61 
1977 4,65 1.06 19,78 8,61 5,19 7,18 8,70 28,71 17,71 14.28 
1978 4,67 1,01 19.58 8,61 4,77 6,94 8,93 28,13 17,36 14,68 
1979 4.37 1.00 19.36 9,22 5,29 7,23 8,91 27,40 18,08 13,06 
1980 4.33 0,99 18.49 8,93 4,83 6,79 9,35 27,00 19,18 14,18 
1981 3,82 0.95 16,74 8.28 4,80 6.14 8.28 25,79 20,70 17,34 
1982 3,72 1.00 17,07 8.09 4,85 6,16 8,39 25,75 20,91 16,53 
1973/1982 -0,70 -0.14 - 4.00 -0.11 -0.50 - 1.12 -0.34 -2,25 3,24 4,18 
1983 3,63 1.02 16,73 8.08 5,07 6.29 8,02 25,55 20,36 18,78 
Moderate demand 
1972 4.05 2.00 17,69 8.70 5.47 4.90 8,98 26.99 18,88 9,20 
1973 4.12 2.20 19.27 8,96 4.86 5,06 7,96 26.98 18.65 9,22 
1974 3,66 2.07 18,40 8.42 4,91 4,80 7,51 27,05 19,96 10,70 
1975 3.74 2.10 17.39 9,56 5,20 4,71 8,18 28,33 20,44 10,00 
1976 3,95 1.89 18,06 9,31 4,91 4,84 7.36 26.71 19,66 11,01 
1977 4.02 1.83 18,82 9.42 5.23 4.64 7,72 27,57 17,87 12,33 
1978 4.03 1,80 18,64 9.27 5.75 4.48 8,09 26,83 17,53 12,74 
1979 4,15 1,83 19.03 10,09 5,87 4,63 8,26 26,69 17,66 10.86 
1980 3.95 1.80 18,54 9,56 5,91 4,59 9,04 27.66 18.26 12,24 
1981 3,57 1.77 17,01 8,73 5.41 4,20 7,84 26,49 20.42 14,76 
1982 3.68 1.75 18,57 8.48 5,31 4,33 7.57 26.32 19,12 13,98 
1973,'1982 -0.46 -0.34 -0.69 -0.22 0.19 -0.72 -0,76 -0,58 1.01 5.16 
1983 3,77 1.82 18.25 8.56 5.55 4.54 6,87 25,80 18,54 15.30 
Weak demand 
1972 9,76 1.08 13,90 9.35 8,94 4.38 9,52 25.35 8.22 11.99 
1973 10.08 1.03 15,53 9.50 7,72 4.38 9,25 25.53 8,90 10,93 
1974 9.37 0.95 16.38 9.26 7.45 4.28 7,93 26.19 9,51 13,57 
1975 8.30 1,05 15.72 9.76 9.24 4,20 8.32 27,23 9,66 12.85 
1976 8.38 1.01 15.32 9.03 9.20 4.38 8.33 25.04 9,09 12,84 
1977 8,29 1.02 I 5.35 9.40 10.23 4,24 9.59 27,65 8,18 12.74 
1978 8.34 1.02 I 5.58 9.16 I 1,09 4.22 9.76 28.41 8.03 11,86 
1979 8,18 1.04 15.37 9.37 I 1.58 4,02 9.76 27.23 8,81 10,53 
1980 8.14 1.08 14.82 9.43 10.57 3,89 10.16 26,86 10.62 10,99 
1981 7.40 I. 14 . 14.37 9.26 I 1.70 3,69 7,97 27,89 10.42 13,43 
1982 7.21 I. I 7 15.05 9.00 12.66 3.78 7,75 28,12 9,37 13.52 
1973/ 1982 -2.62 0.10 -0.01 -0.29 3,84 -0,65 - 1.52 2,57 1,34 2,02 
1983 7,81 us 15.20 9.26 13.3 I 3.94 8.1 I 29.43 9.20 13.43 
(II Change i I 9K I-K2)-(1972- 7J); 19K5-19K2 
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Table 7 0 .. j 1;r. ~ 
Share of intra EEC trade of total OECD exports 
B DK D F NL UK EUR to USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 4,37 0,63 8,11 4,80 3,33 3,77 2,65 28,15 3,58 1.42 
1973 4,47 0,72 8,89 4,96 2,97 3,81 2,64 29,01 3,66 1,39 
1974 4,02 0,62 8,31 4,58 2,68 3,75 2,51 27,01 3,56 1,37 
1975 3,78 0,69 7,64 4,61 2,93 3,57 2,62 26,43 3,35 1,20 
1976 4,02 0,64 8,18 4,49 3,01 3,71 2,72 27,35 3,40 1,45 
1977 3,89 0,60 8,17 4,52 3,13 3,49 3.00 27,45 3,15 1,58 
1978 - 3,94 0,64 8,30 4,64 3,36 3,42 3,08 28,07 3,20 1,60 
1979. 4,00 0,66 8,79 5,03 3,65 3,62 3,35 29,83 3,54 1,48 
1980 •, 3,82 0,67 8,43 4,73 3,36 3,43 3,48 28,66 4,08 1,64 
1981 3,28 0,61 7,43 4,06 2,95 2,97 2,90 24,86 3,85 1,89 
1982 3,27 0,64 8,09 3,92 3,22 3,09 2,85 25,82 3,77 1,78 
1973/1982 .,; , -1,15 -0,05 -0,75 -0,89 -0,06 -0,76 0,23 -3,24 0,19 0,44 
1983 i'. :1 3,35 0,65 8,04 4,03 3,36 3,13 2,79 26,13 3,80 2,01 
Strong demand 
1972 3,16 0,40 9,42 4,17 2,76 4,78 2,85 27,81 5,44 2,07 
1973 3,32 0,41 10,33 4,49 2,58 4,88 2,84 29,15 5,25 2,12 
1974 3,26 0,39 9,69 4,39 2,48 5,00 3,01 28,52 5,15 1,91 
1975 3,28 0,37 8,74 4,34 2,53 4,80 3,05 27,46 5,02 1,80 
1976 3,30 0,36 9,12 4,20 2,41 4,96 3,01 27,75 5,18 2,11 
1977 3,30 0,37 8,87 4,15 2,28 4,54 3,23 27,24 5,05 2,27 
1978 3,37 0,37 8,81) 4,27 2,22 4,38 3,27 27,23 5,11 2,56 
,•, 1979 3,19 0,37 9,21 4,71 2,31 4,72 3,74 28,88 5,39 2,42 
1980 3,03 0,36 8,64 4,49 2,23 4,39 3,89 27,76 5,71 2,75 
1981 2,63 0,34 7,64 4,03 2,07 3,47 3,40 24,30 5,73 3,25 
1982 2,59 0,36 7,94 3,91 2,16 3,58 3,39 24,77 5,98 3,25 
1973/1982 -0,63 -0,06 -2,08 -:0,36 -0,56 -1,31 0,55 -3,95 0,51 1,16 
1983 2,50 0,36 7,89 3,91 2,23 3,53 3,32 24,63 5,84 3,37 
Moderate demand 
1972 3,16 0,92 7,77 4,69 2,46 3,48 2,50 25,53 3.61 1.25 
1973 3,15 1,13 8,46 4,79 2,25 3,51 2,38 26,24 3.80 1,24 
1974 ,-- 2,70 0,99 7,60 4,18 . 1,98 3,34 2,15 23,50 3,58 1,23 
1975 2,76 1,07 7,01 4,44 2,04 3,12 2,30 23,39 3,22 1,04 
1976 3,08 1,00 7,68 4,35 2,16 3,24 2,34 24,41 3,16 1,40 
1977 3,04 0,90 8,01 4,46 2,27 3,10 2,58 24,99 2,83 1,63 
1978 I 3,15 0,94 8,35 4,67 2,47 3,11 2,78 26,15 2,91 1.57 
1979 3,30 0,98 9,11 5,10 2,76 3,29 2,92 28,17 3,17 1.39 
1980 3,06 0,99 8,73 4,54 2,55 3,11 3,07 26,71 3,63 1.41 
;. 1981 2,70 0,87 7,55 3,74 2,08 2,81 2,62 22,88 3,66 1,66 
1982 2,84 0,91 8,59 3,62 2,27 2,97 2,50 24,26 3,39 1.40 
1973/1982 -0,38 -0,14 -0,04 -1,06 -0,18 -0,61 0,12 -2,32 -0,18 0,28 
1983 2,96 0,91 8,45 3,79 2.41 3,00 2,39 24,47 3.38 1.71 
Weak demand 
1972 7,28 0,37 7,50 5,49 5,14 3,34 2,71 32.48 1.94 1,11 
1973 7,40 0,37 8,32 5,62 4,36 3,35 2,85 33,00 2,09 0.99 
1974 6,54 0,32 8,09 5,31 3,82 3,23 2,55 30,58 2,14 1.08 
1975 5,91 0,34 7,69 5.13 4,75 3,21 2,76 30,50 2,07 0,94 
1976 6.26 0,32 8,10 4,99 5,01 3,30 3,05 31,86 2,09 0.90 
'. 1977 5,87 0,34 7.75 4,99 5,38 3,11 3,47 31,74 1.85 0,85 
1978 '.l 5,77 / 0,40 7,74 4,96 5,94 2,99 3,37 32.01 1.80 0.73 -, 
1979 ·, 5,87 0,44 7,90 5.23 6,34 3,05 3,63 33,32 2.28 0,71 
1980 5,78 0,48 7,77 5.27 5,70 2.97 3.69 32.54 3.17 0,88 
1981 5,02 0,48 6,97 4,64 5.49 2,69 2.84 28,96 2,07 0,78 
1982 4,85 0,49 7,34 4.49 6.20 2,76 2,86 29,87 1,88 0.77 
1973/1982 -2,41 0,11 -0,76 -0,99 1.09 -0,62 0,o7 -3,33 -0.04 -0,27 
1983 5.15 0.54 7.46 4,65 6.58 2,86 2,86 31.12 1.91 0,79 
( I) Change (1981-82Hl972-73); 198S-19gi 
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Table 8 
Rate of cover of imports by exports 
B DK D F NL UK EUR IO USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 1,17 0,93 1,47 1.09 1,25 1,04 1,08 1,44 0,87 2,35 
1973 1,14 0,85 1,60 1,07 1,02 1,03 0,95 1,37 0,97 1,81 
1974 1,13 0,91 1,81 1,09 1,07 1,07 0,94 1,49 1,09 2,14 
1975 1,10 0,97 1,67 1,25 1,36 1,04 1,08 1,65 1,30 2,55 
1976 1,07 0,82 1,61 1,11 1,25 1,06 1,06 1,50 1,14 2,81 
1977 1,06 0,86 1,60 1,17 1,40 0,98 1,09 1,55 1,02 3,14 
1978 1,05 0,90 1,56 1,15 1,45 0,96 1,05 1,51 0,89 3,03 
1979 1,03 0,92 1,48 1,15 1,30 0,98 0,96 1,37 0,98 2,34 
1980 1,01 1,05 1,44 1,09 1,14 1,00 l,o3 1,32 1,10 2,60 
1981 1,05 1,15 1,51 1,12 1,33 1,08 1,00 1,47 1,04 3,14 
1982 1,05 1,11 1,59 1,04 1,32 1,11 0,94 1,46 0,96 3,00 
1973/1982 -0,11 0,24 0,02 -0,00 0,19 0,06 -0,05 0,06 0,08 0,99 
1983 1,07 1,13 1,49 1,08 1,42 1,10 0,84 1,40 0,81 3,09 
1984 1,08 1,10 1,48 1,13 1,37 1,11 0,81 1,40 0,69 3,28 
1985 1,11 1,09 1,52 1,15 1,36 1,11 0,80 1,41 0,66 3,27 
1982/1985 0,06 -0,02 -0,07 0,11 0,04 0,00 -0,14 -0,05 -0,30 0,27 
Strong demand 
1972 1,03 0,66 2,04 1,02 1,05 1,33 1,32 1,91 1,45 3,75 
1973 1,05 0,60 2,09 1,03 0,89 1,35 1,15 1,83 1,52 3,03 
1974 1,06 0,64 2,23 1,05 1,02 1,45 1,21 2,01 1,75 2,97 
1975 1,08 0,64 1,94 1,15 1,08 1,37 1,38 1,99 1,88 3,55 
1976 1,10 0,61 1,92 1,06 0,96 1,40 1,32 1,86 1,55 3,81 
1977 1,13 0,65 1,87 1.11 1,06 1,34 1,33 1,90 1,49 4,11 
1978 1,15 0,65 1,81 1,10 0,93 1,33 1,25 1,73 1,31 4,15 
1979 1,05 0,65 1,69 1,13 0,91 1,36 1,16 1,62 1,52 3,37 
1980 1,07 0,71 1,62 1,07 0,79 1,31 1,27 1,53 1,62 3,67 
1981 1,07 0,77 1,60 1,07 0,89 1,34 1,10 1,49 1,49 4,24 
1982 1,06 0,79 1,62 1,00 0,88 1,36 1,03 1,43 1,38 3,91 
1973/1982 0,03 0,15 -0,45 0,01 -0,80 0,01 -0,17 -0,41 -0,05 0,69 
1983 1,07 0,79 1,56 1,06 0,95 1,35 0,94 1,41 1,13 4,35 
Moderate demand 
1972 0,91 1,48 1,95 1,19 1.13 1,17 1,11 1,74 1,07 2,94 
1973 0,89 1,34 2,18 1,16 0,94 1,15 0,98 1,67 1,16 2,68 
1974 0,87 1,46 2,45 1,18 1,07 1,15 0,97 1,83 1,30 2,85 
1975 0,91 1,47 2,24 1,45 1.22 1,16 1,14 2,10 1,61 3,19 
1976 0,92 1,20 2,19 1,30 1,17 1,21 1,10 1,95 1,46 3,91 
1977 0,91 1,25 2,17 1,35 1,27 1,05 1,07 1,94 1,29 4,72 
1978 0,89 1,29 2,06 1,32 1,31 1,01 1,03 1,85 1,14 4,57 
1979 0,89 1,39 2,02 1,36 1.17 0,99 0,95 1,74 1,17 3,52 
1980 0,90 1,64 2,02 1,27 1,07 1,09 1,09 1,77 1,26 3,98 
1981 0,97 1,70 2,04 1,27 1,14 1,19 1,09 1,88 1,31 4,82 
1982 0,98 1,68 2.18 1,18 1,10 1,22 0,99 1,89 1,15 4,93 
1973/1982 0,08 0,28 0,05 0,05 0,09 0,04 -0,01 0,18 0,11 2,07 
1983 1,01 1,67 2,01 1,20 1.23 1,17 0,85 1,77 0,96 4,72 
Weak demand 
1972 1,52 0,56 0,80 1,02 1.57 0,68 0,90 0,96 0,36 1,48 
1973 1,45 0,48 0,91 1.00 1,21 0,69 0,82 0,90 0,46 1,01 
1974 1,39 0,53 1,12 1,02 1,11 0,70 0,76 0,99 0,52 1,43 
1975 1,31 0,61 1,03 1,08 1,78 0,66 0,83 1,08 0,59 1,72 
1976 1,22 0,49 0,94 0,91 1,58 0,65 0,86 0,93 0,49 1,68 
1977 1,18 0,55 0,93 0,99 1,84 0,63 0,96 1,02 0,42 1,75 
1978 1,17 0,59 0,94 0,99 2,16 0,63 0,93 1,07 0,36 1,59 
1979 1,15 0,60 0,89 0,93 1,82 0,65 0,84 0,93 0,45 1,23 
1980 1,08 0,71 0,84 0,90 1,54 0,64 0,83 0,85 0,58 1,32 
1981 1,10 0,82 0,94 0,97 2,09 0,71 0,80 1,06 0,44 1,53 
1982 1,13 0,75 0,98 0,90 2,11 0,72 0,77 1,06 0,39 1,45 
1973/1982 -0,37 0,26 0,10 -0,08 0,72 0,03 -0,07 0,13 0,01 0,25 
1983 1,14 0,82 0,91 0,95 2,20 0,72 0,72 1,04 0,33 1,37 
(I) Change (1981-82).(1972-73); 1985-1982 
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Table 9 :, ! :,t ,. I 
Value-added at market prices (1975 prices) index: 1972 = 100 • 0 • ..... -'N •1','. ' .. '.·~ . 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
1973 109,9 105,5 105,4 106,8 110,8 110,4 109,3 107,6 111,0 113,9 
1974 :\(! 4 114,6 107,4 106,5 110,8 117,9 116,7 107,9 110,1 106,5 111,4 
1975 106,1 104,5 101,7 108,9 106,4 106,0 100,5 104,2 99,0 106,1 
1976 115,9 109,2 109,6 115,4 119,9 114,4 102,3 111,6 108,5 120,5 
1977 117,2 110,2 112,3 120,1 122,5 115,1 104,3 114,4 115,7 129,6 
1978 119,5 111,1 113,3 123,8 124,6 119,8 105,0 116,3 122,1 138,8 
1979 125,1 118,7 117,8 127,1 133,0 123,8 104,7 120,3 125,5 153,8 
1980 123,8 120,8 117,5 127,7 141,3 123,7 95,8 120,0 120,0 169,9 
1981 121,1 119,8 116,0 126,0 140,0 120,0 89,7 117,5 123,0 180,1 
1982 121,6 120,2 113,3 126,6 137,8 121,4 89,7 116,5 114,9 194,0 
1973/1982 1,6 1,7 1,2 2.2 3,1 1,5 -1,7 1,3 1,3 6,4 
1983 123,2 127,8 114,5 128,4 132,7 121,6 91,9 116,7 121,0 200,8 
1984 128,6 135,6 119,0 130,8 137,7 127,7 95,2 120,9 130,9 223,1 
1985 133,5 143,2 124,4 133,2 141,9 134,2 98,3 125,2 134,8 236,5 
1982/1985 3,2 6,0 3,2 1,7 1,0 3,4 3,1 2,4 5,5 6,8 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 116,3 118,2 109,8 111,8 112,9 115,1 113,1 111,8 111,0 116,1 
1974 126,5 123,6 123,4 122,7 122,2 132,9 117,1 122,8 108,4 117,2 
1975 111,7 119,7 114,0 121,3 112,0 108,l 109,6 114,1 102,9 108,8 
1976 128,8 133,2 126,7 130,7 125,8 125,0 114,4 125,5 113,7 133,8 
1977 138,0 136,2 134,7 139,5 130,0 125,9 117,8 132,0 123,9 152,2 
1978 148,9 137,9 134,0 147,4 138,9 134,4 121,8 136,0 133,7 181,1 
1979 157,9 148,2 139,2 155,0 148,9 142.5 124,0 142,3 141.3 202,5 
1980 151,0 156,7 138,4 152,6 160,3 137,8 117,9 141,5 141,5 244,4 
1981 149,5 150,3 140,6 154,9 159,8 130,1 113,2 141,4 149,1 283,1 
1982 149,7 159,6 138,3 156,6 166,6 136,7 115,3 142,6 143,2 328,5 
1973/1982 3,7 4,0 3,2 4,4 4,9 2,4 0,8 3,3 3,7 12,2 
.Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 107,4 102,7 105,7 106,5 110,6 111,0 107,6 107,1 111,8 116,8 
1974 111,6 110,4 103,8 108,7 116,0 114,5 107,9 108,1 106,1 118,4 
1975 109,9 107,6 100,7 110,7 105,5 113,1 101,6 104,7 100,6 115,9 
1976 115,2 107,8 111,1 118,1 116,2 119,5 102,6 112,0 110,1 127,5 
1977 116,6 110,0 111,3 122,6 118,0 120,1 104,5 113,8 117,4 136,6 
1978 118,9 111,7 114,2 126,4 121,7 123,5 105,3 116,6 122.0 138,0 
1979 125,8 118,1 120,4 131,2 127.0 128,0 105,4 121,1 123,9 152,6 
1980 123,9 122,2 120,5 133,3 134,7 130,2 100,4 121,6 116,9 165,4 
1981 124,0 122,8 121,1 132,5 134,3 129,7 94,3 120,4 119,3 172.8 
1982 128,2 122,0 120,1 134,7 130,8 130,9 93,6 120,2 114,2 179,5 
1973/1982 2,2 2,1 1,8 2,9 2,6 2,4 -1,1 1,7 1,1 5,6 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 
1973 109,5 105,2 102,4 104,4 110,0 105,8 107,8 105,6 110,2 110,5 
1974 112,2 96,1 99,7 106.6 117,8 107,3 101,3 105,6 106,4 103,3 
1975 99,4 93,6 95,6 99,1 104,2 94,5 93,1 97,7 93,6 97,2 
1976 110,5 102,0 97,2 103,9 119,6 99,4 95,1 103,2 101,8 108,6 
1977 108,2 100,5 100,0 106,2 122,8 99,9 96,2 105,3 106,0 112.9 
1978 106,8 99,8 99,6 106,7 120,4 103,5 95,3 104,8 112,5 118,4 
1979 109,6 108,2 101,5 105,9 130,5 103,6 94,9 107,2 115,7 130,6 
1980 111,3 104,6 101,1 107,2 139,0 103,8 78,7 106,4 108,8 136.5 
1981 105,6 102,9 94,7 102.5 135,6 98,8 74,0 101,4 109,5 134,6 
1982 102,5 102,0 90,5 101,4 130,4 96,6 73,6 98.5 94,9 138,4 
1973/1982 -0,1 -0,0 -1,0 -0,0 2,7 -0,6 -3,7 -0.3 -0,3 2.9 
(ll Ave111'° annual growth 11110 (19n-73)'( 1981-82); 1982:1985 
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Table 10 
Total employment (percentage growth rate) 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 -1,4 2,3 -2,4 1.1 -1,1 -3,4 -3,4 -1,7 2,4 -0,4 
1973 0,8 1,3 1,0 2,1 1,6 -1,6 0,5 1,1 5,7 4,1 
1974 0,8 -3,3 -2,3 I, I 2,3 -0,3 0,6 0,0 -0,0 -1,0 
1975 -6,0 -8,1 -5.5 -2,7 -0,2 -3,6 -5,1 -3,9 -8,5 -5,7 
1976 -4,2 0,1 -2,7 -1.3 0,3 -4,2 -3,3 -2,1 3,7 0,9 
1977 -3,9 -0,5 -0,6 -0.5 0,1 -2,7 0,8 -0,3 3,7 -0,0 
1978 -4,0 -0,6 -0,4 - 1,6 -0,8 -2,4 -0,6 -0,9 4,4 -0,9 
1979 -2,7 -0,0 0,3 -1,8 0,3 -1,0 -1,3 -0,6 2,5 0,6 
1980 -2,0 -5,1 0.3 -1,5 0,6 -1,1 -2,6 -0,9 -3,3 1,5 
1981 -5,1 -4,6 -2,7 -3,5 -1,5 -3,0 -10,0 -4,5 -0.6 1,2 
1982 -3.6 -0.3 -3.7 -1.7 -1,9 -4.3 -5.6 -3,3 -6,6 -0,3 
1973il982 -3.2 -2.4 - 1.7 -1.3 0,1 -2,4 -2.7 -1,6 0,1 -0,2 
1983 -2.5 -0.1 -4.2 2.3 2.9 -4.9 5.5 -3,7 2,0 2,1 
1984 -0,2 -3,2 -0,6 -3,2 -3.9 -2.1 -1,5 -1,9 5,2 2,0 
1985 -0,3 2,7 1,2 -2,7 -1,5 1,0 -0.6 -0.4 0,5 1,5 
1982. 1985 -1,0 1,9 -1,2 -2,9 -2,8 -2,0 -2,2 -2,0 1,2 1,9 
Strong demand 
1972 -3,4 5,4 -2,0 2,3 0.4 -3,4 -3,6 -1.4 2,4 0,6 
1973 4,5 6,6 4,0 4,5 2.8 1,4 3,1 8,5 5,5 
1974 5,3 -2,5 2,1 3,7 5.9 3,5 3.5 3,3 2,8 1,7 
1975 -3,1 -10,6 -5,2 - 1,1 0.5 -1,2 -5.8 -3,7 -7,9 -8,3 
1976 -3.1 -0,3 -3.2 -0,7 0.4 -4,1 -4.1 -2.5 3.0 1,1 
1977 -3.0 0.2 0.2 0,3 -0.5 -2,0 2.0 0.4 4,9 -1,0 
1978 -2,0 1.3 -0.5 -0.5 - 1.0 -2,3 0,2 -0,5 5,8 -1,4 
1979 -0,9 -2.9 0,3 -0,7 -0,9 -0,8 -0,5 -0.4 4,7 1,9 
1980 - 1,5 -1,2 0.5 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -0.4 -0,1 8,1 
1981 -2,8 -10,7 -2,1 -2.5 -4.7 - 1.4 -7,7 -4.0 0,4 3,7 
1982 -3,1 -0.2 -4.1 -1.2 -3.3 -3.7 -4.6 -3.5 -4.3 -0,1 
1973/1982 - 1,2 -2.7 -0,9 -0.1 -0.1 - 1,2 - 1.8 -0.9 1,6 0.8 
Moderate demand 
1972 -1,0 1.4 -1,7 1.3 1.4 -2.2 -3,8 -1,3 2,3 -0,2 
1973 1,7 1,2 1.0 2,6 2.5 -0,4 0.0 1,2 6,3 4.2 
1974 - 1,8 -0,8 - 1.9 1.2 3.0 -0,0 1,2 0.3 -0,0 -0,4 
1975 -4,4 -6,9 -4.4 -2,I -0.7 -2.7 -3.9 -3.3 -7.2 -4.3 
1976 -2,7 -0.4 -1.3 -0.2 0.1 -3.4 -2.4 -1.3 3,3 0,9 
1977 - 1.5 0.8 -0.4 0.2 0.1 - 1.8 0.1 -0.2 4.4 0,9 
1978 -1,2 -0.0 0,1 -0,6 -0.2 -1.7 0.5 -0.1 4,6 -1,0 
1979 -0,5 0,9 u -1.4 1.5 -0.0 -1.4 -0.1 3,3 0,1 
1980 -0,6 -3.0 1,1 - 1.1 1.3 - 1.3 -1,5 -0,3 -3,4 -0,6 
1981 -3.0 - 1.7 - 1.3 -2.7 -0.9 -2.1 -8.1 -3,5 -0,1 1,0 
1982 -2,9 -1.4 -1,7 -1.2 -2,3 -3.0 -5.1 -2,7 -5.0 -0.5 
1973, 1982 - 1.8 -1.3 -0.8 -0.7 0.5 - 1.6 -2.0 -1.0 0.5 -0.2 
Weak demand 
1972 -0.7 2,5 -3,3 0.6 -2.8 -4.8 -2.7 -2.2 2.5 -0,9 
1973 - 1.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.9 0.9 -3.7 0.5 0.1 3.5 3,6 
1974 0.8 -6.9 -5,1 0.1 I. I -2.6 -1.4 - 1.6 - 1.6 -2,6 
1975 -7.9 -8.7 -6,8 -3.9 -0.2 -6.1 -6.0 -4.5 -10.2 -5,7 
1976 -5.6 1.0 -4,0 -2.5 0.3 -5.1 -3.7 -2.6 4.7 0,8 
1977 -5.6 -2.6 -1.4 -1.4 0.3 -4.4 0,9 --0.8 2,4 -0.3 
1978 -6,8 -2.2 -0,9 -3.1 - 1.0 -3.6 -2.4 -2.0 3,3 -0.6 
1979 -5.0 -0.3 -0.7 -2.6 -0.1 -2.5 -1,7 -1.3 0,5 0.5 
1980 -3.4 -9.8 · -0.7 -2.0 0.4 - 1.6 -4.8 - 1.8 -5.2 0,5 
1981 -6,l -4,0 -4.6 -4,7 - 1.1 -5.5 -14,0 -5.7 -1.9 0.1 
1982 -4.4 -2.5 -6.7 -2,5 - 1.4 -6.6 -6.8 -4.3 - 10.1 -0.2 
1973;1982 -4.7 -3.9 -3.1 -2.3 -0.1 -4.1 -4.1 -2.5 -1.4 -0.7 
111 l\\crnp:c ,inmrnl p:rowlh rate (197:!- 7~) ( 19X 1-K:!); 11.JK:! 14K5 
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Table 11 .:;J, 
Total employment (absolute change from preceding year) ....... :. ~ 1 · .. 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 -15,3 12,5 -230,0 63,7 -63,0 -41,1 -272,0 -545,1 448,6 -61,6 
· 1973 9,1 7,5 93,0 120,1 88,0 -18,5 36,0 335,2 I 089,4 599,3 
1974 8,5 -18,6 -219,0 62,8 129,0 -3,1 47,0 6,6 -6,9 -153,7 
1975 -66,9 -44,4 -507,0 -160,2 -12,8 -41,1 -400.0 -1 232,4 -1 716,9 -857,3 
1976 -44,8 0,6 -236,0 -71,4 14,6 -46,2 -244,0 -627,2 694,2 124,4 
1977 -39,0 -2,3 -55,0 -28,3 7,2 -28,8 55,0 -91,2 718,0 -7,0 
1978 -38,8 -3,0 -35,0 -90,3 -43,0 -25,0 -45,0 -280,1 874,4 -124,6 
1979 -25,4 -0,2 29,0 -97,3 15,0 -10,0 -96,0 -184,9 531,0 85,3 
.1980 -18,4 -25,4 26,0 -78,3 32,0 -11,0 -187,0 -262,1 -708.8 216,0 
1981 -45,7 -21,7 -226,0 -185,3 -87,0 -30,0 -697,0 - I 292,7 -130,2 165.6 
1982 -30,0 -1,3 -303,0 -87,7 -106,0 -41,0 -351,0 -920,0 -1 359,2 -40,7 
1973/1982 -280,9 -111,9 -1 328,0 -631,1 46,0 -224,9 - l 724,5 -4 256,3 120,0 -272,0 
1983 -19,0 -1,0 -336,0 -113,7 -158,0 -42,0 -328,0 -955,0 -362,0 240,0 
1984 -1,0 14,0 -46,0 -149,0 -177,0 -17,0 -82,0 -466,0 936,0 235,0 
1985 -2,0 12,0 92,0 -123,0 -64,0 8,0 -32,0 -109,0 94,0 180,0 
1982/1985 -22,0 25,0 -290,0 -385,7 -399,0 - 51.0 442,0 -1 530,0 668,0 655.0 
Strong demand 
· 1972 -5,4 3,7 -4G,O 20,5 3,0 -8,2 -52,0 -78,4 88,9 15,0 
'1973 6,9 4,7 77,0 40,5 20,0 20,0 169,1 325.8 146,2 
1974 8,4 -1,9 42,0 34,4 44,0 8,0 50,0 184,9 116,5 47,9 
1975 ., -5,2 -7,9 -107,0 -10,5 4,3 -2,8 -86,0 -215,0 -338,1 -239,6 
1976 -5,1 -0,2 -61,0 -6,7 3,3 -9,7 -57,0 -136,4 118,0 29,7 
1977 -4,8 0,1 4,0 2,9 -4,2 -4,6 26.0 19.4 196,0 -27.0 
1978 -3,0 0,9 -9,0 -,-4,9 -8,0 -5,2 3,0 -26,2 245,9 -37,5 
1979 , -1,3 -2,0 5,0 -6,4 -6,9 -1,8 -7,0 -20,4 209,9 50.5 
1980 -2,2 -0,8 9,0 -8,4 -3,1 -0,1 -17,0 -22,7 -5,8 213,9 
1981 -4,1 -6,9 -40,0 -23,5 -36,5 -3,1 -102,0 -216,l 20,6 105,4 
1982 -4,4 -0,l -75,5 -10,8 -23,9 -7,8 -57,0 -179,4 -204.1 -1,7 
1973/1982 -16,1 -16,3 -156,2 -8,3 -9,1 -23,1 -208,5 -437,6 -623,9 215,5 
Moderate demand 
1972 ,· · -4,2 3,7 -63,0 28,9 22,0 -11,4 -140,0 -163,9 177,7 -11,9 
1973 6,6 3,3 36,0 57,9 41,0 -2,2 1,0 143,6 498,5 209,5 
1974 · -7,3 -2,3 -73,0 26,1 50,0 -0,1 41,0 34,4 -0,5 -18,6 
1975 ,' -17,5 -19,5 -163,0 -48,8 -12,2 -13,6 -142,0 -416,6 -603,2 -222,0 
1976 -10,l -1,0 -45,0 -3.9 2,5 -17,1 -82.0 -156,6 255,6 45.2 
1977, -5,6 2,2 -14,0 3,4 2,1 -8,9 2,0 -18,8 350,6 42,8 
1978 -4,5 -0,1 2,0 -12,7 -4,0 -7.8 17,0 -10,2 382,2 -49,2 
1979 -1,8 2,3 45,0 -31,8 24,9 -0,2 -46,0 -7.6 286,8 4.8 
· 1980 -2,0 -8,0 37,0 -24,3 21,7 -5,9 -50,0 -31,5 -303,9 -30,6 
1981 -10,7 -4,4 -46,0 -57,9 -16,4 -9,6 -266,0 -411.1 -12,9 50,5 
1982 -10,0 -3,5 -58.1 -24,6 -39,4 -13,7 -156,0 -305,2 -439,4 -24,0 
1973/1982 -61,2 -31,0 -268,0 - 133,3 69,4 -71,2 -603,5 - I 098,8 384,4 -84,4 
Weak demand 
1972 -3,9 5,1 -127,0 14,3 -88,0 -21,2 -79,0 -299.7 181,9 -64.7 
1973 -5,9 -0,6 -20,0 21,7 27,0 -15,8 13,0 19,5 265,2 243.5 
1974 4,7 -14,4 -188.0 2,3 35,0 -10,7 -41,0 -212.1 -122,9 -183,0 
1975 -44,1 -17,0 -237,0 -100,9 -6,0 -24,0 -169,0 -598,0 -775,5 -395,8 
, 1976 -28,6 1,8 -130,0 -60,8 9,0 -19,1 -98,0 -325,6 320.5 49.5 
1977 -27,4 -4,6 -45,0 -34,6 9.2 -15,6 24,0 -94,0 171,4 -22,7 
1978' -31.2 -3,8 -28,0 -72.7 -30,0 -12,0 -62,0 -239.6 246.2 -37.8 
1979 -21,6 -0,5 -21,0 -59.1 -3.0 -8,0 -43.0 -156.2 34.4 30.0 
1980 -13,8 -16,6 -20,0 -45.6 13,4 -5,0 -120,0 -207,6 -399.1 32,7 
1981 -23.9 -6.2 -140.0 -103,9 -34.1 -17,3 -330,0 -655,3 -137.9 9,7 
1982 -16.3 -3.7 -194.6 -52.3 -42.7 -19.6 -138,0 -467,1 -715,6 -14.9 
1973/1982 -197.0 -63.3 -916.3 -490,6 -14.4 - 129,4 -901,5 -2 712,3 -888.2 -403.1 
(I) Chan~ (1981-82Hl972-7J); 1985-1982 
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Table 12 
Observed labour productivity (Index: 1972 = 100) 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 109,0 104,) 104,4 104,5 109,0 112,1 108,8 106,4 105,1 109,3 
1974 112,8 109,6 107,9 107,3 113,3 118,9 106,7 108,9 100,8 108,1 
1975 111,0 116,0 109,1 108,5 102,6 112,0 104,7 107,3 102,3 109,2 
1976 126,7 121,0 120,8 116,4 115,2 126,2 110,2 117,3 108,1 123,0 
1977 133,2 122,7 124,6 121,8 117,6 130,4 111,5 120,6 111,2 132,2 
1978 141.5 124,5 126,2 127,6 120,6 139,1 112,9 123,8 112,4 142,9 
1979 152,3 133,0 130,7 133,4 128,3 145,2 114,) 128,9 112,7 157,4 
1980 153,8 142,6 130,0 136,0 135,6 146,7 107,2 129,7 111,5 171,3 
1981 158,6 148,1 132,0 139,0 136,4 146,8 111,6 133,1 115,0 179,5 
1982 165,1 149,2 133,8 142,1 136,9 155,2 118,2 136,5 115,0 193,9 
1973/1982 5,0 4,3 3,0 3,6 3,0 4,0 1,1 3,0 1,3 6,6 
1983 171,6 158,7 141,2 140,9 128,1 163,5 114,7 142,0 118,7 196,6 
1984 179,5 173,9 147,5 148,3 138,3 175,4 120,6 149,9 122,1 214,1 
1985 186,8 178,8 152,4 155,2 144,7 182,5 125,3 155,8 125,1 223,6 
1982/1985 4,2 6,2 4,4 3,0 1,9 5,6 2,0 4,5 2,8 4,9 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 111,3 110,8 105,6 107,0 109,8 115,1 111,5 108,4 102,2 110,1 
1974 115,0 119.0 116,2 113,2 112,2 128,4 111,5 115,2 97,1 109,3 
1975 104,7 128,9 113,3 113.1 102,3 105,7 110,8 111,3 100,1 110,6 
1976 124,7 143,9 130,0 122,8 114,5 127,4 120,7 125,4 107,5 134,6 
1977 137,7 146,8 137,9 130,7 118,9 131,0 121,9 131,5 111,7 154,7 
1978 151,6 146,7 137.9 138.8 128,3 143,2 125,7 136,2 113,9 186,7 
1979 162,2 162,5 142,9 147,0 138,8 153,1 128,7 142,9 115,0 204,8 
1980 157,4 173,8 141,3 146,0 150,0 148,2 123,9 142,7 115,2 228,7 
1981 160,3 186,6 146,7 151.9 157,0 141.9 128,9 148,7 120,9 255,5 
1982 165,6 198,6 150,5 155,4 169,) 154,8 137,7 155,3 121,4 296,7 
1973/1982 4,9 6,9 4,2 4,5 5,0 3,6 2,6 4,3 2,0 11,3 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 105,7 101.5 104,7 103.8 107,9 111.5 107,6 105,9 105,2 112,0 
1974 111,8 110.1 104,9 104.7 109,8 115.0 106,6 106,6 99,8 114,0 
1975 115,2 115,2 106.4 109.0 100,6 116,7 104,6 106,8 102,0 116,6 
1976 124,1 115,9 118,9 116.4 110,7 127,7 108,1 115,8 108,0 127,1 
1977 127,5 117,3 119,6 120,7 112,2 130,8 110,0 117,8 110,4 135,0 
1978 131,6 119,1 122,7 125,2 116,0 136,7 110,3 120,7 109,7 137,7 
1979 140,l 124,9 127,6 131,8 119,4 141,8 112,0 125,5 107,9 152,2 
1980 !38,7 133.1 126,4 135,4 125,0 146,0 108,2 126,4 105,4 166,0 
1981 143,1 136,2 128.7 138,3 125,8 148.6 110,7 129,6 107,6 171,7 
1982 152,5 137,3 129,8 142,3 125,4 154,6 115,7 132,9 108,5 179,2 
1973/1982 4,1 3,5 2.6 3,6 2,1 4,1 1,0 2.7 0,6 5,8 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 
1973 110,6 105,5 102,9 103,5 109,1 110.0 107,3 105,4 106,4 106,7 
1974 112,5 103,5 105,6 105,6 115,5 114,5 102,3 107,1 104,4 102,3 
1975 108,2 110,5 108,6 102.2 102,3 107,4 100,0 103,8 102.2 102,2 
1976 127,3 119,2 115,0 109,8 117,1 119,0 106,0 112,6 106,2 113,3 
1977 132,1 120,5 120,) 113,9 119,9 125,1 106,3 115,8 108,1 118.3 
1978 139,9 122.3 120,6 118,0 118.7 134,4 107,8 117,5 110,9 124.7 
1979 151,2 133,0 123.7 120.3 128,8 138,0 109,3 121,9 113,6 137,0 
1980 158,9 142,5 124.1 124.2 136,6 140,4 95,3 123,1 112,7 142,4 
1981 160,5 146,0 121.9 124,6 134,7 141,5 104.2 124,3 115,6 140,2 
1982 163,2 148,4 124.9 126,5 131,3 148,3 111,2 126.2 111,5 144,4 
1973/1982 4,9 4,1 2.2 2,4 2,7 3,6 0,4 2.2 I. I 3.6 
(I) Average annual growth rate (1972-7J)/(1981·82): 1982/1985 
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Table 13 
Price index ofvalue-added (1972 = llKl) 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 103,8 109,4 105,0 107,2 113,1 101,3 100,4 106,3 100,4 108,9 
1974 117,3 121,6 112,6 119,5 137,1 110,5 109,8 118,1 109,2 129,4 
1975 122,9 139,3 117,5 135,0 163,0 117,2 139,9 132,6 123,8 131,0 
1976 127,5 150,0 119,9 147,7 192,7 123,1 161,7 143,2 128,7 131,8 
1977 132,6 161,3 124,7 157,7 224,2 124,4 191,7 154,8 136,7 133,2 
1978 135,0 172,8 129,9 170,5 252,5 123,8 217,3 165,5 144,7 136,5 
1979 136,2 179,1 132,7 187,2 290,0 122,2 243,0 177,1 153,0 135,5 
1980 140,7 195,8 137,4 210,4 340,7 127,4 288,9 195,2 165,5 132,9 
1981 146,3 213,0 141,3 233,3 386,7 133,2 320,8 210,3 178,7 133,3 
1982 157,8 239,2 149,1 264,1 454,7 132,8 349,5 229,4 186,3 130,3 
1973/1982 4,6 8,9 3,9 10,2 16,5 3,1 14,4 8,8 6,9 2,6 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
1973 99,4 99,7 101,6 103,2 112,4 102,2 97,1 103,8 100,3 100,0 
1974 109,1 110,3 110,9 114,9 132,3 113,6 101,0 115,3 107,9 107,5 
1975 121,3 127,0 114,5 121,8 153,0 116,3 132,5 126,5 121,3 112,1 
1976 121,3 130,6 114,1 129,8 178,9 119,1 148,9 133,8 127,2 109,1 
1977 124,3 134,9 115,9 139,1 197,3 117,8 176,5 142,3 135,4 105,3 
1978 119,5 145,9 118,5 143,8 212,8 114,0 197,6 147,9 140,1 101,1 
1979 119,3 151,4 120,2 159,6 237,6 112,9 217,2 156,5 145,6 97,4 
1980 128,4 161,7 122,2 179,1 260,6 117,4 261,9 169,6 159,6 88,9 
1981 136,2 182,2 125,1 194,6 290,4 121,1 277,5 179,3 170,9 85,1 
1982 150,0 208,6 130,5 .215,5 325,7 128,3 309,1 194,2 181,5 80,2 
1973/ l 982 4,1 7,8 2,7 8,1 12,6 2,4 12,9 7,0 6,5 -2,1 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 102,5 113,l 106,1 108,0 109,1 98,2 99,7 105,4 99,1 105,0 
1974 112,4 122,4 111,9 118,3 133,2 104,2 106,9 115,1 105,4 123,9 
1975 127,1 142,2 119,6 137,1 . 162,4 115,8 132,7 131,7 122,0 132,3 
1976 133,0 157,2 123,6 152,9 189,9 120,9 161,0 144,7 126,3 136,5 
1977 138,7 169,8 131,3 164,0 222,1 122,4 192,2 158,3 133,8 142,3 
1978 143,6 181,4 137,2 180,1 251,2 122,7 216,9 170,4 141,3 147,9 
1979 143,8 189,1 139,2 196,2 288,4 120.0 243,3 181,8 149,6 142,9 
1980 148,l 208,3 144,8 220,5 340,3 126.3 279,0 200,2 160,9 145,0 
1981 155,0 230,4 148,6 245,9 384,1 129,6 319,3 217,7 176,6 152,6 
1982 166,0 255,9 157,8 277,0 461,6 133,8 348,6 238,1 184,8 155,4 
1973/1982 5,3 9,6 4,5 10,8 16,8 3,2 14,4 9,3 6,9 4,6 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 107,3 107,7 105,7 108,7 117,1 103,9 106,8 109,3 102,3 117,7 
1974 126,5 125,5 114,3 124,3 142,4 113,9 123,9 124,0 115,1 148,9 
1975 119,4 139,8 116,7 142,5 169,1 119,4 160,7 138,6 128,6 142,0 
1976 125,3 147,1 119,0 153,4 202,7 129,1 172,8 147,7 134,5 142,1 
1977 131,0 159,8 122,6 163,5 238.2 132,6 202,9 159,0 144,3 143,8 
1978 135,6 171.1 128,7 179.7 274,3 133,8 232,8 172,1 155.6 153,3 
1979 138,6 175,9 133,4 199.1 317.9 134,1 256,6 185,7 165,8 158,9 
1980 140,2 191,5 138,9 221,9 379,0 137,6 321,7 206,3 178,3 161,0 
1981 143,4 196,3 144,3 248,0 438.3 137,9 337,3 221,5 189.7 163,3 
1982 153,9 223,8 152,2 284,7 521,5 144,5 362,2 243,5 194,9 162,4 
1973/1982 4,1 8,1 4,1 11,0 18.0 3,7 14,5 9,3 7.4 4,6 
(I) A•·•rall" annual Jrowth rate (1972-73)/(1981-82); 1982/1985 
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Table 14 
Earnings per head deflated by price of GDP ( 1972 = 100) 
B DK D f" NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 107,9 104,0 104,8 102,2 109,7 108,1 107,7 105,8 101,6 108,3 
1974 115,9 113.7 109,6 102.4 114,1 114,3 108,4 109,0 101,4 112,6 
1975 118,0 116.4 111,2 114,5 118,7 115,3 114,4 113,7 102,7 119,4 
1976 131,6 119,6 119,8 120,0 124,7 118,7 116,3 119,7 106,1 123,6 
1977 133,5 120,7 125,6 124,7 125,6 120,8 113,9 122,5 108,9 128,8 
1978 139,1 120,0 128,5 129,4 126,1 123,1 117,9 125,6 109,8 131,2 
1979 143,5 124,7 131,8 130,8 126,6 126,2 120,6 128,1 110,4 137,4 
1980 151,1 132,4 135,2 135,9 125,1 126,6 114.8 129,6 111,4 142,9 
1981 154,1 131,8 137,6 138,3 126,9 125,2 116,0 131,6 111,6 148,7 
1982 155,3 130.4 137.9 142,3 126,3 126,7 120,3 133,7 111,8 153,2 
1973/1982 4,5 2,8 3,3 3,7 2,1 2,1 1.4 2,9 1,1 4,2 
1983 156,2 135,9 137,7 142,6 125,0 129,6 122,5 134,3 114,9 161,3 
1984 160,1 135.4 139.9 143.1 126,7 125,7 128.1 136,4 116,9 168,8 
1985 163.3 135.4 141,6 145,8 129,3 126,2 131.5 138.7 117,5 175,8 
1982/1985 1,7 1,3 0,9 0,8 0,8 -0,1 3,0 1,2 1,7 4,7 
Strong demand 
. 1972 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
1973 108.1 104.1 104.8 99.5 111.3 109.2 107.4 106.2 100,3 106,9 
1974 113.8 114.3 111.5 99.2 111,8 115,5 105,3 109.6 99,8 109,4 
1975 116.4 119.2 113.9 108,4 114,3 115.5 114,6 113,6 102,9 116,8 
1976 130,2 121.5 122.8 113.5 119,4 119,0 116,6 120,5 105.9 120,9 
1977 133,8 122,1 128.4 119.2 117,9 122,7 113,8 123,7 107,3 127,4 
1978 140.1 122.0 130,8 119.0 118.0 125,4 119.6 125.9 107,7 131,3 
1979 140.8 129.0 134,7 124,5 117.1 128.2 121,4 128,7 107.9 136,8 
1980 150,8 139.0 136.0 127.9 114.7 128,3 116.3 128,4 110,0 134,6 
1981 152,8 139,5 140.1 126.1 116.0 128,8 118.4 129.9 110,7 141,0 
1982 155.9 135,7 140.8 130.8 117.0 131.1 123,2 132,9 113.6 148,6 
1973/1982 4.5 3.4 3,6 2.9 I. I 2.4 1,7 2,7 1,3 3,8 
Moderate demand 
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
1973 107.9 103.4 105,6 104.1 106,6 106,9 108,3 105,9 101.6 108,7 
1974 120.2 113.1 109.7 105.0 108.4 112.4 108.4 108.7 100,5 113,1 
1975 124.8 116.8 112.1 118,0 114,6 113,9 113,0 114,2 101,4 119,7 
1976 138,4 119.3 120.7 124.9 119,3 116.8 114.4 120.2 105.2 125,2 
1977 138.5 119,5 126.2 130.3 119.7 117,8 112,5 122.9 108.2 129,5 
1978 142.1 118.5 129.1 136.9 120.6 119,4 115.8 126.3 108,6 132,3 
1979 144,8 122.4 132,8 139.1 119,7 122,3 119.9 129,5 108,6 139,5 
1980 151,8 127,9 137,8 147.6 117.0 122,3 115.5 132.5 109,5 148,6 
1981 153.5 125.2 138.9 155,3 118.1 122,3 144.8 134.9 109,1 154,5 
1982 154.4 126.4 137.7 159,I 116,7 124,5 118,0 136.7 109.2 159,4 
1973/1982 4.5 2.4 3.4 4.9 1.4 2,0 1.2 3,1 0.9 4,6 
Weak demand 
1972 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 
1973 107.5 104,7 103,5 101.4 111.3 108,5 107.1 105.1 102.3 108,6 
1974 113.5 113.1 107.3 100.7 118,9 114,8 110,1 108.2 103.2 113,7 
1975 112.9 112.6 106.9 112.8 123, I 115, 1 115.8 112.2 103.4 120,6 
1976 125.9 118.0 115,0 116,7 130,6 118,7 118.1 117.6 106,7 123,6 
1977 127,6 120.5 121.0 119.6 133.1 120,9 115.1 119,9 109.8 128.9 
1978 133,7 119.6 124.0 124.5 133,2 123,8 118.8 122.9 111.5 130.1 
1979 140.5 124.7 126.3 122.2 135,5 127,2 119,9 124.1 112,7 135.6 
1980 146.9 133,9 128.7 124.0 135,5 128,2 111,5 124.6 112,5 142,6 
1981 147.5 133.2 130.9 122.0 138.2 127.9 114.5 125,8 112,7 147.6 
1982 147.7 132.9 129.8 125.1 137.9 130.2 120.1 127.4 109.9 149.8 
1973/ 1982 4.0 3.0 2.8 2.3 3,0 2.4 1.4 2.4 I.I 4.0 
tl) AHrnE?CUnnu.iliro\lothratcjl'ln-nitl9Xl->C); 19X:! Jt,lj,i~ 
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Table 15 
Real unit labour costs (1972 = 100) 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 99,0 99,9 100,4 97,8 100,6 96,4 99,0 99,4 96,6 99.0 
1974 102,7 103,8 101,6 95,4 100,6 96.2 101,6 100.0 100.6 104.1 
1975 106,3 100,3 101,9 105,5 115.7 103.0 109,3 106.0 100,4 109,4 
1976 103,9 98,8 99,2 103,0 108.2 94,1 105,5 102,1 98,1 100,5 
1977 100,2 98,4 100,8 102,4 106,8 92,6 102,1 101,5 98,0 97,4 
1978 98,3 96,5 101,8 101.5 104,6 88,5 104,4 101,4 97.7 91,8 
1979 94,2 93,8 100,8 98,1 98,7 86,9 105,6 99,4 97.9 87,2 
1980 98,3 92,9 104,0 99,9 92,3 86,3 107,1 99,9 99,9 83.4 
1981 97,1 89,0 104,3 99,5 93,1 85,3 104,0 98.9 97.0 82.8 
1982 94,0 87,4 103,0 100,1 92,3 81,6 101,8 98.0 97.2 79.0 
1973/1982 -0,4 -1,4 0,4 0,1 -0,9 -1,8 0,4 -0,1 -0.1 -2,3 
1983 91,0 85,6 97,5 101,2 97.6 79,3 106,8 94,6 96.8 82,0 
1984 89,2 77,9 94,8 96.5 91,6 71, 7 106,2 91.0 95.7 78,8 
1985 87,4 75,7 92,9 93,9 89,4 69,2 104,9 89,0 93,9 78.6 
1982/1985 -2,4 -4,7 -3,4 -2,1 -1,1 -5,4 1.0 -3,1 -1,1 -0,2 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 
1973 97,1 93,9 99,2 93,0 101,3 94,9 96,3 97,9 98.1 97,0 
1974 98,9 96,1 96,0 87,6 99,6 90,0 94,4 95,1 102.8 100,1 
1975 111,1 92,5 100,5 95,9 111,8 109,2 103,4 102,1 102.7 105.5 
1976 104,4 84,5 94,4 92,4 104,3 93,4 96,6 96.0 98.5 89.8 
1977 97,2 83,2 93,1 91,2 99,2 93,6 93,3 94.1 96.1 82.4 
1978 92,4 83,1 94,8 . 85,7 92,0 87,5 95,1 92,5 94,5 70.3 
1979 86,8 79,4 94,3 84.7 84,3 83,7 94,3 90.1 93.8 66.8 
1980 95,8 80,0 96,2 87,6 76,5 86,6 93,9 90.0 95.5 58,8 
1981 95,3 74,7 95,5 83,0 73,9 90,8 91,9 87,4 91.6 55.2 
1982 94,1 68.3 93,6 84,1 69.2 84,7 89,5 85,6 93.6 50.1 
1973/1982 -0,4 -3,3 -0,6 - 1.6 -3.7 -1,2 -0,9 -1,5 -0.7 -6.7 
· Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
1973 102,1 101,9 100,9 100.3 98,9 95,8 100.7 100.0 96.5 97,1 
1974 107,5 102.8 104,6 100,3 98,7 97,7 101,6 102.0 100.8 99.2 
1975 108.3 101.3 105,4 108.3 113,9 97,6 108.1 106,9 99,4 102.6 
1976 111,5 103,0 101.5 107,2 107.8 91,5 105,9 103.9 97,3 98.4 
1977 108,6 101,9 105,5 108,0 106,6 90,1 102,3 104.4 98,1 95,9 
1978 107,9 99,5 105.3 109,4 103,9 87,3 105.0 104.6 99.1 96,0 
1979 103,4 98,0 104.1 105,5 100,3 86,3 107.1 103,2 100,6 91.7 
1980 109,4 96,1 109,0 109,1 93,6 83,7 106,7 104,8 104.0 89.5 
1981 107,2 91.9 107,9 112.3 93,9 82.3 103.8 104,1 101.4 90.0 
1982 101.3 92,1 106,9 111,8 93,0 80.5 102,0 102.8 100.7 88.9 
1973/1982 0,3 -1.0 0,7 1,3 -0.7 -2.0 0,3 0.4 0.3 - I.I 
Weak demand 
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1973 97,2 99,3 100,6 97.9 102,1 98.7 99.8 99.7 96.1 101.8 
1974 100,9 109,3 101,6 95,4 103,0 100,3 107,7 101.0 99.8 111.1 
1975 104,4 101,9 98.4 110.4 120,3 107,3 115,8 108,1 101.2 118,0 
1976 98,9 99,0 100,0 106.2 111.5 99,8 111.4 104.4 100.5 109.1 
1977 96,6 100,0 100.8 105.0 111.0 96.7 108.3 103.6 101.6 109.0 
1978 95,5 97,8 102.8 105.5 112,3 92,1 110.2 104.6 100.6 104.3 
1979 92,9 93,8 102,1 101.6 105.2 92.2 109,7 101.9 99.3 99.0 
1980 92,4 94,0 103,7 99.8 99.2 91,3 117.0 101.2 99,8 100.1 
1981 91,9 91,2 107.3 97.9 102.6 90.4 110.0 101.2 97.5 105.3 
1982 90,5 89,5 103.9 98.9 105.0 87.8 108,0 101.0 98.6 103.7 
1973;1982 -0.9 -I.I 0,6 -0.1 0.3 -1.2 1.0 0.1 -0.0 0.4 
tll A,·~rngr annual gro"th rat~ (IQ'1·Bl 1(1Q81·81); JQ81 IQ85 
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Table 16 
Adjusted labour share 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 71.7 79,6 72,9 75,8 79,4 68,2 75,1 74,7 70,8 53,5 
1973 72,8 80,3 74,4 74,6 77,2 69,3 74,7 74,6 72,0 54,5 
1974 75,0 84,7 74,6 72.1 74,6 69,4 79,7 74,7 74,9 58,1 
1975 83,8 80,6 75.6 80,3 83,1 78,0 83,9 79,7 71,9 65,l 
1976 84,3 80,4 74,6 78,6 78,4 73,4 82,5 77,7 71,5 63,3 
1977 83,7 80,9 75,4 79,7 79,8 75,7 77,1 77,8 71,2 64,1 
1978 84,0 81,1 76,1 79,7 78,7 76,6 77,0 77,9 72,1 61,6 
1979 83,1 81,7 76,8 77,7 74,2 77,9 80,5 77,7 74,3 60,6 
1980 87,8 80,1 79,2 79,4 71,9 79,0 82,3 79,0 76,7 60,7 
1981 87,0 78,1 80.1 80,5 75,9 76,4 81,5 80,0 75,3 61,7 
1982 83,7 75,5 78,6 82,2 74,9 75,7 78,9 79,0 77,1 61,2 
1973/)982 13,1 -3,1 5,7 6,2 -2.9 7,3 5,3 4,9 4,8 7,4 
Strong demand 
1972 64.6 74.1 72,2 70,7 73,4 60,7 68,1 70,3 67,3 41,3 
· 1973 66,8 77,1 75,3 68,7 71,7 60,6 68,4 71,1 69,5 44,8 
1974 70,0 80,5 71.2 64.5 69,1 55,5 73,3 68,8 73,7 51,9 
1975 77,1 75,9 76,3 75,8 77,8 73,4 77,6 76,4 71,4 56,6 
-1976 78,2 73,4 74.6 75,2 74,1 66,8 74,2 74.2 69,0 52,6 
1977 76,2 76,I 75,1 75,6 76,6 72,1 69,2 74,3 67,0 52,9 
1978 78.2 77,0 77,8 75,6 74,5 73,4 70,2 75,5 68,5 49,2 
1979 76,6 76,1 79,1 74.5 70,9 73,2 73,1 75,6 71,1 49,8 
1980 82,2 77,8 82,4 77,4 70,9 77,0 72.4 77,6 72,2 49,4 
1981 80,8 71,3 82.8 78,0 73,0 72,7 74,8 78,3 70,6 49,5 
1982 77,6 63,0 81,5 80.7 71,7 73,1 70,1 77,0 72,4 48,6 
1973/1982 13,5 -8,4 8,4 9.6 -0,2 12,2 4,2 6,9 3,1 6,0 
Moderate demand 
1972 68,6 81,1 73,2 75,5 79.4 70,9 73,8 74,2 68,0 54,2 
1973 72,7 80,7 74,0 75,6 77,4 72,2 79,1 75,4 70,0 56,1 
1974 78,1 84,8 77,4 75,8 73,5 76.2 80.6 77,0 74,6 58,6 
1975 78,7 81,2 76,4 80,0 79,5 77,2 85,3 79,2 69,4 61,2 
1976 82,0 81,4 73,I 77,5 76,2 74,2 82,2 76,3 69,4 60,5 
1977 82,0 81.1 74,1 79.1 77,2 75,9 76,1 76,2 69,9 59,8 
1978 81,7 81,1 73,6 79.0 75.7 77,4 75,8 75,8 71.8 60,2 
1979 81,4 82.4 74,7 77,7 72,2 78,5 79,6 76.3 74,9 61,l 
1980 87,6 79,3 77.6 80,4 69,3 77,9 82.6 78,3 78,7 60,4 
1981 86,1 75,9 77,7 81,1 73,2 76,8 79,8 78,4 76,4 59,2 
1982 82,2 75,7 75,9 83,4 70,7 77,0 77,9 77.4 77,2 58,5 
1973/1982 13.5 -5.1 3,1 6,7 -6.4 5.4 2.4 3,1 7,9 3,7 
Weak demand 
1972 77,3 79,2 72,7 78,6 79,6 70,4 81,3 77,2 77,2 60.4 
1973 75.2 80,7 73,9 76,4 77,3 72.5 77,8 76,1 76,6 58,5 
1974 74,6 86,0 73,5 72,1 75,9 73,5 81,9 75,4 76,1 60,8 
1975 91. 7 81.2 73,6 82,9 86,2 83,2 86,0 81,8 76,1 73,0 
1976 89,2 81,7 76,1 81,6 80.0 77,7 88,2 81,1 76,4 71,8 
1977 89,1 82,6 77,1 82.6 81,3 78.1 83,9 81,3 76,3 74,9 
1978 88,8 82.7 78,0 82,8 81,1 77.8 83,2 81.5 75,3 70,3 
1979 88.1 82.9 77,6 79,5 75,6 80,8 86,9 80,1 75,8 66,1 
1980 90.4 82,6 78,7 79,2 72,9 82,1 89,I 80.1 77,5 67,8 
1981 90,8 86,5 81.3 81,2 77,5 82,6 89,7 82.6 77,7 72,1 
1982 88,1 82,3 78,1 81,4 78,0 81,0 88,2 81.3 81.5 72.7 
1973/1982 13,2 4,4 6.4 3,8 -0,7 10.3 9.4 5.3 2,7 13,0 
(I) Change (19KI-K2)-(ln2-7.1); 1985/1982 
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Table 17 
Rate of investment (current prices) 
B DK D F NL UK EUR 7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
·1_' 1972 16,3' ,. 15,0. ,;., 13,9 16,8 14,5 15,1 9,4 13,8 8,4 19,7 
1973 t 'i··: 16,0 J 16,8, oC· 12,1 15,8 16,1 15,6 10,3 13,6 8,4 21,5 
1974 ' 18,1 19,5' . 10,8 15,6 17,2 16,7 12,3 13,8 10,6 23,1 
1975 17,9. ,, 15,0 10,7 14,1 14,6 15,9 11,7 12,9 10.5 20,8 
1976 
' 
14,5 ',:, 16,6 •, 10,9 14,1 12,9 13,9 11,3 12,4 10.0 18,6 
1977 12,0 15,1 · .. 11,0 13,5 12,7 17,1 11,3 12,3 10,7 17,2 
1978 11,4, .. 15,4· :/ 11,1 12,7 11,5 19,0 11,8 12,1 10,9 14,9 
1979 ·). 11,4 14,9: ';, 12,1 12,7 11,6 19,9 12,2 12,5 11,1 17,3 
1980 14,2 14,8' 13,2 14,0 12,4 19,8 11,2 13,2 12,2 19,9 
1981 12,8 13,4 12,9 13,5 11,9 18,7 8,8 12,3 11,8 20,2 
1982 13,9 13,0 12,0 12,7 10,3 18,4 8,3 11,4 11,7 20,1 
1973/1982 -2,8 -2,7 -0,6 -3,2 -4,2 3,2 -1,3 -1,8 3.3 -0.4 
1983 12,8 13,0 . 11,7 12,3 9,8 18,5 8,4 11,5 12,3 18,6 
1984 13,3' 17,8 11,5 13,4 9,2 21,6 9,2 11,8 13,3 17,4 
1985 12,8 19,2 11,9 13,3 10,8 23,6 9,6 12,4 13,9 17,3 
1982/1985 -1,1 6,2 -0,1 0,6 0,5 5,2 1,3 1.0 2,2 -2,8 
Strong demand 
1972 20,7 _,_ ...... '.',! 14,4 17,7 19,9 22,4 11,8 8,4 18,3 
1973 :,i: 18,4' _,,;t 17,0 13,2 17,1 20,5 19,7 11,3 15,3 9,3 22,7 
. ' 1974 ,_;,•• 18,4' .f'" 20,2 13,0 17,2 24,1 17,8 13,7 15,9 12,7 28,7 .. :, 
,11: 1975 24,6: 'i i 16,5 13,7 17,0 24,7 20,7 15,0 16,8 13,3 24,3 
1976 ~j l j 28,l• · ·:· 17,8 12,3 17,4 23,1 20,7 15,0 16,3 12,7 20,5 
1977 
. ' 17,l: . 19,0 12,5 17,3 22,0 26,5 14,6 16,0 12,7 20,5 
1978 14,0· ;_ 16,5 12,l 16,5 17,1 24,9 16,4 15,1 12,3 16,4 
1979 .. 14,3'. : .• · 20,3 13,1 16,6 15,1 20,7 16,1 15,1 12,6 19,9 
1980 \, .... 14,6. !, 21,8 14,6 17,6 16,4 20,5 14,0 15,7 13,4 24,2 
1981 V:. 12,2 14,2 16.6 15,5 22,2 11,9 13.4 25,0 
1982 13,0 13,4 16,7 12,7 22,5 10,5 13,3 23,2 
1973/1982 -6,9 
' 
-0,0 -0,8 -6,1 1,3 -0,4 4,5 3,6 
· Moderate demand 
1972 13,2:.1, 12,7 14,2 12,1 12,2 7,3 7,8 21,3 
1973 14,S: 15,7 10,8 13,8 13,7 14,0 8,9 11,7 7.7 23,7 
1974 15,6 ;-'. 18,7 10,0 15,6 15,6 18,4 10,5 12,8 9,5 22,5 
1975 11,5 .:, , 14,8 9,7 13,3 11,6 15,0 9,4 11,2 8,7 18,0 
1976 9,3, r. 16,7 9,5 12,6 10,5 12,1 8,4 10,4 8.5 15,8 
1977 10,l; · 14,2 10,3 12,7 12,2 14,4 9,2 11,1 9,5 15,9 
1978 12,0. ·. • 16,2 10,9 12,3 11,8 18,0 10,l 11,6 10,3 16,1 
1979 11,7.•.' · 14,3 12,0 12.0 12,8 21.5 II.I 12,3 10,9 18,4 
1980 14,9. 13,0 13,3 12,9 13,3 21,6 10,4 13.0 12,2 21,0 
1981 i 13,T · 13,1 12,9 13,0 19.6 8,1 12,4 19,6 
1982 ! 13,8 12,2 12,3 12,1 18.2 7,7 11,9 19.0 
1973/1982 -0,1 1,0 -1,4 -0,3 5,8 -0,2 4,4 -3,2 
Weak demand 
1972 17,I • · 15,1 19,3 14,4 13,4 12,0 9,4 19,2 
1973 16,2 ·,,: 18,6 13,1 17,6 16,4 14,6 12,0 14,8 9,0 19,2 
1974 19,7. ': 20,8 10,1 14,9 15,9 13,5 14,7 13,7 10,6 20,8 
1975 21,S •. ':: 14,7 10,0 13,4 13,3 13,2 13,6 12,7 11,0 21,5 
1976 13,l\. , . 15.9 11,8 14,2 10.9 10,6 14.4 12,6 10,0 20,0 
1977 11,1 15.0 11.0 12.4 9,9 13,1 13.1 11,5 10,8 16,4 
1978 9,3 -:. 13,3 10,6 11,2 9.2 15,3 11.9 10,8 10,5 12.9 
1979 9,6 . . ·· 13,2 11.4 11.5 9,4 16,7 11,8 11,2 10.4 14,6 
1980 13,1 14,7 12,0 13.4 10.5 16,2 10,6 12.0 11.3 16,2 
1981 12,2 11.5 12.5 10.0 15.7 7,9 9,5 17,7 
1982 14.4 10,3 11.0 8.2 13,2 7,9 10.1 19,0 
1973/1982 -3,4 -3.2 -6.7 -6,3 0.5 -4,1 0.6 -0,9 
\I) Chan~ (1981-821-(1972-73); 198S-198~ 
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Table 18 
Gross fixed capital formation (197S prices) index: 1973 = 100 
B DK D F NL UK EUR7 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 105,4 123,5 92,1 102,1 118,3 109,0 107,0 102,I 107,2 119,I 
1974 123.5 138,3 81,9 99,6 125,2 107,7 117,1 101,2 126,2 118,5 
1975 108,7 106,3 75,4 87,8 93,8 98,8 105,4 87,8 113,4 98,8 
1976 95,6 124,2 81,0 92,7 91,2 94,4 102,0 89,6 li6,4 96,0 
1977 79,7 115,4 85,6 93,2 92,2 111,7 106,7 91,5 133,3 93,4 
1978 76,7 117,5 87,1 90,4 84,9 110,0 114,0 90,9 139,5 87,7 
1979 78,6 117,6 95,5 195,5 94,1 107,8 118,2 97,6 141,0 105,8 
1980 98,9 123,0 102,2 107,5 108,6 110,7 102,0 104,6 146,2 124,5 
1981 89,5 103,5 97,7 102,6 98,8 93,7 76,5 95,8 143,1 134,4 
1982 98,8 105,5 89,7 99,1 84,8 87,7 73,8 89,6 128,4 141,8 
1973/1982 -1,0 -0,7 -0,3 -0,0 -1,9 -1,6 -3,5 -0,9 3,0 2,6 
1983 93,9 117,6 90,0 102,2 77,2 91,3 72,8 91,3 139,4 135,2 
1984 111,6 173,9 91,8 114,0 75,3 114,0 80,9 97,7 161,4 140,8 
1985 111,6 198,5 99,2 114,6 89,3 128,3 86,4 106,7 173,2 147,4 
1982/1985 4,1 23,5 3,4 5,0 1,8 13,5 5,4 6,0 10,5 1,3 
Strong demand 
· 1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 96,7 97,9 112,4 110,6 94,7 103,2 117,6 126,4 
1974 101,6 108,5 122,1 126,7 102,4 114,0 153,1 138,2 
1975 122,6 IOI,! 108,6 112.S 110,0 107,5 147,8 109,0 
1976 155,7 98,0 100,3 113,9 109,0 106.2 155,I 105,1 
1977 100,1 105,2 123,3 109,2 113,5 111,2 170,6 111,2 
1978 82,7 100,3 124,0 86,6 134,1 107,2 171,1 100,3 
1979 87,1 108,7 136.9 83,3 133,2 112,9 175,2 124,5 
1980 90,4 116,5 149,8 92,3 115,7 118,2 188,4 157,1 
1981 77,1 113,5 140,3 82,7 92,0 108,9 194,9 179,4 
1982 85,8 105,3 146,4 68,4 87,3 104,2 183,4 
1973/1982 -2,1 1,1 3,4 -3,6 -0,9 0,5 7,3 5,4 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 112,9 91,0 105,7 115,6 116,4 103,4 105,1 120,0 
1974 122,2 80,6 114,6 129,6 124,7 105,4 118,2 108,1 
1975 91,8 74,6 101.7 89,0 106,7 89,7 102,8 86,8 
1976 77,6 80,3 104,3 86,5 98,2 90,3 107,2 82,5 
1977 86,8 90,1 108,3 100,3 114,5 100,1 128,0 89,6 
1978 104,6 98,9 106,9 100,5 127,1 105,8 140,0 93,8 
1979 104,1 109,4 109,9 116,8 140,2 115,1 143,5 109,1 
1980 133,7 119,8 120,9 131,3 125,3 123,2 149,2 128,7 
1981 126,4 117,I 120,6 120,9 95.7 115,7 154,9 131,7 
1982 133,7 110,2 117,1 112,8 92,0 110,6 136,4 
1973/1982 2,3 2,0 1,6 0,9 -1,6 1,2 5,1 2,2 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 104.7 89,8 94,0 124,3 102,4 99,7 103,2 113,8 
1974 135,8 67,5 76,6 120.6 115,5 89,6 118,4 116,3 
1975 113,9 61,0 65.8 86,9 105,4 75,4 103,9 103,7 
1976 77.7 71,6 76,6 81,9 101,0 79,0 102,3 102,9 
1977 64,5 69,l 64,5 76,6 93,1 71,7 115,3 86,1 
1978 54,0 66,8 58,3 72.2 87,7 67,0 118,3 74.7 
1979 56,5 72,9 61,2 82,7 85,0 71,7 115.8 91,5 
1980 78,8 75,1 72,3 100,3 68,7 78,3 115,3 101,2 
1981 69,9 67,7 64,9 90,8 46.4 68,6 95,3 110.0 
1982 81, I 58,8 56.6 72,7 45,9 60,3 121,9 
1973/1982 - 3.3 -4,4 -5.1 - 3.5 -8.3 -4.8 0.5 0.9 
ill Avcrupc unnual frowth rate (1972·7~)'(19KI-K2); 19K2 19K5 
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Table 19 
Gross capital stock (1975 prices) index: 1972 = 100 
B D F NL UK EUR6 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 105,2 104,6 106,1 104,6 104,6 102,8 104,5 103,3 110,8 
1974 111 ,0 108,1 111 ,9 109,7 109,4 106,0 108,9 107,4 121 ,6 
1975 116,8 110,8 116,8 113,9 113,5 109,2 112,6 111 ,5 130,9 
1976 121 ,3 113,2 121 ,1 116,9 117,0 112,0 115,7 115,0 138,0 
1977 124,5 115,7 125,5 119,9 120,7 114,8 118,9 119, 1 144,2 
1978 126,8 11 8,3 129,4 122,6 124,7 117,8 121 ,9 123,7 150,0 
1979 128,7 120,9 133,1 124,8 128,2 120,8 124,8 128,3 156,3 
1980 131 ,3 123,9 137,1 127,3 131 ,6 123,6 127,8 132,9 164,2 
1981 134, 1 126,7 140,9 129,2 134,1 125,3 130,4 134,7 173,8 
1982 128,8 143,7 130,5 126,5 183,8 
1973/1982 3,3 2,5 3,7 2,7 3,3 2,4 3,0 3,5 6,1 
1983 130,2 146,5 131 ,8 127,2 
1984 131,5 149,0 132,8 128, 1 
1985 133,2 151 ,3 133,2 129,0 
1982/ 1985 1,1 1,7 0,7 0,7 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 106,3 105,2 106,7 105,0 105,5 102,8 104,9 103,5 109,5 
1974 11 2,5 110,5 114,1 110,7 110,4 105,6 110,0 108,5 120,1 
1975 11 9,7 115,7 121 ,1 116,3 114,7 108,6 115,1 114,2 129,7 
1976 128,9 120,1 126,8 12 1,5 119,0 111 ,8 119,7 119,7 136,1 
1977 136,9 124,4 132,9 126,6 124,4 115,0 124,4 125,8 141 ,4 
1978 141,4 128,4 139,7 130,5 129,4 11 8,6 128,9 132,0 147,1 
1979 145,0 132,2 146,8 133,0 132,5 122,5 133,0 138,2 154,0 
1980 148,7 136,3 154,3 134,9 134,6 126,0 137,0 144,6 162,9 
198 1 151 ,9 140,2 161 ,2 136,3 136,3 128,7 140,4 151 ,3 174,1 
1982 143,3 167,0 137,8 130,6 186,5 
1973/ 1982 4,8 3,7 5,3 3,3 3,5 2,8 3,9 4,8 6,2 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
1973 105,7 104.5 106, l 103,4 104,1 102,5 104,2 103,6 113,0 
1974 11 2, l 108,0 11 2,6 107,5 109,1 105,6 108,4 107,6 125,3 
1975 117,5 110,6 11 8,8 110,5 114,1 108,6 112,1 111 ,5 134,8 
1976 120,8 112,9 124,3 11 2,2 11 8,0 111 ,1 115, l 114,7 142,0 
1977 123,8 115,6 129,8 114,3 12 1,6 11 3,7 11 8,3 11 8,7 148,7 
1978 127,6 11 8.8 135,2 116,8 125,8 11 6,9 121 ,9 123,7 156,0 
1979 131,9 122,5 140,3 11 9,5 130,7 120,5 125,8 129,1 164,3 
1980 137,3 126,7 145,9 122,8 136,1 124,0 130,0 134,6 174,8 
1981 142,5 131 ,0 151 ,3 125,7 140,6 126,4 133,8 140,2 186,9 
1982 134,6 155,8 128,3 128,2 199,0 
1973/ 1982 3,9 2,9 4.5 2,5 3,9 2,6 3,3 3,8 6,8 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 104,4 104,2 105,8 105.3 104,4 103,3 104,6 102,9 109,9 
1974 109,7 106,9 110,3 111 ,1 108,5 106,9 108,7 106,3 119,8 
1975 115,2 108,1 113,4 11 5,4 111 ,4 110,4 111 ,7 109,5 128,7 
1976 118,6 109,3 11 6,2 11 8.4 11 3,4 11 3,5 11 4.1 11 2,0 136,3 
1977 120,0 11 0,7 118.8 121 ,0 11 5,2 11 6,3 116,3 114,7 142,8 
1978 120,3 111 ,6 120,3 123.2 11 7,6 11 8,6 117,9 117,7 147,4 
1979 120,2 11 2,4 121 ,5 125,0 11 9,9 120,5 11 9,2 120.4 151,8 
1980 120,7 11 3,4 122,8 127,1 12 1,9 121 ,9 120,5 122,7 157,3 
1981 12 1.8 114,0 123,9 128,4 122.8 122,4 12 1,4 116,9 163 ,9 
1982 113.7 124.1 128,6 122.2 171 ,1 
1973/ 1982 2.2 1,2 2.1 2,5 2,3 2. 1 2.1 2.1 5.3 
(I) Average annual growth rat< (1972-73)/(198 1-82): 1982/ 198S: 
(1972-73)/ 1980.8 1): B. L. EU R 6. USA 
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Table 20 
Gross rate of return on capital, index: 1972 = 100 
B D F NL UK EUR6 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 98,9 97,5 106,4 114,0 97,2 104,8 104,2 99,8 101,5 
1974 93,4 95,5 112,5 121,0 92,1 78,2 101,2 82,6 83,6 
1975 56,4 83,6 77,4 80.9 57,8 61,8 76,4 82,5 58,4 
1976 57,0 88,0 80,6 98,6 73,6 62,0 82,5 85,0 62,9 
1977 57,9 86,3 76,5 92,3 64,5 78,8 82,0 89,4 62,1 
1978 57,2 83,8 78,3 94,2 56,1 78,4 80,9 86,6 67,2 
1979 60,1 81,5 85,1 114,7 48,1 64,9 81,7 76,4 70,2 
1980 47,7 71.6 80,1 130,4 44,2 55,9 76,2 63,2 68,3 
1981 49,2 65,7 74,0 112,0 45,6 53,2 68,9 66,7 65,5 
1982 68,2 67,1 112,0 59,7 65,7 
1973/1982 -8,6 -4,2 -4,1 0,5 -9,4 -6,4 -4,2 -5,2 -4,7 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 96,6 92,5 113,6 116,8 106,9 102,6 103,8 97,1 92,2 
1974 89,0 116,9 137,4 125,7 130,9 79,3 116,4 77,3 66,5 
1975 59,3 82,7 80,9 75,8 56,0 64,2 75,4 75,5 47,9 
1976 56,8 88,8 69,7 88,7 77,4 69,6 79,9 82,6 56,9 
1977 61,4 88,8 69,2 75,6 59,8 84,4 79,5 92,1 57,5 
1978 55,3 76,5 75,5 81,7 50,8 81,3 75,1 87,7 66,1 
1979 59,8 71,5 83,1 97,6 46,4 71,7 74,7 77,0 65,0 
1980 46,0 57,4 72.1 101,4 37,1 72,6 66,3 70,9 64,4 
1981 49,5 54,4 64.6 90,1 43,8 59,5 60,2 74,0 64,8 
1982 : 56,0 53.8 93,1 73.3 67,4 
1973/1982 -8,6 -6,0 -6.4 -1.9 -11,1 -4,6 -5,8 -3,8 -4,1 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 87,0 100,8 101.6 113,0 92,9 76,8 98,1 99,4 97,1 
1974 71,6 84,6 95,7 127,1 72,0 68,2 88,7 75,2 82,8 
1975 67,5 82,4 80,3 95,0 65,3 51,5 77,1 84,4 67,3 
1976 60,9 97.7 89,3 110,7 77.3 59,4 88,9 85,3 70,5 
1977 60,6 95,0 82,6 104,2 69,8 79,7 88,7 86,8 73,l 
1978 60,9 97,3 83,5 108,2 58.3 79,7 89,l 79,7 71,4 
1979 61,8 92.9 86.7 126,5 50.1 65,5 86,7 67,0 69,4 
1980 44,8 80.5 78,8 145,3 50,0 52,9 78,3 50,8 68,7 
1981 48,0 76,3 77,2 122,3 49,5 56,8 73,9 54,8 69,5 
1982 : 80.0 67,9 127,8 60,4 69,9 
1973/1982 -8,4 -2.7 -3,6 1,8 -7,9 -4,5 -3,2 -7,6 -3,8 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
1973 112.8 96.6 108,2 113,5 93,8 123,2 107.2 102,9 111,8 
1974 119.1 95.0 119,9 115,6 85,4 96.3 106,4 101,4 96,4 
1975 41,9 85.5 72,1 74,1 48,1 76,4 75.8 85,6 57,8 
1976 51,8 76,5 75,9 95,0 64,6 59,9 77,2 86,6 60,3 
1977 51,5 74,9 72,0 91,1 61,2 73,0 76.1 90,5 55,5 
1978 52,5 73.0 71,3 90,4 58,2 73,8 74,9 97,6 64,0 
1979 56,0 74.3 81,8 113,8 46.5 57.7 79,9 92,7 74,4 
1980 50,0 70,1 84,4 131.2 42,3 45,8 79.7 78,l 70,3 
1981 47,5 59,7 72,5 112,9 36.0 40,1 67.6 80,0 61,4 
1982 65,0 72,2 108,4 44.8 59.5 
1973/1982 -9,3 -4.9 -4.0 0.4 -10.7 -10.2 -4.2 -3,1 -6,0 
(I) Average annual growth rate ( 1972, 73)/( 1981-82); 1982/1985; 
(1972-73)/(1980-RI): B. NL. EUR 6. USA 
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Table 21 .!-, ,\ _,1_.,i !; '1 
Capital productivity, index; 1972 = 100 ,.• ~ r-;, 1 . -",, . '-;,,,,·. .,; .. , 
B D F NL UK EUR6 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 'I· fi 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 104,5 100,8 100,7 106,0 105,5 106,3 103,0 107,5 102,8 
1974 ,, 103,3 98,5 99,0 107,4 106,7 101,7 101,2 99,2 91,6 
1975 ';. 90,8 91,8 93,3 93,5 93,3 92,0 92,6 88,8 81,0 
1976 ,.1 i 95,6 96,8 95,3 102,5 97,8 91,3 96,4 94,3 87,3 
1977 :. l.! '. 94,1 97,0 95,7 102,1 95,3 90,9 96,3 97,2 89,8 
1978 .:.,: 94,3 95,8 95,7 101,7 96,1 89,1 95,5 98,7 92,5 
1979 . ,\; 97,2 97,4 95,5 106,5 96,5 86,6 96,4 97,8 98,4 
1980 \1.(r 94,3 94,8 93,2 111,0 94,0 77,5 93,9 90,3 103,5 
1981 .. .,\ 90,3 91,6 89,5 108,3 89,4 71,6 90,1 91,3 103,6 
-
1982 : 88,0 88,1 105,6 71,0 : 105,5 
1973/1982 -1,3 -1,2 -1,4 0,4 -1,4 -4,0 -1,2 -1,6 0,3 
1983 87,6 87,6 111,0 75,0 ;1,:. 
1984 84,1 88,7 116,9 79,7 
1985 ·• ,(j 86,4 89,2 122,4 81,5 . ·t· 
1982/1985 -0,6 0,4 5,0 4,7 
Strong demand 
1972 ,• (·1_! 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 109,4 104,4 104,8 107,5 109,1 110,0 106,5 107,2 106,1 
1974 112,4 111,6 107,5 110,3 120,3 110,9 111,6 99,9 97,6 
1975 ~ ' ; ' j j. __ ; 93,3 98,6 100,1 96,3 94,2 100,9 99,1 90,I 83,8 
1976 :.·;: 99,9 105,5 103,1 103,6 105,0 102,4 104.7 95,0 98,3 
1977 100,8 108,3 105,0 102,7 101,2 102,5 106,1 98,5 107,7 
1978 105,3 104,4 105,5 106,4 103,9 102,7 105,5 101,3 123,1 
1979 . _- ! I ;. F 108,9 105,3 105,6· 112,0 107,5 101,3 106,9 102,3 131,5 
1980 ' ,. 101,6 101,5 98,9 118,8 102,4 93,5 103,2 97,8 150,0 
1981 -":-,.· .. 98,4 100,3 96,1 117,2 95,5 88,0 100,6 98,6 162,6 
1982 : 96,5 93,8 120,9 : 88,3 : 176,2 
1973/1982 -0,6 -0,4 -0,8 1,5 -0,7 -1,9 -0,2 -0,7 5,7 
Moderate demand 
1972 ,,_,:-..1! l ) . ~ ; 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 !:_ I 101,6 101,l 100,4 106,9 106,6 105,0 102,9 108,0 103,3 
1974 itl' 99,6 96,1 96,5 107,9 104,9 102,1 99,7 98,6 94,4 
1975 ,. I 93,6 91,l 93,2 95,5 99,2 93,6 93,4 90,3 85,9 
1976 95,4 98,4 95,0 103,5 101,3 92,3 97,4 96,0 89,8 
1977 iii 94,2 96,3 94,4 103,2 98,8 91,8 96,3 98,8 91,8 
1978 93,2 96,I 93,5 104,2 98,2 90,0 95,7 98,6 88,4 
1979 . ' 95,4 98,3 93,5 106,3 98,0 87,4 96,3 96,0 92,8 
1980 90,3 95,l 91,4 109,7 95,7 81,0 93,6 86,9 94,6 
1981 87,0 92,5 87,6 106,8 92,3 74,6 89,9 85,1 92,4 
1982 89,2 86,5 102,0 73.0 90,2 
1973/1982 -1,6 -1,1 -1.6 0,1 -1,2 -3.6 -1,2 -2,3 -1,2 
Weak demand 
1972 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 
-,\''' 104,9 98,3 98,7 104,5 101,4 104,4 100,9 107,1 100.5 
1974 
. \,\• 102,2 93,3 96,6 106,0 98,9 94,8 97,3 100,1 86,2 
1975 86,3 88,4 87,4 90,3 84,8 84,3 87,5 85,4 75,5 
1976 93,2 88,9 89,4 101,0 87,7 83,8 90,5 90,8 79,7 
1977 90,2 90,4 89,4 101,4 86,7 82,8 90,6 92,4 79.1 
1978 88,8 89,2 88,6 97.8 88,0 80,3 89,0 95,5 80,3 
1979 91,2 90,2 87.2 104,4 86.4 78,7 90,0 96.1 86,1 
1980 92.2 89,l 87.3 109,4 85,2 64,6 88,3 88.7 86,8 
1981 86.7 83,1 82,7 105.6 80,4 60,5 83,5 93,7 82,1 
1982 79,6 81.7 101,4 : 60,2 : 80,8 
1973/1982 - 1.7 -2,2 -2.1 0.1 -2.4 -5.7 -1,9 -1.6 -2,3 
( I) Avcra,c annual growth rate (1972, Hl/l 1981-82); 1982/1985; 
(1972,73)1(1980.SI): B. NL. F.UR 6. USA 
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Table 22 
Capital labour ratio, index: 1972 = I 00 
B D t· NL UK EUR6 USA JAP 
Total industry 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 104,3 103,5 103,8 102,9 106,3 102,4 103,4 97,8 106,4 
1974 109,3 109,6 108,3 105,5 111,4 104,9 107,6 101,6 118,0 
1975 122,3 118,8 116,3 109,7 119,9 113,8 115,7 115,3 134,7 
1976 132,6 124,8 122,2 112,4 129,0 120,7 121,6 114,7 140,8 
1977 141,6 128,4 127,2 115,1 136,8 122,7 125,2 114.4 147,2 
1978 150,1 131,7 133,3 118,6 144,8 126,7 129,6 113,9 154,5 
1979 156,7 134,2 139,6 120,4 150,4 131,7 133,6 115,2 160,0 
1980 163,2 137,1 146,0 122,1 156,I 138,3 138,0 123,4 165,6 
1981 175,6 144,1 155,4 125,9 164,1 155,9 147,4 125,9 173,2 
1982 152,0 161,3 129,7 166,5 183,7 
1973/1982 6,5 4,3 5,0 2,6 5,6 5,3 4,3 2,9 6,3 
1983 160,4 169,1 135,0 175,7 
1984 162,9 177,7 141,4 179,5 
1985 163,1 185,7 144,0 181,9 
1982/1985 2,4 4,8 3,6 3,0 
Strong demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 · 101,7 101,2 102,1 102,2 105,5 101,4 101,8 95,3 103,8 
1974 102,3 104,1 105,3 101.7 106,7 100,6 103,2 97,2 112,0 
1975 112,2 115,0 113.0 106,3 112,2 109,9 112,0 111,1 132,0 
1976 124,8 123,3 119,1 110,5 121,4 117,9 119,5 113,1 136,9 
1977 136,7 127,4 124,5 115,8 129,5 118,9 123,8 113,3 143,7 
1978 144,0 132,1 131,5 120,6 137,9 122,4 128,9 112,5 151,7 
1979 148,9 135,7 139,1 123,9 142,4 127,1 133,4 112,4 155,8 
1980 155,0 139,2 147,6 126,2 144,8 132,4 138.0 117,8 152,5 
1981 163,0 146,3 158,1 133,9 148,7 146.4 147,3 122,7 157,2 
1982 155,9 165,8 139,9 155,9 168,4 
1973/1982 5,9 4,6 5,4 3,4 4,6 4,6 4,4 2,6 5,3 
Moderate demand 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 104,0 103,5 103,3 100,9 104,6 102,5 103.0 97,4 108,4 
1974 112,3 109,1 108,4 101.8 109,6 104.4 106,8 101.3 120,7 
1975 123,1 116,9 116,9 105.4 117,7 111,7 114,2 113,0 135,7 
1976 130,1 120,9 122,5 106,9 126,1 117,1 118,8 112,6 141,6 
1977 135,3 124,3 127,8 108.8 132.4 119.8 122,3 111,6 147,0 
1978 141,3 127,6 133,8 111.3 139,3 122,6 126,1 111,3 155,7 
1979 146,9 129,8 141,0 112.3 144,7 128,1 130,3 112.4 163,9 
1980 153,7 132,9 148,2 113,9 152,6 133,7 134,9 121,2 175.5 
1981 164,4 139,2 157,9 117,7 161,0 148,3 144,0 126,5 185,7 
1982 145,5 164,6 123,0 158,5 198,6 
1973/1982 5,7 3,8 5,3 2,0 5,5 4,7 4,1 2,9 7,0 
Weak demand 
1972 100,0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 105,5 104.8 104,9 104.4 108.4 102,8 104.5 99.4 106,2 
1974 110,0 113,2 109,3 108,9 115,7 107,9 110,2 104,3 118,8 
1975 125,4 122,8 116,9 113,3 126,5 118,6 118,5 119,7 135,3 
1976 136,6 129,3 122,8 115,9 135,7 126,6 124.4 116,9 142,2 
1977 146,5 132.8 127.4 118,2 144,4 128.5 127,7 116.9 149,5 
1978 157,6 135,2 133,1 121.4 152.7 134,2 132,0 116.1 155,3 
1979 165,8 137,1 137,9 123,3 159,7 138.8 135,3 118,2 159,1 
1980 172,3 139,2 142,3 124,9 164,9 147,6 139,1 127.1 164.I 
1981 185,2 146,7 150,6 127,5 176,0 172.2 148.5 123,4 170,7 
1982 : 157,0 154,8 129,5 184,5 178,7 
1973/1982 7,2 4,5 4,5 2,6 6,3 6.5 4.4 2.9 6.0 
(I) Average annual growth rate ( 1972-73)/11981-82); 1982;1985 
(1972-73)/(1980-81): B. NL. EUR 6. USA 
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Remarks on the tables 
BDS: 
Volimex: 
Table 1 
Sectoral data bank of the Commission of the European Communities. 
External trade data bank of the Commission of the European Communities. 
Definition: Domestic demand: production - total exports + total imports. Domestic demand in 
volume terms is obtained by deflating the relevant current price figure in national 
currency, by the implicit value-added price index, at market prices. 
Sources: BDS for production data, Yolimex for exports and imports. 
Table 2 
Definition: (Production - total exports) / (Domestic demand) at current prices. in national 
currencies. 
Sources: See Table I. 
Tables 3 and 4 
Definition: (Total imports and extra-Community imports)/ (Domestic demand) at current prices. 
in national currencies. 
Sources: See Table I. 
Table 5 
Definition: Total exports / Production, at current prices, in national currencies. 
Sources: See Table I. 
Table 6 
Definition: (Total exports)/ (Total exports of all OECD countries) at current prices, in USD. 
Source: Volimex. 
Table 7 
Definition: (Exports to the Community) / (Total exports to the Community from all OECD 
countries), at current prices in USD. 
Source: Yolimex. 
Table 8 
Definition: (Total exports) / (Total imports) at current prices. in USD. 
Source: Yolimex. 
Tables 9 to 23 
Source: BDS. 
Table 12 
Def111itio11: (Value-added at market prices. at 1975 prices)/ (Total employment). 
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Table 14 
Definition: Compensation of employees per head, deflated by the implicit price index of value-
added. 
Table 15 
Definition: The figures in Table 14 divided by the corresponding figures in Table 12: (Compen-
sation of employees per head in real terms)/ (Real value-added per head). 
Table 16 
",. Definition: The wage and salary share at current prices (the share of the compensation of 
Table 17 
employees in gross value-added at factor cost) has been corrected by an estimate of 
the earnings of the self-employed, based on the average earnings recorded for each 
activity branch. For the United States and Japan, the denominator is gross value-
added at market prices, at current prices. 
Definition: (Gross fixed capital formation) / (Gross value-added at market prices, at current 
prices). 
Tablel8 
£UR 5: 
Table 20 
Grouping formed of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, for which data on investment by activity branch, at 1975 prices, 
are available. 
Definition: Gross operating surplus / Gross capital stock at replacement cost. For the USA and 
Japan, the gross operating surplus is at market prices, at current prices. 
Table 21 
Definition: (Gross value-added at market prices, al' 1975 prices)/ (Gross capital stock at 1975 
prices). 
Table 22 
Defi11itio11: (Gross capital stock at 1975 prices)/ (Total employment) . 
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